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CONTENTS

Conciliation and Deterrence: A Comparison of Political Strategies in the Interwar and Postwar Periods — *Evan Luard* 167

A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change — *C. S. Whitaker, Jr.* 190

The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies: 1950-1965 — *Soon Sung Cho* 218

RESEARCH NOTE

On the Comparative Study of Communism — *Robert C. Tucker* 242

REVIEW ARTICLES

The Possibilities for Diplomacy in Southeast Asia — *John T. McAlister, Jr.* 258

Old Dragons in New Models — *Davis B. Bobrow* 306

The South and Foreign Affairs: The Hope for Subcultures — *J. Allen Smith* 320

The Contributors ii

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CONCILIATION AND DETERRENCE

A Comparison of Political Strategies in the Interwar and Postwar Periods

By EVAN LUARD

THE period since the end of the Second World War has now exceeded in length the period between the two World Wars. The time has thus perhaps come when it is possible to attempt an overall comparison of the two periods, of the types of threat to stability that arose in each, and of the differing strategies adopted to meet these.

The interwar period is associated in the popular mind with the attempt to pursue peace through a policy of "appeasement." This is the term traditionally used, primarily by hostile critics, and principally after the event, to describe the policy aimed to conciliate, rather than to coerce, those powers dissatisfied with the existing status quo. The policies so described, as is now generally recognized, were adopted by most of the governments concerned not primarily through crass refusal to face the facts of the situation or to summon the resolution necessary for active resistance. They were chosen as a result of a clear awareness of the grievances that moved the dissatisfied powers and from a deep conviction that peace could be preserved only if there were a genuine readiness to explore all possible means to redress these grievances. Governments recognized that the attempt to maintain an unchanging status quo in a changing political environment must inevitably be self-defeating and might only aggravate the risk of conflict through the premature adoption of unyielding and inflexible postures. It was generally felt that it was always possible to make adjustments in the existing international order, as had been done on a massive scale only a few years earlier at Versailles, to remove resentments and legitimate grievances and so to establish the type of international order within which peace could be permanently maintained. The policies chosen reflected the sentiment that wars were the result of the destabilizing influence of unsatisfactory settlements rather than of the deliberate decisions of evil-minded governments.

The postwar period is associated in the minds of many with the doctrine of deterrence. This is the term used to describe policies aimed at the prevention of war by the mobilization of a sufficient degree of armed strength to inflict unacceptable damage on any enemy who might wish to disturb the existing order. It is often believed that the

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avoidance of major war during the period has been the effect of the caution enforced on both sides through a mutual fear, imposed in its extreme form by the existence of nuclear weapons. Policies have been devised to ensure above all the credibility of this deterrent power at various levels of intensity to match varying types of threat, and so to ensure the acceptance of the status quo by all parties. Such policies reflect a belief that any demands for change in the existing order represent a threat to be resisted rather than a claim to be heard, and that acceptance of such demands would only encourage still further demands and still further disturbance of the order. This belief in turn reflects an assumption that the existing order represents a norm, the only legitimate order, and that modifications of it cannot be tolerated without risk of further conflict and the erosion of stability.

In neither period has the dominant policy been adopted to the total exclusion of the other. It would be as misleading to suggest that Britain and France sought, between 1935 and 1939, to confront Hitler with soft words and sweet reason alone as to suggest that the United States and its allies in the postwar world have sought to meet the Soviet Union and China exclusively with armed strength and a total refusal to consider any unrequited political concession. But in each case the strategies employed have been sufficiently consistent to make it worthwhile to attempt comparisons of the motives, and the success, of the dominant policy in each period.

Let us consider, first, what were the main *reasons* for the totally different types of strategy adopted in the two periods.

At first sight the entire structure of relationships is so totally different in the two eras that it might be thought that no useful comparison could be made at all. First, the interwar situation, with five or six major powers and many smaller ones operating largely independently and almost without formal military alliances, is replaced after 1945 by a world, apparently bipolar in structure, at least at first, with two superpowers occupying positions of dominance such as no nation had achieved before and beginning to act as a polarizing force for many of the lesser powers of the world. Next, a world scene still largely dominated by the affairs of Europe, with a total international community of less than fifty, nearly half European, is replaced by one in which a cohort of new nations, including awakening giants such as China and India, pull the center of gravity altogether away from Europe. There is the change in military technology, from the relatively primitive era of tanks and aircraft and battleships to a

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totally new world of electronics, guided weapons, and, in the ultimate resort, nuclear warheads—a change having the vital consequence that military power becomes increasingly a function of economic and technical progress, so that a widening gap in economic development is reflected in a widening gap in military power. There is the huge change in the field of communications, shrinking the distance between nations by four or five times, bringing incomparably greater knowledge and concern over the affairs of other countries, together with increasing interest in political developments elsewhere. To understand the overwhelming effect of this change it is only necessary to compare reaction to events in Korea in 1950, universally recognized as an inherent part of a single world struggle, to the sleepy response in the thirties to Japanese incursions in Manchuria and China, generally regarded as remote and unimportant distractions from the serious matters being confronted in Europe, or to compare the time required for the Lytton Commission to travel to Manchuria and report to the League (nearly a year) with that required for the Security Council to meet (and for U.S. troops to be dispatched) over Korea in 1950.

Yet important though all these changes are, probably more important in determining the different policies undertaken are three others. First, there is the differing conception of the causes of the great conflict immediately preceding. At the close of the First World War, there were long and impassioned arguments about the responsibility for the struggle just concluded. On one point, however, there was a measure of agreement. It was generally felt that the war need not have occurred at all. It was to a large extent a mistake—whether in the form of Austrian miscalculation of Russian response or German misunderstanding of British, premature mobilization by Russia or tardy mobilization by Britain. In any case it could have been avoided by better communication, further negotiation, less precipitancy. War in general occurred over "disputes," which, if only the proper procedures for "arbitration" or "conciliation" were put into effect, could be eliminated altogether, just as the squabbles of citizens can be prevented by legal remedies from breaking out in fisticuffs. Political policies of conciliation, as in "appeasement," only reproduced in a different form the legal procedures of conciliation on which so much reliance came to be placed.

After the Second World War, conceptions of the cause of the conflict were totally different. It was universally accepted that the cause was not insufficient conciliation and negotiation but too much;

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not precipitancy but pusillanimity; not not talking enough, but talking too much when only hard steel could really have talked to any effect. Thus in the succeeding period the aim was not to devise better procedures for conciliation or to examine the causes of disputes and suggest compromise solutions. It was to establish such a degree of armed power that adversaries in any dispute would have no alternative but to accept the existing situation.

The second difference between the two periods has perhaps been even more profound in its effects on policy. This difference concerns the nature of the settlement arrived at after the preceding conflict. The terms imposed at Versailles, though they were the result of prolonged discussion and negotiation and were incorporated in a formal treaty, were never fully and firmly believed in, even by many of the victors. There is a paradox in the fact that the terms imposed on Germany in 1918-1919 were incomparably harsher than those imposed in 1945, despite the fact that Germany's responsibility for causing the First World War was far more questionable. The reason is clear: the greater intensity and losses of the first war for the Western powers aroused greater desire for revenge, while after the second war increasing division among the allies and the determination of each main faction to build up its own half of Germany against the other promoted clemency to the defeated. But what is significant is not the justice in absolute terms of either settlement. It is that in the earlier period justice was doubted, and continued to be doubted, not only by Germany herself but by many all over Europe for twenty years. The justice of the 1945 settlement (and the fact that no treaty was arrived at does not materially alter the situation) has never been very seriously called into question by either of the main factions on the international scene—nor even with any great persistence by the defeated powers themselves.

Moreover, the Versailles settlement, though incorporated in a treaty as that of 1945 was not (in the German case), nonetheless seemed from the start more provisional. Some of its stipulations were quite quickly abandoned. The reparations terms were revised and revised again. The clauses committing the victors to disarmament were never fulfilled. The provisions for demilitarization of the Rhineland and those forbidding an *Anschluss* between Germany and Austria were felt discriminatory and unfair by many from the start and, largely for this reason, were not enforced when ultimately challenged. Even over frontiers adjustments were always held possible: not only Hitler but also Stresemann and other "good Germans" perpetually

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raised the demand for a revision of the Polish Corridor and other frontiers without awakening the shocked sentiments analogous claims from the same quarter arouse today.

The idea of deliberately rewriting the map at convenience, in the interests of justice and self-determination, had been established and sanctified only a few years earlier. The entire map of Europe had been remade in the peace treaty itself, and there seemed little reason why further adjustments should not be made in the future. Hitler's demands on Austria and Czechoslovakia were only for the application on a more consistent basis of the principle of self-determination so fervently proclaimed everywhere in 1918. As the British repeatedly pointed out to the Czechs in 1938, even if Britain were to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia and finally defeat Germany, it was unlikely that in any final settlement the Sudetenland would again be awarded to Czechoslovakia. In the postwar world, however, the idea of adjustments of boundaries became taboo. West Germany's refusal to acknowledge the Oder-Neisse frontier was widely regarded as unrealistic and even provocative. In the prewar world change itself was sometimes regarded as a stabilizing influence. In the postwar world the assumption was the reverse.

A third and almost equally important difference concerns the nature of alliances. In the interwar period, partly as a result of the temporary withdrawal of the two postwar giants, the system remained essentially a balance-of-power system, with six or seven independent powers of the first rank and a large number of lesser powers maneuvering and negotiating to a large extent independently. There were no large and stable groupings of nations comparable to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Where alliances existed at all, they were mainly bilateral (like the French treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland, the many Russian treaties, or the later British guarantees to Poland and Rumania) and for limited purposes (like Locarno and the Little Entente). Moreover, the structure of alliances shifted radically during the course of the twenty years, according to the vagaries of policy of individual governments. So long as national self-interest kept revisionists and antirevisionists aligned against each other, some kind of balance existed. But when ideological and other factors emerged to disturb these groupings, a highly unstable and uncertain pattern emerged in its place. Italy, Poland, and the Soviet Union, by undertaking new alliances with one of the major powers, could radically alter the existing balance of power and so radically affect the chances of war's occurring.

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In the postwar world, the structure of alliances in Europe has scarcely changed throughout the period. Virtually every nation of the Continent has been firmly committed to complementary alliances of almost unchanging membership, each balancing the other. Only today, after twenty years, as the cold war unfreezes, is that pattern beginning to break up. While the East European countries demand a greater degree of independence in the East, France demands greater national independence in the West, and Europe as a whole comes to expect a greater authority in relation to the United States. The ebbing of the cold war uncovers some traces of the prewar pattern, previously submerged. France and Germany once again compete for friendship and favors in East Europe. West Germany, by demanding a return to the 1937 frontiers and the legality of Munich, extends revisionist claims on both Poland and Czechoslovakia, just as she did against the same countries thirty years ago. Rumania, in suppressing its Hungarian minority's ethnic identity and looking to an alliance with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, begins to revive the interwar hostility between Rumania and Hungary. The United States once again begins to feel more concerned with the Far East than with Europe. But these remain only embryonic movements, scarcely discernible. For the most part, the two alliances have confronted each other from cohesive and consistent camps. This has, on the one hand, encouraged in each alliance attitudes of common purpose and common hostility toward the other. On the other hand, there has not been the need for that careful maneuvering and bargaining by each individual power which the shifting patterns of the prewar world made necessary.

At the same time, the rapid shrinking of the world over the past twenty-five years has had a vital effect on the pattern of alliances and their results. In 1920, and again in 1938, Britain felt unable to guarantee Germany's eastern frontiers because of her own inability to mobilize the armed strength to defend them when necessary. In 1949 she did so without hesitation. Czechoslovakia seemed to Britain in 1938 a small and faraway country, not only physically but in terms of Britain's own security interests and moral concern. Even Korea was nearer after the war. Between the wars, it was still possible for the United States to feel Europe so far away that its struggles and disputes did not affect her. In the postwar period Europe has become vital to her own defense. Today nations have a clear and unmistakable interest in the security of other nations even on the furthest side of the globe. Peace is far more indivisible even than in the days of Mr. Litvinov.

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Each of these factors has had a vital influence on the strategies followed in the two periods. First, the belief after 1918 that the previous conflict might have been avoided if there had been more willingness to listen, more time for contacts and negotiations before irreversible positions were taken up, was reflected in the policies of that time. It can be seen in the elaborate provisions of the Covenant for negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, and other devices, intended partly as time-consuming procedures that might allow passions to subside. It can be seen equally in the ban on all warlike measures for three months after the League Council had pronounced on a question. There was a widespread feeling that in times of tension there was need for a cooling down of tempers, not a hotting up of defensive action, a need to stop mobilization and rearmament rather than the reverse. Thus it was inevitable that, in the tensions and crises of that era, it should be felt that the most dangerous mistake was that of precipitating a crisis by overhasty opposition or by refusing to meet and discuss, like reasonable beings, the problems that arose.

In the postwar world, the contrary assumption that war had resulted not from excessive firmness and haste to arm but from weakness and reluctance to arm meant that the first duty of all at the first sign of crisis is to demonstrate firmness, to mobilize force to resist, to be able to negotiate from a position of strength. Needless concessions might be a sign of weakness, an encouragement to salami tactics and further demands. While between the wars the demands made by Germany (for rearmament, for the Rhineland, for the Sudetenland) were seriously pondered and argued on their merits, in the postwar world comparable demands by opponents have been resisted precisely because they were raised by the other side. Similarly, the speedy reaction, far from being damped down, has had to be accelerated to the highest pitch. Aircraft must be kept flying day and night ready for an immediate rejoinder, troops and tanks must be sent to Berlin at the first sign of tension, threats of rocket retaliation must be uttered by the Soviet Union at the first hint of crisis almost anywhere in the world. A willingness to demonstrate strength at the first sign of disagreement is the logical corollary of an international strategy based on deterrence.

Secondly, the widespread lack of faith in the justice of the status quo in the interwar world inevitably reduced the chance of any firm policy of deterrence. A deterrent policy is dependent on faith in the virtue and permanence of the status quo that is being defended—or at the very least on a belief in stability for its own sake. In the interwar

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world neither of these two existed. Because the majority in Britain, and many in other parts of Europe and in the U.S., felt that there was some substance in German complaints not only about reparations, disarmament, the Saar, and the Rhineland but perhaps about Austria and the Sudetenland—even in certain quarters about the Polish Corridor—their governments met such complaints with attempts at an adjustment rather than with a gathering of strength to resist any change. There was a general attempt to discover procedures for "peaceful change" rather than to preserve indefinitely the existing settlements.

Similarly there was little feeling that stability, or the preservation of the status quo, was something desirable for its own sake. During the second half of the nineteenth century there had been perpetual adjustments of the international order, not only through war but through the mechanism of the conference system or through treaties. By these means, the dissolution of the Turkish and Austrian empires had been to a large extent carried through peacefully. At Versailles an even more spectacular transformation had been accomplished. But many still felt that that settlement fell short of perfection and that it had been too much influenced by the partisan passions prevailing at the end of the war. Thus one of the major obstacles to a policy of conciliation at other times, belief in stability for its own sake, now exerted little effect.

In the postwar world the prior value of maintaining the status quo, especially as frontiers are concerned, has been widely accepted. Even the new states, aware of the threat to stability that might come from challenges to the status quo, have affirmed (for example, in the Charter of the OAU) the sanctity of frontiers inherited from the past, despite their manifest irrationality (or perhaps because of it). The two superpowers, each a victor nation enjoying a position of considerable dominance, have been still less inclined to disrupt the existing order. While in the interwar period the revisionist powers included one of the world's most powerful nations, and so an important threat to peace, in the postwar period the two most powerful states have been relatively satisfied, at least in a territorial sense. Even at times of crisis, neither has challenged acknowledged boundary lines: the United States held patience over Hungary, and the Soviet Union over Berlin and even, in a sense, over Cuba. The only fully revisionist powers, in a *territorial* sense, have been nations such as Indonesia and Pakistan who were not in a position to threaten the order in a very serious sense. Thus stability has been maintained. But thus, too, all the most important issues in dispute—Berlin, Germany, Formosa, the off-

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shore islands—have remained in dispute even twenty years after the end of the war. There have been no "betrayals." But there have been no settlements either.

Next, the fact that there existed no stable alliances diminished the feasibility of any consistent policy of deterrence in the interwar era. France's policy was to a large extent designed to establish just such a structure of alliances as would be necessary for deterrence. But the reluctance of the British and the Americans to enter into commitments of the kind that France demanded, and the ultimate disintegration of the Little Entente, prevented her achieving this purpose. The sudden shifts in alliance of countries like Poland and Italy, and, eventually, the Soviet Union, made it impossible to create any coalition of such stability as might have deterred Hitler effectively. Even when powers were nominally allies, in effect arms and military plans remained wholly in national hands. A considerable degree of commitment was thought to have been made by the offer of "military talks," lasting two or three days, between a few staff officers. In the postwar world, alliances have come to mean the total integration of military plans, supreme command, military staffs, targeting, and strategic policies, even to some extent supply and procurement. Alliances thus stand ready poised to respond with the might of their joint forces at a moment's notice. The community of interest within the two halves of Europe, and the genuine fear of aggressive intention have been sufficient to create homogeneous and alert military blocs. While these are to some extent the *effect* of policies of deterrence, they are also necessary conditions without which such policies could never have been put into effect.

Finally, the relative greatness of distance in the interwar period meant that it was considerably more difficult even for an alliance, let alone for individual powers, to mobilize the strength necessary to exert any significant deterrent effect. One needs only to compare the time and preparation required to transport the British Expeditionary Force to France in 1939 with the ability of the United States, in the Big Lift, to fly two divisions to Germany within a day or two in order to recognize the effect of distance on political strategy. It was evident, for example, to all in 1938 and 1939 (though often forgotten since) that Britain and France, however resolute their policies, could not prevent Czechoslovakia or Poland from being conquered if Hitler chose that course: all they could do was to hope eventually to recover them from their conquerors. This fact inevitably encouraged a readiness to conciliate, a reluctance to "provoke" unnecessarily, rather than an effort to deter. Physically it is easier to make the threat of deterrence convincing

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if one can resist an initial attack rather than reverse a defeat already inflicted. Psychologically, too, it is easier to sacrifice a distant acquaintance (as was Czechoslovakia to Britain in 1938) than a close friend (as West Berlin, actually visited by very many British tourists, might seem today). Here again, therefore, the conditions of deterrence have been far more propitious in the postwar world. When military power can be brought to bear on the enemy within a few hours, when "massive retaliation" or "unacceptable damage" can be inflicted at a moment's notice, deterrence can be made effective. But when the threat takes the form of months of military preparation, cumbrous movements of troops, many costly campaigns in distant countries, deterrence appears both less deterrent to the deterred and a less attractive alternative to the deterrer.

If these then have been the historic causes of the totally different political strategies of the two eras, how far have the strategies been justified and rational in the circumstances in which they were adopted?

A deterrent policy is always more rational when a primary objective is the maintenance of the status quo. Force is more easily employed to prevent change than to impose it. This was basically the situation after the Second World War. Though there was talk of "liberation" of East Europe, or revolution in capitalist countries, it was never very seriously believed. When forcible intervention by the major powers has occurred—by the Soviet Union in Hungary, by the United States in Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic, by Britain and France in the Suez Canal, by China in Korea—it has normally been to *maintain* or *restore* the status quo, not to subvert it. Conversely, a conciliatory policy may be irrational in these circumstances, because it may serve to encourage and foster further demands for change. Between the wars this is precisely what occurred. But then the prevention of all change was not regarded as an essential objective. In these circumstances, a policy of conciliation, to explore those adjustments that would establish the most stable order, was rational.

But the relative benefits of a conciliatory or deterrent policy depend not only on how far the existing order is felt to be inherently just or at least inherently stable. They depend also on the assumed motivation of the other actors involved. If it is felt (as was widely believed between the wars) that particular nations will be pacified by certain limited concessions—that appeasement will appease—conciliation may be a justified policy. This may be so even if another power (such as Czechoslovakia) is asked to make a sacrifice (and the suggestion that Sudeten

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Germans, after less than twenty years of Czech rule, should once again be ruled by Germans, though possibly unjust to "Czechoslovakia" was not necessarily unjust to the majority of those most closely affected). The rationality of the course thus depended not on subjective conceptions of "justice" but on the consequences for future German policy. If it had created a more stable order in Europe, it would not necessarily have been an unreasonable price to pay. It became unjust because it failed in this purpose, because the motives attributed to Hitler by Chamberlain and others were very different from his real ones. The concessions made, implicitly or explicitly, over disarmament, the Rhineland, Austria, and the Sudetenland, could be justified on purely rational grounds (for example, on the principle of equality between states or of self-determination); but they undoubtedly served to whet Hitler's appetite for still further gains elsewhere. There was therefore a choice to be made between satisfying justified old demands and awakening unjustified new ones. A conciliatory policy depends on the willingness or capacity of antagonists to be conciliated.

If we believe antagonists to be permanently and unrepentantly aggressive, a purely deterrent policy becomes the rational one: in this case, conciliation is not merely unwise but positively dangerous. On the one hand, it encourages the demand for further concessions. On the other, it strengthens the potential opponent who should above all be weakened. This has been the assumption of most dealings between Western and Communist powers in the postwar period. Assertions by the opponent that it believed in either the "ultimate victory" of communism or the "rolling back" of Russia might give rational grounds for a deterrent policy if those terms are assumed to describe a military victory. If they are not, the assumption by each side that the opponent will never be appeased could be as misplaced as the converse belief was between the wars. To show stubborn unyieldingness to an opponent who possesses a real sense of grievance over specific issues may be as dangerous as to make concessions to an opponent whose ambitions are endless.

But there is another judgment about the mentality of an opponent which is equally relevant in determining whether a conciliatory or a deterrent policy is rational. This is the consideration of whether an opponent can be depended on to react rationally or otherwise. A deterrent policy depends absolutely on the assumption that the antagonist is capable of a sober calculation of his own interest, of the effect, that is, of the deterrent power employed against him. If this assumption cannot be made, it may still be more rational to be conciliatory. If, for

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example, you are locked up in a small room with a raving madman, it may be wiser to seek to appease than to threaten. This was, in a sense, the position of the British government in its dealings with Hitler before the war. It is often said in criticism of British governments at this time that they treated Hitler as if they were dealing with a rational man (who could be conciliated) when it should have been manifest to them they were dealing with a madman (who could not). But the conclusion should have been the opposite. It was precisely because they were dealing with a madman that the British government often felt obliged to be conciliatory. There is no more striking difference between the international atmosphere of the interwar world and the postwar than the widespread assumption in the former that war might be declared at the slightest pretext. British Foreign Office documents already published reveal how often the British government believed (often wrongly) that Germany was about to declare war on such and such an issue. Over and over again they were terrified of adopting a stronger line for fear, in their own words, of "provoking" Hitler. This was not an irrational fear. It was the less irrational the more irrational Hitler himself appeared to be. If the madman you face is not only insane but homicidal, it is neither stupid nor cowardly to refrain from provoking him.

In the postwar world this situation has not existed. There have at certain times been fears of war. Stalin's Russia was felt to be ruthless, even "aggressive." But it was never assumed that Stalin was irrational, or even imprudent. It was always felt that he and his successors could judge accurately their nation's interests. There have been few moments when reasonable men have felt war was imminent. Even China, though regarded as wild by those who know only her words, has been recognized as cautious and prudent by those who have studied her deeds.

The assumption of dealing with reasonable men who can calculate their own interests rationally is thus easier to make when dealing with hardheaded Russian chess players, or even calculating Chinese mandarins, than it could be with a paranoid fanatic like Hitler. Postwar deterrent policies have involved the premise that the Russian leaders not only are able fully to understand the type of damage that United States rockets could inflict on Russian cities but know the type of situation in which this might take place and the kind of behavior that must therefore be avoided. Contemporary strategic doctrine and game theory attribute to those against whom strategy is directed the same wholly rational mentality as is possessed by those who devised the strategy. This assumption is not necessarily always justified. The fact

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that Russian leaders appear to play rationally does not mean that they always play the same game, still less that Nasser or Sukarno will. The fact that governments behave rationally in most circumstances does not mean that they will in all. An assumption of total rationality may be as misleading and as dangerous as an assumption of complete irresponsibility.

The relative value of a deterrent or a conciliatory policy will be affected not only by the degree of rationality attributed to an antagonist but in general by his apparent readiness to risk war. Even wholly rational leaders may in certain circumstances be ready to run the risk of war—if, for example, they believe they will still be able to draw back at the last moment, or if they remain confident of being able to limit the scale of the conflict or of being ultimately victorious in any type of war. It was perhaps considerations of this kind that motivated Mr. Dulles' famous remark about the brink of war. In these circumstances leaders will always have a bargaining advantage over any opponent less confident on any of these points. The latter, the prudent, will undergo the same disadvantage that the prudent suffer in the game of "chicken"; however confident they are of their own skill, they may prefer not to trust the skill of others.

In the interwar period, however, prudence was not equally distributed. Reluctance to contemplate another world war, induced by nightmarish recollections of the hideous conflict of 1914-1918, crucially influenced the conduct of the Western governments in their dealings with Germany. Whether Hitler was regarded as crazed or imprudent, it was unmistakable that he was more ready to contemplate war than were any in the West, and more lightheaded about the consequences. In this situation, Western statesmen were bound to act with some care. Unwillingness to undertake the responsibility for precipitating another great conflict, which is everywhere evident in records of government deliberations of the period, should perhaps be regarded as a sign of a proper sense of responsibility rather than of craven irresponsibility. The object, as the record makes clear, was not to avoid war at any price but to undertake it only for a cause that was really worth the price, the hideously high price, involved. Many in the West felt at the time of Munich not so much that it would be foolish to go to war for a small and faraway country but that history would not forgive them for going to war to deny to the people of the Sudetenland the right to self-determination that had been so recently accorded to others. Sir Neville Henderson even argued the same over Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Men were concerned, far more than in the postwar world, with the

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issues themselves, rather than simply with whether each meant a "gain" or "loss" to a potential enemy. The very fact that your enemy might precipitate war at any moment made it the more important to ensure that this should occur only for an issue of the weightiest importance.

When it is a relatively safe assumption that your opponent does not want war, it is easier to take a bolder course. This has normally been the situation in the postwar world. Consequently, it might be a sensible and well-considered course, at a time of crisis over Berlin, to send troops and tanks down the corridor to demonstrate your strength of purpose. Such a course might reasonably be assumed more likely to stop a war than to start one. It is usually assumed that the reason for the general presumption of unwillingness to risk large-scale war in the postwar world has been the presence of nuclear weapons. But it may be doubted how far this is true. The period when the Soviet Union showed the greatest recklessness in its external policies was in the late forties and fifties. Yet this is precisely the period when she alone ran the risk of nuclear conflict. By the end of the fifties and in the early sixties, the risk that a conventional conflict would lead to nuclear war was probably little greater than that a conventional war in the interwar period would have led to the use of gas or germs. If there was less risk of war it was rather because frontiers were more firmly established and more widely accepted, because the major powers were all relatively satisfied with the status quo, and because even large-scale conventional war was a price few were ready to pay for highly speculative gains. But in either case an assumption of unwillingness to risk war was a relatively safe one.

There is one further condition for the effectiveness of a deterrent policy that may be mentioned. This is the assurance of a certain unity of will among all the opponents currently being deterred. A show of force that deters one power may have no influence at all on another, or may even provoke it to dangerous courses: for instance, there is no use using deterrence against North Vietnam and China over Vietnam unless you are sure that the Vietcong are effectively under the control of North Vietnam or China. It is true that something of the same difficulty may face a policy of conciliation: what conciliates one power may not conciliate its ally. But where there is a real political problem in need of solution, a concession that satisfies one is more likely to satisfy all than a show of force against one is to intimidate all.

Deterrence is also difficult to use in any civil war or guerrilla situation because of the simple difficulty of applying it. A threat that might be influential against a government may be far less so against a scattered fighting force. Threats to bomb large cities or industrial centers will be

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useless against an enemy that has none of these things. The difficulty of achieving any clear-cut victory over such forces may make a political settlement all the more necessary. Similarly, where great powers as today pursue expansionist aims by supporting civil war or revolution elsewhere rather than by aggression, deterrent policies may be difficult to apply effectively. Here, therefore, there may be stronger arguments than in other cases in favor of an element of conciliation, or at least of political forms of deterrence, within the policies adopted.

We have examined, first, the reasons for the adoption primarily of policies of conciliation in the interwar years and of policies of deterrence in the postwar world; and we have considered the factors that in general determine the relevance and effectiveness of the two kinds of policy. Can we next reach any conclusions about the relative success of the two kinds of policy in these periods?

The first, and most obvious conclusion might appear that policies of conciliation have proved less effective than policies of deterrence because the first were succeeded by a major war while the second were not, or at least have not been so far. But this is to be guilty of the fallacy of *post hoc, propter hoc* in its most elementary form. The fact that policies of "appeasement" were succeeded by war in 1939 does not prove that war occurred *because* of the policies of appeasement. The fact that appeasement failed does not prove that other policies would have succeeded. They might have only assured that war came six months or a year earlier than in fact it did. Similarly the fact that there has been no major war in the twenty years since the Second World War does not prove that peace is a direct result of the adoption of deterrent policies. It may be that there would also have been no major war if an entirely different type of policy had been followed. The lack of a major war may be rather because those who have claims against the status quo are not powerful enough to disturb it effectively, or because the cost is now higher than ever. Or the absence of a major war in Europe may have been achieved only through the substitution of many smaller wars in other parts of the world where the great powers have fought out their own battles at much smaller risk to themselves.

Does this mean that it makes little difference what type of policy is pursued, conciliatory or deterrent, that the advent of war in fact depends on factors that are wholly independent of policy: the presence or absence of major grievances among important powers, the way in which particular crises are handled, the types of government in power,

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the balance of political and economic strength between states or alliances, or yet other factors? How can one assess the relative value of the two types of policy if not by their effect in preventing major war?

One way in which this assessment might be made is by attempting to reconstruct what the course of events might have been if a different type of policy had been pursued. Suppose, for example, that Britain had joined France in an attempt to hold Germany, by force if necessary, strictly to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty in the first ten or fifteen years after the First World War—in other words, that a deterrent policy had then been pursued. We cannot be certain what the result would have been. But it certainly seems likely that this would have precipitated the emergence of an even more intense nationalism in Germany and perhaps brought Hitler, or a comparable right-wing nationalist leader, to power even earlier than occurred. Unless Britain and France had been prepared to occupy Germany in strength, it seems unlikely that German rearmament could have been prevented. Unless they had been ready to occupy the Rhineland by force, its repossession could scarcely have been avoided (though it might have been made a *casus belli*). Unless they had been ready to prevent the *Anschluss* by force by occupying Austria first, that union could not well have been prevented. And even if such actions had been politically conceivable at the time—which they were not, certainly, in Britain—they would have aroused such a widespread hostility elsewhere in Europe and the United States that they might have stimulated, rather than deterred, German ambitions. This is an expression of the fact, relevant again today, that the limit of the deterrence that is practically possible is set by the limit of the deterrence that appears reasonable to reasonable men elsewhere.

After 1938, as German claims extended, it might have been easier to enforce an effective deterrent policy, especially if common cause with the Soviet Union or the United States could have been achieved. But it is by no means sure that this could have prevented the outbreak of war. If Hitler was prepared to risk almost certain war for the sake of seizing Poland in 1939, would he not have been ready to do the same for the sake of seizing Czechoslovakia in 1938? If he was ready to add the Soviet Union to his existing enemies in 1941, might he not have dared confront the same combination in 1939? The insane and aggressive ambitions of Hitler, which are so often used to show the futility of a policy of appeasement, prove equally clearly the difficulty in similar circumstances of bringing to bear a policy of deterrence.

The same procedure of reconstruction may be attempted with regard to the postwar world. If Stalin had been met with policies of concilia-

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tion rather than with military strength in the years after the war, what would have been the effect? This was in fact, to a large extent, the policy pursued by Truman and Byrnes during 1945 and the early part of 1946: U.S. military strength was largely abandoned and every possible effort was made to conciliate Soviet apprehensions. But it is doubtful if there was any significant difference between Stalin's policies at this period and at the height of the cold war five years later, when a United States policy of total deterrence had been substituted. If NATO had not been created, or West Germany not rearmed, it is possible that the Soviet Union would have sought to exploit her superior conventional power to win advantages for herself, for example, in Greece, Yugoslavia, Finland, or even Austria. It is equally possible that a relaxation would have taken place in East Europe earlier than in fact occurred. The difference between the postwar and the interwar periods is that after the war the former response was regarded as the certain effect of conciliatory policies, while before it was felt as only a possibility. When the risk of a violent response is thought to be great, deterrent policies will always be chosen because the disadvantage of military defeat will always loom larger than that of losing the opportunity of an accommodation.

Another way of making a comparison is by contrasting the periods *within* the interwar and postwar eras in which mainly conciliatory, and mainly deterrent, policies were followed, and noting the effects of each. In respect of the interwar period, it could be argued that the times of maximum deterrence were the periods 1918-1924 (with the treaty provisions on reparations, war guilt, disarmament, and other matters, as well as with French attempts to encircle Germany with allies, and French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr); 1930-1934 (with Allied refusal to countenance German-Austrian customs union, failure to revise the disarmament clauses binding Germany, the attempt to mobilize Italy within an anti-German coalition, and the effort of the Soviet Union to invite herself into that coalition); and 1939 (with the British guarantees to Poland, Greece, and Rumania, rearmament in Britain and France, and half-hearted attempts to join the Soviet Union in that alliance). Periods of conciliation were between 1924 and 1930 (with the Dawes and Young plans, Locarno, the Kellogg Pact, negotiations on disarmament, and more moderate governments in France); and 1935-1938 (with the acceptance of German rearmament, the Rhineland occupation, the *Anschluss*, and finally Munich, and repeated efforts on the part of Western governments to reach a final settlement with Hitler).

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If one compares these phases, one cannot say that in their effect on German policy, or on the general stability of Europe, there was any very marked difference between them. As one would expect, the deterrent periods tended to provoke German nationalism and efforts to restore the balance, such as the Rapallo Treaty, secret rearmament, and increasing opposition to the reparations and war-guilt clauses between 1918 and 1924; the walkout from the disarmament conference and the subsequent decision to rearm, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, and the general acceptance of the Hitler regime between 1931 and 1935; and the final decision to make Poland the pretext for a general European war in 1939. The effect of the periods of conciliation was sometimes to bring temporary improvements in relations and general mood. Between 1925 and 1931, Germany became a member of the League, resumed normal relations with France and other countries, signed the Kellogg Pact and other international agreements. But resentment at the reparations, disarmament, and war-guilt clauses was not diminished, and the resurgence of nationalism, stimulated by the Depression, continued unchanged. Between 1935 and 1939, far from being appeased, these nationalist sentiments became still further inflamed, the appetite growing with what it fed on. Yet certain accommodations were reached in these periods which, in other circumstances, might have done something to resolve the tensions and make more possible some kind of lasting settlement.

In the postwar period a similar analysis may be made. The periods of high tension, in which exclusively deterrent policies were followed, have been 1946-1951 (with the crises over Germany, Czechoslovakia, Berlin, East Europe, and other areas, the establishment of the Atlantic Pact, and the Korean War); 1952-1954 (with continued disagreement over Germany, plans for German rearmament, and the European Defense Community); 1956-1958 (with crises in the Middle East and Hungary, the continued development of atomic weapons on both sides in Europe, the offshore islands crisis, and the Soviet ultimatum over Berlin); 1960-1962 (the U-2 incident and the breakdown of the summit conference, continued crisis over Berlin, conventional rearmament on both sides, disputes over the Congo and the UN, and the Cuba missile crisis); and 1964 onward (Vietnam). The periods of more conciliatory policies on both sides have been 1951-1952 (with Soviet proposals for a cease-fire in Korea and for reunification and disarmament of Germany); 1954-1955 (with the 1954 Geneva Conference, settlement of the Trieste dispute and the Austrian peace treaty, and the 1955 Geneva summit conference); 1959 (with Mr. Nixon's visit to Moscow, Camp

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David, the Antarctic agreement, the first Soviet attempts to restrain China); 1963 (with the resolution of the Cuba crisis, U.S. withdrawal of intermediate missiles from Turkey and Italy, and the test-ban and hot-line treaties). Here again, the main difference between the two types of period is in mood rather than in specific achievements. There has certainly been a secular movement of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States between 1950 and 1965 which is only marginally interrupted by the variations just noted. But again it remains true that it has only been in the periods of low tension that specific agreements, whether on political matters or on disarmament, have been attained. The agreements on Korea and Indochina, on Trieste and Austria, the first cultural exchange agreements, disarmament of the Antarctic and the first moratorium on tests, the test-ban treaty and the agreement banning weapons on outer space—these all date from the periods of low tension.

At first sight this analysis might suggest that there is no great difference in effect whether a policy aimed mainly at conciliation or one aimed mainly at deterrence is followed. This is not necessarily so. For while claims against the status quo may be equally, or more, important in determining the danger of war, the policies followed may also have a contributing influence. A policy of deterrence may make less likely the final disaster of large-scale war. But it may do so only at the expense of closing the door to lasting understanding and so maintain the *need* for deterrence. A conciliatory policy may, in the right circumstances, increase the chance of accommodations and finally alter the entire context in which relations are conducted. But under the wrong circumstances—for example, where motives are misjudged (as between the wars)—it may lead to disaster. Which type of policy is in fact conducted, however, seems normally to be determined not so much by careful analysis of the circumstances and likely effects as by the mood of the moment and general assumptions inherited from the past.

Perhaps the most important conclusion from this survey is not related to the comparative effects of the two types of policy. What it suggests is the importance of the proportions in which they are combined. The record demonstrates that neither a policy of conciliation nor one of deterrence can ever be successful if conducted in isolation from the other. A. J. P. Taylor, in his book *The Origins of the Second World War*, suggests that either policies of deterrence *or* policies of conciliation might have succeeded in preventing war in that period if they had been consistently followed. My own view is exactly the opposite. It is unlikely that either policy will ever succeed by itself. The fault of

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the British and other governments before the second war was not that they attempted to pursue conciliation in their dealings with Germany. Other policies, as we have seen, might have brought war more quickly and more certainly: a consistent policy of deterrence, a policy designed to maintain the Versailles settlement unimpaired, could never have succeeded so long as the most powerful nation in Europe harbored resentment against it and so long as many in Europe were convinced that that resentment was justified. The fault was that the British and others attempted conciliation without a sufficient reserve of deterrence as an inducement against alternative courses.

Conceivably, it is true, no degree of armed strength on their part could have convinced Hitler that they really meant business or could have deterred him from war even if he thought they did so mean. A decision for war, as we have seen, is not necessarily rational. On the other hand, a policy of meeting those German demands that were reasonable—a revision of the disarmament clauses, a reassessment of war guilt, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, self-determination for Austria and possibly even for the Sudetenland—combined with a total refusal to make any other concessions, if backed by a clear demonstration of adequate military strength in concert with the Soviet Union and any other powers ready to join, might have provided some hope for a peaceful outcome. Conciliation unbacked by strength was certain to fail. While Britain began to rearm lackadaisically in 1935, and seriously in 1938, in other respects her policies were not such as to inspire conviction that she was ever likely to make use of the arms acquired.

The same lesson may be applicable in a reverse sense in the postwar period. Even if the Soviet Union and China have never harbored aggressive ambitions comparable to Hitler's (as have often been attributed to them), deterrence may have been necessary to guard against the *risk* of aggressive action. But here, too, a policy of deterrence, unaccompanied by any attempt at conciliation over outstanding issues, dooms itself to ineffectiveness. It may have prevented the outbreak of a major conflagration for the moment. But this may be only at the expense of exacerbating relations in the interim, and leaving beneath the surface many tensions and instabilities that both might prevent a stable settlement in the immediate future and might still erupt in disaster over the longer term. Many of the most acute and important issues—Germany, Berlin, Formosa, the offshore islands—these and others remain explosive charges which, if only the appropriate fuse were to be lighted, might set the world ablaze once more. To establish a more stable international environment, there may be need for talk as well

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as tanks, debate and deliberation as well as determination and deterrence.

This need is especially relevant in relation to recent policies toward China. China is today perhaps the only large and powerful, and yet dissatisfied, power such as Germany represented in the interwar years. While it is true that her dissatisfaction is not mainly territorial, it still may be dangerous to world peace. A policy of yielding to every demand she makes would be as ineffective and as dangerous now as it was to Germany then. But, conversely, an attempt at simple deterrence or containment, unaccompanied by any attempt at contact or conciliation, may fail even in its own objectives. United States U-2's over Chinese territory, United States submarines in the surrounding oceans, and United States bases in Korea, Okinawa, and Japan may deter China from irresponsible actions. But they may also provoke yet deeper hostility, increase support for her government at home and sympathy for it abroad. In this way deterrent policy may deter from accommodation as much as from aggression.

Once again the crucial criterion in testing the relevance of a policy adopted is the motivation assumed in the adversary. If, for example, one assumes an incorrigibly aggressive intention on China's part whatever policy toward her is adopted, a policy of pure deterrence may not be irrational. If, however, a study of Chinese policies were to suggest that external aggression is not an essential Chinese aim, this might cease to be so. Certainly Chinese behavior in Laos, Hong Kong, and Macao, even in Vietnam, suggests that China is in many ways cautious in her external policies (especially when compared with the freedom of action demanded by the Soviet Union and the United States in areas adjacent to their borders). There exists a very wide gap between Chinese words and Chinese deeds. A policy of fomenting revolution elsewhere may require a totally different response from one directed at aggression. If this is so, a policy of pure deterrence may be as ill-conceived in this case as a policy of pure conciliation was between the wars. In certain circumstances deterrence, by preventing the transition from open hostility to mutual toleration, and so increasing the believed *necessity* for deterrence, may represent a form of self-fulfilling prophecy, condemning both parties to a permanently congealed attitude of mutual threat. Just as the policy of deterrence in Europe in the late forties and fifties may have served to make the East European countries more dependent on the Soviet Union and have intensified anti-Western sentiment there, so a similar policy in the Far East may encourage China in her deep-rooted hostility. In both

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cases, as in the 1920's, the essentially negative aims of "containment" may need to be accompanied by a positive effort to devise (for example, in the divisions of spheres of influence or noninfluence) the basis of a mutually acceptable order.

A comparison of the interwar and postwar periods, therefore, suggests that neither deterrence nor conciliation alone will ever be enough. If one assumes that nations, like individuals, are partly rational and partly emotional, partly capable of judging their interests soberly and partly liable to violent reaction to any believed threat to security or pride, one might indeed expect a need for policies designed to appeal to both parts of their mentality. There is need, on the one hand, for such a degree of armed strength as may induce a realistic assessment of the consequences of arbitrary action. But there is also need for genuine attempts to confront the basic issues in dispute, so that resentment at unconsidered grievances is allayed and, in the best eventuality, the basic cause of dispute may then be solved.

In the interwar period, as we have seen, a number of factors favoring a policy of conciliation were present. The inability to bring deterrent power immediately to bear, even if it had been present, the lack of faith in the justice or stability of the existing settlement, the lack of conviction in the rationality of the opponent, the greater readiness to risk war, all of these represented good grounds for choosing a conciliatory policy. On the other hand, the belief that the opponent was not fundamentally aggressive and could be appeased by concessions, the belief that reasonable settlements could be reached by reasonable discussions, these were falsified by events and therefore represented faulty apprehensions of the true state of affairs. It was these additional factors which indicated that, whatever arguments in favor of being ready to talk with Hitler may have existed, there was need in addition for some ultimate source of strength, both as an inducement in the negotiations themselves and as a safeguard in the event of failure.

In the postwar world, there have been a number of factors that have made deterrent policies more likely to succeed than before. The capacity to bring strength immediately to bear even on distant powers, the general acceptance of the status quo, the apparent rationality of opponents, the reluctance to contemplate large-scale war, the bipolar nature of the confrontation, all of these have made policies of deterrence more feasible. On the other hand, the lack of clear ground rules for peaceful coexistence, the prevalence of guerrilla war and civil

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war situations, the gradual disintegration of the bipolar blocs, the readiness of a few powers to risk war on a limited scale, all these have told against the efficacy of exclusively deterrent policies. They suggest that, in certain situations at least, conciliation as well might be necessary.

Such an analysis seems to bring out the point that no international environment will be such as to demand exclusively policies of deterrence or exclusively policies of conciliation. Some factors will usually favor one type of policy and others another. The best adjusted policy may need to draw on both options together.

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A DYSRHYTHMIC PROCESS OF POLITICAL CHANGE

By C. S. WHITAKER, JR.*

I

WITH several notable and recent exceptions, the current literature on "modernization" in "developing countries" implicitly or explicitly assumes an inherent irreconcilability between "modern" and "traditional" values, institutions, and behavior patterns. Related to this assumption is the expectation that whenever important elements of these two social systems collide, the natural result is social convulsion.

It is typical of this literature to qualify these assumptions with the caveat, commonly employed in conjunction with the use of "ideal types," that differences between these two apparent classes of society are only relative, or that "pure" cases of either type are never manifested. Logically, however, these caveats do not contradict the assumption of a mutual exclusivity of these systems, nor can those who employ them reasonably intend that they should.[1] Thus, even those scholars who insist on a "qualified" dichotomous relationship of these systems tend to believe nonetheless that virtually the only alternatives facing people significantly exposed to modernity are atavistic withdrawal or a prolonged period of severe strain, instability, and conflict.

* A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Princeton University Conference, "The Politics and Economics of the Emerging Nations," under the chairmanship of Sir Arthur Lewis, February 10-11, 1966.

[1] It is obvious that modifiers which indicate relative contrasts of the so-called mini-max variety must imply mutual exclusivity no less than absolute differences. Thus, if the proposition is that a given social quality necessarily conflicts with another to any degree, then maximization of both qualities in the same context is precluded. To that extent, in other words, they are mutually exclusive. Statements in connection with the use of the supposedly heuristic concepts "traditional" and "modern" typically suggest that "most people" in the one type of society behave one way with respect to certain values or activities, or that each type of society behaves as a whole in a certain way in "most instances." Indeed to claim that qualities associated with the terms "traditional" and "modern" do not diverge significantly would be to nullify the supposed significance of the terms, namely, that they identify distinguishable classes of societies.

Concerning the logical status of the Weberian "ideal-type" formulations and similar constructs, the philosopher of science C. G. Hempel demonstrated some time ago that any distinction between this sort of mental operation and a hypothesis in the strict sense is simply spurious. See American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division), *Science, Language and Human Rights; Symposium: Problems of Concept and Theory Formulation in the Social Sciences* (Philadelphia 1952), 71-134.

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My study of Northern Nigeria's encounter with modernity and findings of some others elsewhere lead me to reject dichotomous conceptualizations of the nature and process of change in the so-called developing areas, at least as universally valid. Indeed, this rejection extends to the very terms "modern" and "traditional" as analytic tools.

To discuss this position fully is beyond the feasible confines of an article: my intention is to do so in a larger work. Here it must suffice merely to suggest that a full critique entails examination of (1) the comparability of Western and non-Western contexts of change, (2) the logical cogency of the premise of dichotomy, (3) the adequacy of the typology of societies associated with this premise, and (4) the predictive/explanatory value of this premise with respect to specific problems and conditions of change. The object of this article is more limited, but highly relevant to these matters. Before discussing it, however, perhaps a few more comments about the wider context are in order.

As others have noted, today's scholars of "modernization" are intellectual heirs of the most noted students of sociopolitical change in Western societies. Maine, Morgan, Weber, Tonnies, and Durkheim advanced parallel concepts of observable contrasts between historic periods—status and contract, *societas* and *civitas*, traditional and rational authority, *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* relations, mechanical and organic solidarity. Indeed, our present conceptual understanding of sociopolitical change in general very largely *is* the work of these men, each of whom arrived at his concepts in an attempt to identify principles or norms of institutions and behavior implicit in change.

Whatever the merits of this exercise, which is not without possible controversy, in the hands of students of contemporary change in non-Western societies it has become something profoundly if subtly different. The original concepts represent abstractions derived from retrospective analysis of Western experience in terms of certain overt antagonisms of cognition, sentiment, and value, which may be shown to have accompanied sociopolitical change in the West. From an apparent soundness of these concepts in that context, today's student of "modernization" has inferred what in effect is a hypothesis about how non-Western people generally will react to the kind of institutions yielded by change in the West. This hypothesis in essence is that ultimately all non-Western peoples will either accept or reject these institutions, more or less wholesale. (This hypothesis may be called,

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from the point of view of the non-Western indigenous institutions, the displacement/rejection alternative.)

To reject this hypothesis is to discard the notion of "modernization." To do so in light of its pervasive influence and deep intellectual roots must at first appear foolhardy; certainly to dismiss it simply on grounds of cultural relativism seems lame and unpersuasive. To challenge the concept at the roots, however, seems to me essential if social scientists are to come to grips with important realities in at least parts of the non-Western world.

In this article, the object is to present a critique of only one of several assumptions entailed in conceptualizing the encounter of "modernity" and "traditionality" in terms of (allegedly) mutually exclusive social qualities (e.g., universalism versus particularism, achievement versus ascription, specificity versus diffuseness, and so on). For this purpose, the Northern Nigerian experience provides relevant empirical material.

Stated succinctly, the proposition to be examined here is that the process of sociopolitical change in contemporary developing societies is necessarily eurhythmic. The term "eurhythmic" is advanced because it encompasses variable connotations of several other terms more commonly used to characterize a supposed relation of various constituents in a process of change, namely, "interdependent," "complementary," "harmonious," "syndromatic," and so on. At least two such distinguishable meanings are germane to our discussion: (1) Significant change in one sphere of activity (e.g., economy) occasions corresponding and supportive change in another sphere (e.g., polity, or cult). (2) Within a given sphere of social activity, significant change in any one aspect of the activity (e.g., normative, psychological, institutional, structural) promotes consistent change in all or most other aspects.[2] The universality or necessity of a eurhythmic relation of elements in change, in either or both of the above senses, is the specific claim that this article challenges.

[2] It is important to note that the terms "eurhythmic" and "dysrhythmic" are not synonymous with "smooth" and "rough," or "peaceful" and "violent." In the present discussion, "eurhythmic" (consistent and supportive) change means *further change toward the characteristics of the society from which the original change derived.* Conceivably, both eurhythmic and dysrhythmic processes could be either smooth or rough, peaceful or violent. However, if a eurhythmic process involves the interaction of mutually exclusive qualities, then rough or violent change seems indicated. Thus it is that a combination of dichotomous and eurhythmic conceptualizations of phenomena of change have typically produced pathological characterizations of a supposed "transitional" or intermediate phase. Use of the very term "transitional" as a general category connotes unilinear direction, i.e., from one known type or class of society to another already defined one.

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Before I present an account of the substance and dynamics of certain changes in Northern Nigeria which seem to disconfirm the hypothesis of eurhythmy, two assertions implied in the preceding paragraphs should be elaborated and underscored. The first is that belief in the mutual exclusivity of "modern" and "traditional" patterns is encouraged by assuming a necessary eurhythmic process; the second is that both ideas are widely held among students of contemporary social and political change in "developing countries." A third pertinent preliminary step will be to indicate some of the arguments commonly advanced in support of the view that a eurhythmic pattern of change is necessary. I shall also want to draw attention to the views of those alluded to above as "notable exceptions," whose ranks have increased significantly of late.

II

Scant reflection is needed to see the link between the two ideas. If a certain change is incapable of being isolated, contained, or counteracted as between different spheres and aspects of action, the impact of this change on the encountering society must be either transformative or abortive. To hold, in other words, that novelty is indivisible or that an innovation inevitably produces a chain reaction of mutually reinforcing consequences is to rule out the possibility of equivocal results. Innovations that come only in an "explosive package" cannot form stable mixtures or viable combinations with important elements of the encountering society. That such mixtures or equivocations are impossible is clearly the implication of postulating irreconcilability between "modernity" and "traditionality."

To speak in logical terms, eurhythmic process constitutes *a necessary condition* of irreconcilability. Eurhythmic process is *not*, however, a *sufficient* condition of irreconcilability (since, for example, change might proceed eurhythmically in an encountering society that previously contained a perfect correlative of an innovation). It follows that those who hold with dichotomous analysis are committed, willy-nilly, to the postulate of eurhythmy and that those who reject the first position must abandon the second. But the converse is not necessarily true.

III

As to my second assertion, just a partial listing of the relevant scholars indicates the currency and persuasiveness of the conceptual apparatus in question: Parsons, Levy, Hagen, Sutton, Shils, Redfield,

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Riggs, Millikan and Blackmer, Sinai, the Etzionis, and (despite recent appearances to the contrary) Apter—and even this partial listing is deliberately focused only on those whose work consciously extends beyond the context of a particular case. (The number of empirical cases treated from this perspective in different branches of the social sciences is simply too prodigious to attempt their inclusion. This list also leaves aside many instances in which dichotomous formulations of change have been accepted as a feature of the analysis of problems that are related to but distinguishable from the study of change as such, e.g., much of the current literature on political integration. It also excludes certain theorists whose commitment to dichotomous schemata is less explicit and overt and therefore too hard to pin down within the limits of this article.)

Although the dichotomous analytical framework of the contemporary social scientists mentioned above is sufficiently known to make extensive elaboration of that point unnecessary here, their related attachment to the eurhythmic hypothesis does warrant special attention. Here, too, I have selected as representatives of the position only those who have most clearly articulated it. And in this company, Marion J. Levy, Jr., is conspicuous.

In a paper published in 1952 discussing what he entitled "The Vulnerability of the Structures of Relatively Non-industrialized Societies to Those of Industrialized Societies,"[3] Levy, taking for granted the validity of the mutual exclusivity idea (which he regarded as "too obvious to require elaboration") and acknowledging that his discussion is based on Parsons' pattern-variable formulation, asserts

> . . . an apparent tendency of those patterns to become generalized widely through a social system if that system is to maintain its adjustment to its setting. The allocation of goods and services is only analytically separable from the allocation of power and responsibility. Highly universalistic relations in the economic aspects of action are functionally incompatible with highly particularistic ones in the political (i.e., allocation of power and responsibility) aspects of action (p. 123).

> The introduction of new patterns from one relatively non-industrialized society to another can frequently be absorbed with relatively slight changes . . . [but] the highly industrialized patterns break this mold and as a minimum afford an alternative economic

[3] In Bert F. Hoselitz, ed., *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas* (Chicago 1952), 113-25.

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base for deviance not otherwise provided. In case after case the initial patterns of family organization, of production units, and of authority and responsibility have broken down (p. 124).

The net balance of subversiveness would seem to be a function of the motivation or pressures to attempt new patterns. . . . The processes [of change in the direction of highly industrialized patterns] . . . once started . . . may create stresses and strains that motivate further abandonments of the old, if only because of presentation of a functioning alternative to serve as a standard (p. 125).

Study of the prospects for long-run stability of highly industrialized systems of economic allocation combined with highly authoritarian systems of political allocation turns up extremely interesting hypotheses. They are hypotheses that, if tenable, are extremely pessimistic for long-run stability of such systems . . . (p. 123, n. 7).

In a much more recent article, Levy has reiterated the eurhythmic hypothesis underlying these paragraphs in terms that are, if anything, more explicit and, for the present purposes, most appropriate:

We are confronted—whether for good or for bad—with a universal social solvent. The patterns of the relatively modernized societies, once developed, have shown a universal tendency to penetrate any social context whose participants have come in contact with them. From many points of view it makes little difference whether these patterns penetrate at least partially by the will and preference of relatively nonmodernized peoples or whether they have the patterns thrust upon them. The patterns always penetrate; *once the penetration has begun, the previous indigenous patterns always change; and they always change in the direction of some of the patterns of the relatively modernized society.*[4]

Of particular interest in this last quotation is the deliberate dismissal (in the third sentence) of any reason to distinguish fundamentally between the historic experiences of the Western cases and those of non-Western countries currently being exposed to patterns predeveloped, as it were, in the West. In other words, one is en-

[4] "Patterns (Structures) of Modernization and Political Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 358 (March 1965), 29-40. The quotation is from p. 30; the emphasis is mine. Levy's views are most recently elaborated in his *Modernization and the Structure of Societies,* 2 vols. (Princeton 1966).

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couraged to disbelieve that there are any significantly different results that follow from exogenously as against endogenously induced change.[5]

It is well to reiterate that Levy has been singled out here only because he states systematically and unequivocally what many others vaguely imply. Thus, in the pertinent literature are to be readily found looser expressions, the eurhythmic purport of which is tantamount to that of the statements by Levy cited above:

"The process of modernization is a seamless web, and the strands that compose it can be analytically separated only with some loss of realism" (Millikan and Blackmer).[6] And more explicitly, ". . . In the countries in which the transition to economic growth has occurred it has been concomitant with far-reaching change in political organization, social structure, and attitudes toward life. The relationship is so striking and so universal that to assume that one of these aspects of basic social change is unrelated to the others is to strain the doctrine of coincidence beyond all warrant" (Hagen).[7] Riggs, endorsing Toynbee, strikes a similar note: "Toynbee asserts that elements in his spectrum are interdependent, despite their seeming autonomy, so that a borrower finds he cannot limit his borrowing to one element, but must go on to borrow more: 'one thing follows another.' This tends to confirm our hypothesis about the functional interdependence of institutions in our models, and the tension or disequilibrium in transitional settings where dysfunctional elements have been introduced from external sources. . . . It is only after they have borrowed the innovations that they discover they have opened their doors to a modern 'Trojan horse.'"[8]

In his more recent reformulations, Riggs develops the same theme in the context of legal and juridical innovations said to be brought by industrialization: ". . . The introduction of contract procedures and safeguards begins to transform the whole social and economic structure, all the way from the nature of the marriage vows to the emergence of associations and the reorganization of the bureaucracy."[9] Summarizing the contributions of twelve different authors on the

[5] Cf. Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven and London 1957), 420-21; and Eric Hoffer, *The Ordeal of Change* (New York 1964), 25-26.

[6] Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer, *The Emerging Nations* (Boston 1961), 44.

[7] Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood 1962), 26.

[8] Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria," in W. J. Siffin, ed., *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Bloomington 1957), 103-4.

[9] *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston 1964), 47.

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general topic "Processes of Change: Initiation, Diffusion, Termination," the Etzionis point out in the concluding section of their volume on social change that "underlying the analysis of most processes described in this section is the assumption that the various parts of any social system are interdependent, so that changes in one sector will be followed by strains which necessitate adjustive changes in other sectors if the social system is to maintain its viability."[10]

At the risk of tedium, it would be easy to go on culling comparable statements, varying in degree of explicitness, from other contributions to the literature; but I trust that those quoted serve adequately to indicate the currency and prevalence of the proposition under examination here.

Having deliberately lifted these statements from what are for the most part very carefully developed schemes of analysis so as to make the issues starkly clear, it is only proper for me to dispel any suggestion of unsubtleness on the part of the authors concerned. One frequently made point, for example, is the likely occurrence of a time lag in change as between different spheres or aspects of action. Since not every conceivable action or behavioral pattern is regarded as germane (though there is disagreement on what is or is not germane, e.g., cult), room is usually left for residual spheres that may be unaffected by otherwise transformative change. However, these and other exigencies are viewed precisely as complicating or limiting the scope of the eurhythmic process, not as invalidating the basic proposition. It should also be noted in this connection that the idea of inevitability of change is not *necessarily* or properly involved here; rather the crux of the argument is that *when and if* some significant element of modern Western society starts to penetrate or sustain itself in one major context of a society it always thereafter spreads, eurhythmically, to the others. Thus, some but not all of those writers cited explicitly allow for the possibility of an arrestation of change (as a whole) or for its complete reversal. Finally, it is most important to observe that while most of the scholars mentioned focus primarily on one sector or aspect of society, each nevertheless acknowledges, and some emphasize, that transformative change may also originate in any of the other sectors.

IV

Several factors are frequently cited as contributing to the necessity of a eurhythmic process of change, though these are formulated with

[10] Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni, *Social Change* (New York 1964), 403.

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varying clarity and precision in the different works of the literature concerned. (But significantly, the idea is hardly developed at all in cases where eurhythmic process is in effect deduced from the dichotomous premise.) At least four such factors or considerations may be extrapolated and summarized, in no particular rank order of incidence or salience, as follows:

1. *Psychological.* People who acquire fundamentally new habits, attitudes, or values in one major field of social activity find it necessary or desirable to conduct themselves according to the same or similar principles of behavior in the other fields.

2. *(Dys)functional.* Retention of fundamentally different cognitive and/or normative standards in different major fields of social activity would undermine the coherence of judgment and response necessary to the viability of the society as a unit.

3. *Institutional.* All the various institutions of any society are so mutually interdependent or interlocking that change is *perforce* cumulative and self-reinforcing. (This might be characterized as the "domino theory" applied to sociopolitical change.)

4. *Structural.* Significant change in one sphere of society always produces or supports persons having vested interests in that change who see to it that the change is secured through the dissemination of its spirit to every other relevant social sphere. Such persons also see to it that their ranks are elevated and swelled at the expense of persons with rival vested interests in the old order. New functions require new roles and new role occupants.

As the main object of this article is a disconfirming juxtaposition of empirical data derived from a single case with a universal claim, these propositions are suitably dealt with here in light of the relevant facts of the case. Thus, no additional effort will be made to consider as such their *internal* adequacy, except to suggest in passing that careful reflection on them individually or severally raises questions of tautological inference and necessary connection, as well as questions of sufficiency of empirical evidence. It is also very important to note that a common assumption that appears to underlie all these propositions is that in every society basic normative consensus is imperative.

V

Signs have recently appeared of a trend away from the dichotomous doctrines of "modernization" analysis. Those who have, for varying reasons (and with varying emphasis and cogency) expressed dissatisfaction include Bendix, Black, Deutsch, Eisenstadt, Hoselitz,

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LaPalombara, Moore, Pye, Sanger, and Ward and Rustow. Others have come to *ad hoc* conclusions that are implicitly congenial to nondichotomous premises without formulating them as such, e.g., Levine, Friedland, and LeVine, all of whom, significantly, have been primarily concerned with African materials.[11] Of particular interest as an example in a non-African context is Lockwood's carefully unsanguine discussion of the relationship of democratic development and industrialization in the historic Japanese experience.[12] A limited selection of a few of the more explicit general statements made in recent works will again be sufficient for our purposes here:

> No society is wholly modern; all represent a mixture of modern and traditional elements. It has often been thought these elements stood in basic opposition to each other, and that there was implicit in the social process some force which would ultimately lead to the purgation of traditional "survivals," leaving as a residue the purely "modern" society. The preceding chapters amply document the falsity of such a thesis, at least where Japan is concerned, showing that the role of traditional attitudes and institutions in the modernization process has often been symbiotic rather than antagonistic. . . . We can, therefore, identify a quality of "reinforcing dualism" within at least some modernizing experiences (Ward and Rustow).[13]

> What we are suggesting is that such distinctions as ascription-achievement or consanguine-conjugal, although usually depicted as mutually exclusive alternatives useful for characterizing differences between societies or groups, are more accurately viewed as conflicting principles always present (Moore).[14]

> A third objection to the use of "modern" or "modernity" when dealing with problems of political systems is that the terms tend to suggest a single, final state of affairs—a deterministic, unilinear theory of political evolution. . . . The very words "modern" or

[11] Donald N. Levine, "Ethiopia: Identity, Authority, and Realism," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton 1965), esp. 270-71. Levine's full-scale treatment of Ethiopia is *Wax and Gold* (Chicago 1965). William H. Friedland, "Some Sources of Traditionalism Among Modern African Elites," reprinted in William H. Hanna, ed., *Independent Black Africa: The Politics of Freedom* (Chicago 1964), 363-69. Robert A. LeVine, "Political Socialization and Culture Change," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (Glencoe 1963), 280-303.

[12] William W. Lockwood, "Economic and Political Modernization: Japan," in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton 1964), 117-45.

[13] Pp. 444-45.

[14] Wilbert E. Moore, *Social Change* (Englewood Cliffs 1963), 67.

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> "modernity" imply a social Darwinian model of political development. They suggest that change is inevitable, that it proceeds in clearly identifiable stages, that subsequent evolutionary stages are necessarily more complex than those which preceded them, and that later stages are better than their antecedents. What we need at this time are genuinely open models of political change that will permit us to identify the various ways in which many variables that bear on change are interrelated. . . . Systems may remain in a given stage for exceedingly long periods, and *when change does occur it may not necessarily represent a step forward.* Concern with the nature of change rather than with definition is likely to permit the development of a science of comparative politics (LaPalombara).[15]

It may be noted that a common element in these statements is the separation of economic and political definitions of modernity, a separation that would be consistent with dysrhythmic premises.

However, as might be expected in light of the depth, tenacity, and august auspices of the received concepts, the break with them has so far been halting, sketchy, and in some instances ambivalent. An example of the last difficulty is Pye, who having explicitly dissociated himself from the dichotomous analytic tradition then proceeds in its characteristic spirit to treat the case of his "transitional" Burmese bureaucrats strictly in pathological terms.[16] Furthermore, he more recently has flatly restated the eurhythmic notion, while also suggesting, curiously, the displacement/rejection choice anew.[17] Another example of less than complete liberation is Ward and Rustow's summary discussion (quoted from above) of the Japanese and Turkish experiences, which surely suggests abandonment of the term and concept of modernization in favor of the far more open-minded idea of political change. Yet unlike LaPalombara they fail to make explicit this logical implication and indeed retain the old usage and, one suspects, to a certain degree at least the definitional concept. More disappointing, this still-fledgling revolt has yet to produce anything like

[15] Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), 38-39, emphasis mine.

[16] Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (New Haven and London 1962).

[17] "The Concept of Political Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 358 (March 1965), 1-13. Pye states, "The politics of historic empires, of tribe and ethnic community, or of colony must give way to the politics necessary to produce an effective nation-state which can operate successfully in a system of other nation-states" (p. 7). "Although to a limited extent the political sphere may be autonomous from the rest of society, for sustained political development to take place it can only be within the context of a multidimensional process of social change in which no segment or dimension of the society can long lag behind" (p. 11).

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a comprehensive and systematic examination of the issues inherent in the old tradition. Nor, to my knowledge, has an attempt been made to state explicitly and to sustain nondichotomous premises by a detailed analysis of any single empirical case, apart, if it may be demurred, from the present writer's as yet unpublished study.[18]

Most important in terms of this particular article, the theoretical role of the eurhythmic process in dichotomous schemes of analysis of change is rarely identified or appreciated. The one possible exception that I know of is Wilbert E. Moore, whose conclusions on the general subject of "modernization" at times seem close to my own. Moore certainly seems to be questioning the eurhythmic idea in asking whether "standard components of cultures and societies" may sometimes be autonomous. If a condition of relative autonomy is possible, he asserts, then "change might occur without a kind of 'systemic resistance' deriving from interlocking patterns." He adds, interestingly, that "although this line of speculation runs contrary to the major current theoretical positions in anthropology and sociology, which emphasize and possibly exaggerate systemic relations, it is consistent with rather impressive historical experience."[19]

Most serious of all, there remains a paucity of comparably developed alternative models, much less new propositions concerning specific conditions and consequences of different patterns of change. This objection should not be interpreted as a call for any immediate grand new theoretical "breakthrough" in this respect, however, for if the "modernization" model is as faulty as I believe it to be, the remedy probably lies partly in a far more substantial empirical grounding (including, especially, political history) for less grandiose generalizations about change, and this development obviously cannot take place overnight. Having expressed this reservation about hasty new departures, it is nevertheless appropriate for me simply to state, without elaborating the point here, that if the idea of a universal requisite of normative societal consensus is indeed essential to dichotomous analysis and is false, then the foundations for new theoretical perspectives may be abuilding. I have specific reference here to the concepts of social pluralism and the plural society, as exploratively formulated by Furnivall, Kuper, Smith, and Van den Berghe, whose studies challenge the premise of necessary normative consensus directly and explicitly.[20]

[18] C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "The Politics of Tradition: A Study of Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria," unpubl. diss., Princeton, 1964.

[19] *Social Change*, 75. See also Moore's *The Impact of Industry* (Englewood Cliffs 1965).

[20] J. S. Furnivall, "Some Problems of Tropical Economy," in Rita Hinden, ed., *Fabian Colonial Essays* (London 1945), and *Colonial Policy and Practice* (London

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With these observations set forth, we can turn to an account of certain concrete aspects of political change in Northern Nigeria as they relate to the proposition of eurhythmic process.

The focus of this account is the impact on the local parliamentary structure of the political system of the traditional kingdoms or emirates of Northern Nigeria, as that Region of the Federal Republic of Nigeria existed up to January 1966. At that time an assassination plot, planned and led by a small group of southern Nigerian army officers, resulted in the deaths of, among others, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Northern Region premier and Sardauna of Sokoto, and the prime minister of the Federal Republic, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who was also born and politically based in that Region. This development also brought about the abolition (whether temporary or permanent is not yet clear) of civilian parliamentary government in Nigeria generally, at the direction of a new military government that has described itself as interim. Of course it is too soon to determine the implications of these events for the future of the country, and apart from two passing comments, no discussion of the events is essential to the topic here. The first comment is that the immediate context of the assassination plot was political turmoil and crisis in a southern Nigerian Region, combined with issues of interregional relations and balance, *not* the internal affairs of the then substantially autonomous Northern Region. Secondly, so far as the rise of a military government did concern the political situation within the Northern Region, this was an indication of the strength and resilience of the largely *ancien* regime there, which as we shall see had shown no signs of either regression to untrammeled "traditionality" or spontaneous growth toward true "modernity."

The discussion here proceeds with brief mention of salient features of the traditional system as it operated before and after the introduction of parliamentary forms and of the circumstances and conditions accompanying their introduction, followed by a concise synopsis of some results of change which reflect our theme.

1948). Leo Kuper, *An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class, and Politics in South Africa* (New Haven 1965), and "Plural Societies—Perspectives and Problems" (forthcoming). M. G. Smith, who combines expertise in African and West Indian studies, has written a critical statement of his position on the premise of necessary societal consensus in the preface to his collection of essays *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1965), vii-xvii. Also see his "Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism" and "Pluralism in Pre-Colonial African Societies" (forthcoming). Pierre L. Van den Berghe, *Africa: Social Problems of Change and Conflict* (San Francisco 1965), and "Pluralism and the Polity—A Theoretical Exploration" (forthcoming). These forthcoming papers will appear in a volume edited by Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith; they were produced for the 1965-66 Colloquium in African Studies, University of California, Los Angeles.

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VI

The traditional political system of the Hausa emirates, whose beginnings go back as far as the fifteenth century, retained its basic character throughout the colonial era, as M. G. Smith's study of one of these emirates clearly shows.[21] Thus, to a very large extent it is possible to speak of this system in continuous terms up to and including the period in which parliamentary institutions of the British type were superimposed on it.

The major event of the precolonial era was the *jihad* of 1804-1810, which placed Fulani emirs on the thrones of most of the Hausa states, whose political (and religious) unity, with that of a few newly-founded kingdoms, thereafter centered in the Fulani imperial seat at Sokoto, whence Usuman dan Fodio had first raised the call to conquer for the sake of local purification of Islam.

The Fulani emirs, like the British colonial rulers after them, helped to assure political continuity by adapting to their own ends the main political characteristics, together with the administrative techniques and organization, of the local regimes before them.[22] (In the case of the British, it is now well known that their adaptations and adjustments were later rationalized, principally by Lord Lugard, into the now famous British colonial doctrine of indirect rule.) Though with respect to the structure and composition of these regimes there are important variations, some of which historically, as today, have significant political implications and consequences, the major features they share amply justify their characterization as a system.

In this system, both administrative and political relations, closely entwined as these are, are centered in the emir, whose autocratic position was in practice limited originally only by recourse to extralegal sanctions, by natural exigencies, and by the dynamics and problems inherent in the nature of the system itself. Religious prescriptions politically applicable in principle have suffered from the usual embarrassment of the classical Islamic states generally, and also, for that matter, of historic Christendom: lack of any independent machinery for enforcement and of "means of protecting against government reprisal" for would-be defenders of those prescriptions.[23] Indeed, to the Hausa-Fulani political order, the principal impact of concern with the

[21] *Government in Zazzau* (Oxford 1960).

[22] See Smith, "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption Among the Hausa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* VI (1963-64), 164-94.

[23] Whitaker, "Three Perspectives on Hierarchy: Political Thought and Leadership in Northern Nigeria," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies,* III (March 1965), 6.

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local (Maliki) version of the Islamic Shari'a, or divinely sanctioned law (at once temporal and spiritual), is the idea that disobedience to the emir or his representatives is an abnegation of faith.

The dynamics and problems engendered by the system for all Northern Region emirate regimes have stemmed in very large part from corporate organization and cleavage within the royal dynasties and other hereditary lineages, both Fulani and non-Fulani. Many of these corporate subgroups have independent and collective claims to both central and local bureaucratic offices, territorial and functional. The balance, adjudication, maintenance, and pursuit of these rival corporate claims to office at all levels of the bureaucracy have always been the overwhelming political preoccupation of members of the ruling stratum. Strictly vicariously, they are the concern of the subjugated masses of politically nonparticipant commoners as well.

This competitive feature includes the office of emir itself, succession to which is determined without benefit of primogeniture or any other automatic provision. Furthermore, Islamically sanctioned polygamy and concubinage plus cultural emphasis on maximum male progeny naturally proliferate the number of eligible persons for all hereditary offices, and this extends and intensifies the intramural competition. Severe personal tension is inherent in the system, for as Smith states about the Zaria emirate in 1950, "neither was administrative offence a sufficient ground for dismissal, nor administrative merit a sufficient ground for appointment. Political offence, defined by the system as attachment to the king's political rival, was the principal ground for dismissal; and political solidarity with the king and opposition to his rivals was the principal ground for appointment."[24] Apart from solidarity with superiors, the essential criterion of and precondition for success in this institutionalized system of competition, which in Hausa is called *neman sarautu*—the quest for offices and the prestigious formal titles that go along with them—was and is wealth and influence (largely purchased).

The ubiquitous institution of *neman sarautu* is very greatly responsible for two ostensibly contrasting sets of qualities in the system as a whole: on the one hand, political and administrative insecurity, uncertainty, instability, arbitrariness, domination, dogmatism, coercion, and restrictiveness; on the other hand, competitiveness, flexibility, mobility, calculation, inventiveness, and secular devotion to whatever the requirements and rewards of power might be. These apparently "dual" syndromes are simultaneously endemic to this system, and their copresence

[24] *Government in Zazzau,* 106.

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suggests the profoundly misleading inadequacy here of a monochromatic categorization of "traditionality" as static, prescriptive, closed, and nonrational—notwithstanding the clear fact that the basis of authority and power in the system has always been fundamentally hereditary.

In terms of the supposed dichotomous antinomies, the inextricably mixed qualities of this system are epitomized by the existence of high-office-holding slaves and small numbers of commoner client-retainers who enjoy official status. Thus, the very realities that render a hereditary emir insecure and repressive also sometimes induce him to extend his official patronage to persons, such as slaves, who *because of* hereditary ineligibility are powerless to threaten legitimately the position of the emir. As such, they are highly suitable agents of autocratic and deeply personalized government. The point here, of course, is not to obscure the emphasis of the system, the approximation of which to the dichotomous model of generic "traditionality" is in many respects real, but to indicate that its more "modernistic" characteristics are equally relevant and entrenched.

Additional comment concerning the situation of the masses of commoners, or *talakawa*, is necessary here. As one government-sponsored report on the vast web of official gift-giving in cash and kind which goes hand in hand with *neman sarautu* concluded, "It is clear that in the ultimate analysis the *talakawa* pay for everything."[25] Indeed, the late prime minister of Nigeria publicly pointed out in 1950 that "much of the attraction" of holding office and title in the traditional bureaucracy or "native administration" has been the "opportunities it offers for extortion of one form or another."[26] Thus, the great majority of the largely peasant masses are not only deprived of membership and participation in this traditional political system but are systematically exploited in its behalf as well.

The one avenue of traditional political access available to *individual* commoners is clientage, a Hausa-Fulani institution that Smith defines as "an exclusive relation of mutual benefit which holds between two persons defined as socially and politically unequal, which stresses their solidarity."[27] In other words, the commoner client-participant in this system is dependent for his position wholly upon the uncertain benevolence of his overlord. Elsewhere I have stated the general function and role of the institution as follows: "The crux of the clientage relationship

[25] *Report on the Exchange of Customary Gifts* (Kaduna 1954), 6.
[26] *Northern Nigeria, Regional Council Debates,* August 19, 1950 (Kaduna 1950).
[27] *Government in Zazzau,* 8.

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is that patronage, economic security, and protection may be exchanged for personal loyalty and obedience. For the *Habe* (Hausa) *talakawa*, clientage represented the principal channel of upward mobility, toward and within the ruling circle. For those who remained outside that sphere, lesser forms of clientage relationships provided virtually the only defense against such eventualities as arbitrary tax-levies, injurious treatment in judicial proceedings, discrimination in allocation of farming land or in administration of public services, to mention only the most common perils."[28]

One important final point here is that in the case of the large non-Muslim populations living under several emirate regimes, this general structure of political domination is reinforced and enhanced, in consequence of their status in the eyes of their Muslim rulers as legitimately outside the pale of any justice and security enjoined by the precepts of Islam.

VII

Whatever may be true elsewhere in Africa or even in Nigeria, the introduction in Northern Nigeria of a parliamentary structure of regional government by the British colonial authority was in essence a compromise between two not easily reconciled objectives: (1) to launch Nigeria as an independent and democratically governed national entity, and (2) to prevent abrupt discontinuity with British policy toward the emirate system which for half a century had been to preserve the Fulani regimes as instruments of law and order and as vehicles of controlled innovation along modern British social and political lines. For whatever the merits of the original policy might previously have been, once the decision was made to transfer power to Nigeria as a whole under democratic forms, the reality of past policy meant British fear that the existing foundations of social, economic, and political order and progress in the emirates would be shattered. Thus, the British perceived that their immediate responsibility in this area was to cushion the impact of change, and a British strategy of "guided democracy," as it were, therefore governed the terminal phase of colonial rule. It will be relevant and instructive to recount at this point some of the specific means through which the British contrived to manipulate change to serve the interests of continuity.

The electoral rules initially used in the Northern Region employed the hierarchy of local councils, which were almost completely composed of dependent and loyal members and clients of the emirate bureauc-

[28] "The Politics of Tradition," 447.

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racies, as electoral colleges. These indirectly yielded the membership of the Northern parliament, the House of Assembly, which in turn chose the Northern members of the central Nigerian legislature in Lagos. As extra safeguards, emirs were given the right simply to appoint directly ten percent of the membership of the penultimate colleges, and suffrage was limited to taxpayers. These arrangements, like others, were peculiar in Nigeria to the Northern Region.

The transfer to elected Northern government ministers of executive authority over the functions of "their" ministries (and therefore of supervisory authority over many of the functions of the emirate bureaucracies) was delayed five years beyond the time of this devolution in the southern Nigerian regions. Indeed, for two years after the introduction of the nonexecutive ministers, conspicuously no minister for local government was appointed at all.

At the appropriate time, British officials helped to design substitute devices for the above measures under a new Nigerian constitution. These measures included investment of power over all matters having to do with appointment, grading, and discipline of Northern chiefs (including emirs) in an autonomous, nonpopularly elected Council of Chiefs, the small permanent membership of which included the two most important emirs (Sokoto and Kano). A constitutional provision also gave to a House of Chiefs powers that in relation to the popularly elected chamber (the House of Assembly) were coordinate, indeed, technically supreme.[29]

The ultimate power to make appointments to the higher levels of the local emirate bureaucracies legally rested with the regional government. Thus these local officials had the virtual status of civil servants. Yet, for purposes of regional and party political activity, these officials were defined as nongovernmental officials, free, under the British code of the nonpolitical civil service, to be elected to parliamentary seats, and to occupy them even while retaining local office in the traditional bureaucracies.

The British also supported the insistence, on the part of the essentially *ancien* political regime thus shored-up with the above arrangements, that the existing territorial boundaries of the North remain intact under the federal constitution. The significance of this proviso was that those boundaries politically incorporated into this region non-Muslim peoples, amounting to at least a third of the total Northern population,

[29] See R. L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "The Federal Republic of Nigeria," in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States* (Ithaca 1966), 59.

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who were historically outside the boundaries of the Fulani Empire. Their inclusion within these boundaries allowed the Fulani-dominated regional regime to dominate the minority areas, where there was strong evidence of mounting secessionist sentiment. When linked to the fact that this Northern unit as a whole contained more than fifty percent of the entire Nigerian population, the crucial contribution of the British to the policy of "One North" (and thus to the dominant political role later played by the Northern majority political party in the affairs of what became the Federal Republic of Nigeria) becomes obvious. All these constitutional and political manipulations also help explain why, under the Republic, the local emirate regimes remained safe from any unwelcome interference from Lagos.

The main point of this brief delineation of British policy in the terminal phase of colonialism is *not* that this policy alone was responsible for the actual results of political change in Northern Nigeria. On the contrary, a very good argument can be made out that those results would have occurred without British efforts. But British policy did help establish the most favorable conditions for a process that British officials in the North often approvingly called "continuity in change." A second, equally important, point here is that such compromise policies and constitutional devices made it unnecessary for either the British or their successors to reject a parliamentary structure in order to foster continuity.

VIII

The paragraphs to follow represent a compendium of selected events, facts, and relationships that indicate dysrhythmic change, i.e., examples of change in one aspect or sphere in the direction of a pattern of "modernity" which either occasioned, in another aspect or sphere, change having the effect of sustaining or reinforcing a premodern institution or pattern of behavior, or caused no significant change, in Northern Nigeria in the period 1952-1966. (Identification by the reader of what are "modern" patterns, and from the brief discussion of the emirate system above, what are "premodern" or "traditional" patterns, is assumed.)

Aspects of Change and Continuity

INSTITUTIONAL VS. STRUCTURAL ASPECTS

Social composition of the Northern parliament (House of Assembly). The decisive impact of traditional emirate status patterns on the composition of the Northern parliament (1956-1961) is reflected in data

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derived from a careful survey using face-to-face interviews and independent sources.

Out of 103 members elected from constituencies situated in the emirates (the total of elected members was 131), 77, or 75 percent, belonged to the traditional ruling class, applying this term only to members whose *fathers'* status corresponded to one or more categories of membership in that class. Extending the definition to include those whose own office or title or marriage relationship placed them in one or more of these categories, the percentage of ruling-class members was 82 percent (84 members). Well over a third of the total emirate members were related to royal families and another fourth belonged to the hereditary nobility. Twenty-four percent of the group of 77 were sons of emirs. Out of the group of 77 belonging intergenerationally to the ruling class, 60 held traditional titles, or *sarautu*. The 1956-1961 House was elected on the basis of a mixed system of direct and indirect procedures (mostly the latter). All elected members of the 1961-1966 House were elected on the basis of direct procedures and adult male suffrage. In the expanded 1961-1966 House, 97 of 173 had not been members of the previous House. A spot check of just under half of the new members from emirate constituencies indicated that the percentage of (intergenerational) ruling-class members may have slightly increased, and most certainly did not decrease significantly.

Northern Peoples' Congress party structure. The Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) emerged after 1952 as a party commanding the support of the overwhelming majority of the Northern Nigerian electorate. It won by increasingly wide margins in the elections of 1954 (federal), 1956 (regional), 1961 (regional), and 1964 (federal).

Prior to 1952, when parliamentary government was established, the NPC was controlled by a majority whose occupations, traditional social status, and political attitudes placed them outside the sphere of traditional elite membership and loyalty. It could be described as a party of "moderate radicals."[30] After 1952, control of the party passed to persons loyal to and dependent upon the emirate bureaucracies. An important impetus for this shift was the advantage to the party in having the apparatus of the traditional bureaucracy double as the organizational machinery for the party. Having gained control of the party, the new dominant faction voted in 1957 to "freeze" the slate of elected party officers, and no further voting was ever held. Indeed, after 1957, no open

[30] P. C. Lloyd, "Traditional Rulers," in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1964), 400.

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congresses of the party were held, all decisions being taken by the *parliamentary* party in the name of the party as a whole.

In 1952, the presidency of the party passed to Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto (a traditional title) and a member of the Sokoto Fulani imperial dynasty; first-round balloting had indicated a majority preference for Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a commoner and an outspoken critic of traditional bureaucratic administration. The consideration leading to the second-ballot election of the Sardauna was the desire to secure the backing and influence of the emirs and their supporters.

After 1952, NPC party nominations for parliamentary seats were monitored by and subject to the approval of the emir in whose domains constituencies were located. In effect, membership in the legislature became a *sarauta* in the patronage of the emir.[31]

Majority-minority relations. Control of the regional legislature accomplished what historic Fulani ambitions had previously failed to achieve: extension of Fulani jurisdiction over unconquered tribes and enclaves (e.g., notably, the Tiv people). As elsewhere observed, "even such formerly independent Muhammedan Chiefdoms as Habe Abuja have been forced by this situation to follow the Fulani lead in order to avoid isolation."[32]

The political solidarity of kingdoms that were historically and ethnically divided, i.e., Bornu and the Sokoto Empire as a whole, was stimulated by the need to mobilize support for the perpetuation of the ruling elites in the emirates against (1) radical, commoner-oriented opposition parties operating within the emirates (e.g., the Northern Elements Progressive Union and the Bornu Youth Movement), (2) opposition parties based in the minority areas or Northern "Middle Belt" (e.g., the United Middle Belt Congress), and (3) nationalistic and radical socialist-oriented parties based in the southern regions of Nigeria, which were naturally attempting to gain support in both majority and minority areas of the Northern Region. The roles of the Sardauna of Sokoto as regional premier and of Shettima Kashim (previously Waziri or Vizier of Bornu) as (constitutional) governor of the Northern Region appropriately expressed this development. This solidarity, achieved "at the expense" of incorporating new non-Fulani elements into the dominant political structure, facilitated Fulani preponderance.

Dual membership in the traditional bureaucratic structure and the

[31] R. L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "Nigeria," in Coleman and Rosberg, 609.
[32] Smith, *Government in Zazzau,* 250.

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parliamentary structure. Those who were simultaneously members of a modern legislature and office-holders in one of the traditional emirate bureaucracies enjoyed enormous and reciprocal advantages, both personal and political, over others. Salaries starting at £720 per annum (before a national "austerity" cut in 1961 the figure was £860) were often invested in the pursuit of promotion in the local bureaucracy, while chances of success in this, the ubiquitous traditional institution of *neman sarautu*, were enhanced considerably by command of the various resources that legislative membership provided. This relationship is reflected in the successful "dual" careers of numerous legislators.

As ministerial office in the regional government required such officials to reside in Kaduna, the regional capital, ministers (unlike rank-and-file legislators) could not simultaneously hold bureaucratic office (though they usually retained the status of "on leave without pay"). They could, however, pursue higher title without office, and at least eight ministers succeeded in elevating their positions in this respect while in office. Even more significant, no fewer than ten Northern ministers of government (including here both regional and federal ministers) *resigned* office to accept prestigious posts in their local emirates after enjoying remunerative terms of office at Kaduna or Lagos.

These reciprocal advantages had important implications for the balance between rival dynasties and lineages in the ruling hierarchies of the emirates. One implication was that a parliamentary contest involving members of such rival traditional corporate groups sometimes exacerbated those corporate cleavages and solidarities in the context of the local native administration. In several instances, dismissed local office-holders (members of rival dynasties or lineages) compensated for their loss of office by winning a parliamentary seat, thus recapturing status.

INSTITUTIONAL VS. NORMATIVE ASPECTS

Secular promotion of Islam. In 1959 the Sardauna proclaimed in the Northern House of Assembly: "As long as [my] party, the NPC, is in power in the Region, it . . . [will] not legalize what God has forbidden."[83] This attitude was reflected in various ways in and through the new political institutions. Symbolically, the official motto of the Northern government was "Work and Worship"; green, the color of dan Fodio's flags of investiture of authority in the *jihad*, and strongly evocative generally of Islam, was the official color both of the government (e.g., it replaced "Westminster black" in the robes of the Speaker

[83] *Daily Times of Nigeria*, September 3, 1959, 3.

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of the House of Assembly) and of the NPC, whose women supporters, especially, duly displayed it on all appropriate occasions.

Conspicuously frequent trips to Mecca on pilgrimage (Islam *requires* only one) by the Sardauna and his prominent and favored colleagues in both regional government and native administration served to emphasize the role of the new political leaders as vehicles of the faith, as did a series of Muslim convocations convened by the Sardauna in Kaduna between 1960 and 1966.

Under the Northern Nigerian Penal Code introduced in 1960, drunkenness is a criminal offense (Section 401), as is drinking of any amount of alcohol by a Muslim (Section 403—punishable by one month's imprisonment, five pounds, or both). Adultery is punishable by two years' imprisonment, a fine (maximum unspecified), or both. In homicide cases there has been an attempt to capture the spirit of the orthodox Islamic law of talion (Sections 393, 394). Several other provisions approximate authoritarian Islamic standards of relations between bureaucratic officials and the public (especially Sections 136, 137, 138, and 10).

A persistent and highly inflammatory NPC campaign theme has been the duty of true Muslims to follow Muslim political leadership, or to reject, in other words, that of non-Muslim or "nonorthodox" southern Nigerians. In the cause of this NPC doctrine of religious obligation to follow its lead as the great protector of traditional authority, the conservative *mallamai*, or religious teachers, have been very active and most effective.

Secular promotion of hereditary rule. Apart from the more or less spontaneous reinforcement of traditional norms implicit in the preceding sections on dual membership and secular promotion of Islam, the regional government sought to strengthen the position of the native administration structures in many ways. It vested them with legal authority and responsibility to maintain law and order generally, to regulate and determine issuance of permits for political party meetings, assemblies, and so on, and to serve as officials for the conduct of popular (parliamentary) elections. In the case of the larger emirates, it confirmed the judicial functions of (otherwise executive) emirs, extending in some cases to the power to try capital cases. It devolved much of the responsibility for the administration of public services onto native administrations, such that virtually every important government amenity in rural areas was distributed through these units. It utilized the local bureaucracies, as had the British, as tax-assessing and tax-collecting agencies. It made available to them considerable financial

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aid through grants, loans, and retention of tax revenues, and allotted them a significant role in capital or economic-development projects and expenditures (by 1960 over ten percent of the total regional funds were so allocated). While the composition of the central executive councils of the emirates was generally liberalized to include representatives of nontraditional ruling elements, in the great emirates (especially Sokoto, Kano, Bornu, and Zaria) such reforms went no further than a shift from autocracy to oligarchy. Thus, measures strengthening "local government" in the North were in effect bolstering hereditary rule.

NORMATIVE VS. STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

NEPU's use of traditional influences in an effort to effect radical change. The objective of the opposition NEPU (Northern Elements Progressive Union) was structural transformation, i.e., abolition of the traditional bureaucracies; secular government; popular participation in, and effective control of, governmental institutions, local and regional. Particularly after 1956, probably out of frustration at its failure otherwise to attract mass support, NEPU not only emphasized the traditional cleavages between *talakawa* and *sarakuna* (ruling-class members), but also utilized religious symbols and themes in its own appeals and propaganda to counter NPC strategy. It accepted dissident traditional elements into its fold and sought to exploit their residual prestige and influence, e.g., most revealingly in the 1959 federal election, when two of NEPU's candidates were deposed emirs seeking to recover lost glory. In a number of situations involving local dynastic or lineage rivalries, NEPU sought to take part to its own advantage. In sum, NEPU, which ostensibly represented a revolutionary political force working contrary to the traditional structure, in practice was to a significant extent obliged to rely tactically on "premodern" and to some degree "antimodern" tendencies.

Spheres of Change

ECONOMY VS. POLITY

The traditionally oriented regime working in the cause of economic development. The social and political characteristics of the parliamentary regime described above evidently were no deterrent to its serious pursuit of economic development, including industrial projects.

A 1963 study conducted under the auspices of the Northern Ministry of Trade and Industries, with the cooperation of British industrial consultant firms, boasted findings as follows: "Factories built in Northern Nigeria during the period 1960-63 produce a variety of products and

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the total investment in industrial development in this short time approximates £20,000,000 of which about £5,000,000 is from Northern Nigerian sources." And, "Within the Federal national income growth Northern Nigeria has shown the most rapid growth. From 1950 to 1957 the national income of the North increased more than twice as fast as that of either of the other two Regions. Since 1957, Northern Nigeria has at least maintained her share of the Federal total so that by 1960 her national income had risen to a total of about £560 million, at 1960 prices—an increase of 68 percent over the decade compared with 47 percent increase in Federal national income."[34]

Admittedly, some of the impressiveness of these figures results in part from the relatively backward base from which the North began its growth compared with that of the South, but the figures do indicate that the regime neither was indifferent to nor did it seek to inhibit economic development. In fact, the regime assiduously sought to publicize the advantages offered by a "disciplined" society for purposes of economic growth.[35]

Economic development in the service of traditional interests. As in the other regions of Nigeria, government-created and government-controlled marketing boards in the Northern Region purchased the main export crops from producers at fixed prices for sale abroad, the difference between prices paid to the producer and received from abroad yielding a surplus. These surpluses were used to fund statutory development corporations, which undertook projects aimed at development and, through subsidiary loan boards and finance corporations, made loans and grants to local government authorities, private firms, and individuals. As might be expected, high-status persons in traditional roles who benefited through participation, indirect or direct, in such projects and new enterprises were numerous. Suffice it to say that like the perquisites of parliamentary membership, wealth generated through the process of economic development was also available for "reinvestment" in traditional institutions and structures. Moreover, it was hardly a secret that private foreign firms, confronted with the copious legal and practical powers at the disposal of native administrations, found it convenient to grant to the more influential local officials substantial favors.

EDUCATION VS. POLITY

Achievement sustains ascription. Striking as the hereditary origins of

[34] Northern Nigeria, Ministry of Trade and Industries, *The Industrial Potentialities of Northern Nigeria* (Kaduna 1963), 13, 16.

[35] *Ibid.*, 30; also see *Provincial Annual Reports* (Kaduna 1953-1964), *passim.*

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the Northern parliamentarians are, the fact is, too, that they constituted an elite in terms of Western education as well. My survey of the 1956-1961 members showed that in a general population of which less than two percent were literate, these parliamentarians enjoyed an average of 7.5 years of formal, Western-type schooling. The average for Northern ministers (regional and federal combined) was 10.6 years. The relatively high modern educational attainments of this traditional elite group were directly attributable to the initial British view that, as one governor put it, "If indirect rule is to be truly tribal [in Northern Nigeria], we must educate from the top down, and not as in Southern Nigeria from the bottom upwards."[36]

Although the percentage of children at school in Northern Nigeria doubled between 1959 and 1965, the percentage in 1965 was still strikingly low in the great emirates (e.g., Kano, 4.9 percent, Bornu, 4.1 percent, Sokoto, 3.2 percent), suggesting that, despite the fact that Western education is officially now open to all, its result in those areas continues to be that it further sets the established ruling classes apart from the ordinary masses of subjects.

Conclusion

It will be noted that the illustrations above omit explicit consideration of important combinations of variables. One of these, the spheres of polity and cult, was left out because it seems unnecessary to elaborate the obvious lack of parallel between how they are thought to have been related in the historic Western experiences of change and how they have interacted in the Northern Nigerian situation. Clearly, that situation has not conformed to any model of political change involving a shift from sacred to secular political institutions and values. Lack of hard data dictated no special attention to the relationship of psychological to other aspects of change, though here, too, it seems an obvious inference that psychic stress has hardly characterized the condition of those called upon to play dual roles. More generally, it might be noted that the illustrations tend to stress simple continuity at the expense of the occurrence of change short of the model of "modernity," though again this latter result represents merely an implicit variation on the theme of what is presented.

In any case, the illustrations seem quite sufficient to indicate the unacceptability, so far as the Northern Nigerian experience is concerned, of the proposition that "once the penetration [of modern patterns] has begun, the previous indigenous patterns always change; and they always

[36] Whitaker, "The Politics of Tradition," 408.

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change in the direction of some of the patterns of the relatively modernized society."[37]

Three likely objections to this attempted disconfirmation may be anticipated. One is that the patterns involved were not "truly" or sufficiently modern to provide a fair case; the second is that there was not enough time (fourteen years) for an inherent eurhythmic process to unfold; the third is that the Northern Nigerian experience in this period was unique. To the first and second objections, there are essentially two pertinent rejoinders. One, if certain quantitative degrees or levels of "modernity" are necessary to the eurhythmic hypothesis, then this quantification must be incorporated in it, which evidently has not heretofore been done. Indeed, we have been encouraged to believe that the process will obtain under virtually any magnitude of stimulus. The same point holds true for the matter of time span: the operative amount will have to be included in the proposition. Secondly, even if an operative time span is indicated and such elusive qualities as "achievement," "universalism," and "specificity" were quantifiable for operational purposes, significant phenomena resulting from "low" or "subthreshold" conditions must nevertheless be taken into account in any valid general theory of the process of change. As for the third objection, it may be suggested, apart from the fact that a single counter-instance is sufficient to disconfirm the hypothesis as presently stated, that any apparent "uniqueness" of the Northern Nigerian case may well be an effect of the prevalence of the hypothesis rather than a sign of its general validity.

In the absence of a revised formulation of the hypothesis of eurhythmic process, three general counterpropositions to the present version seem to be suggested by this discussion of the Northern Nigerian case:

1. Significant change in one important sphere or aspect of social activity may ramify in other aspects or spheres; however, such ramifications are not always consonant with the character and direction of the initial change.

2. Change may offer novel opportunities for those adversely subjected to that change to defend, recoup, reaffirm, augment, or facilitate antecedent activity or value, notwithstanding that such activity or value is manifestly or latently inconsistent with the character and direction of the initial change.

3. Subjected to potentially transformative political change, a society previously characterized by political domination presents special oppor-

[37] Levy, cited n. 4.

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tunities for "manipulative response" that limits the impact of that change.

None of the fine points of this analysis should be allowed to obscure the deeper general significance of the Northern Nigerian case, however. The analysis reveals that the general factors (as outlined in Section IV) which allegedly contribute to a necessary eurhythmic process of change are at best special occurrences. We have seen, moreover, how a "traditional" system may include important features that are as close to the modern model as to the traditional one, and how agents of "modernity" may simultaneously act in defense of "tradition." Furthermore, many of the points of convergence between "traditional" and "modern" elements in the Northern Nigerian case seem highly functional and systematically viable. They point to the possibility of those very symbiotic combinations of qualities which dichotomous and eurhythmic conceptions would preclude. As a general proposition, in other words, analytically or normatively antithetical social elements may in actuality be quite compatible under certain conditions. If so, the occurrence of a dysrhythmic process of change, as described in this article, ultimately indicates the need for hypotheses about political change which are at once more limited and more inclusive than the concept of modernization allows.

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THE POLITICS OF NORTH KOREA'S UNIFICATION POLICIES 1950-1965

By SOON SUNG CHO*

SINCE the April 1960 student-led revolution there, debate in South Korea on the peaceful unification of the two Koreas has increased in frequency, intensity, and popularity among students, intellectuals, political parties, and other social groups. Popular support for independent and peaceful unification is rapidly mounting. This changing mood may be due to more effective North Korean propaganda as well as to the unhappy economic conditions in South Korea. In response to North Korea's aggressive unification campaign, the ROK (Republic of Korea) government has found it necessary to set up a research organization dedicated solely to the study of problems of unification.

The North Korean government is now using the issue of peaceful unification as a major instrument of its propaganda campaign. From reading the various polls conducted by South Korean newspapers one can easily imagine how the North Korean proposals for cultural and economic exchange between North and South and ultimately for peaceful unification affect the thought and feelings of the South Korean people.[1] Despite every effort of the South Korean government to jam radio broadcasts and censor newspapers, northern propaganda for unification originating from Pyŏngyang, Kaesŏng, and Wŏnsan radio stations somehow reaches the intellectuals and students in the South. In the era of the cheap transistor radio, the South Korean policy of "thought control" by means of censoring the "northern news" has not been successful.

Since the onset of the Korean War, the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) unification proposals have passed through three important phases in content and method. In the first phase, during the war,

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[1] For example, see the results of the opinion poll conducted by *Chosŏn Ilbo* (Seoul), published November 4, 1964. On the issue of North-South cultural and economic exchange, forty-eight percent of the respondents supported the idea while only fourteen percent positively rejected it. Twenty-five percent supported the idea despite their doubt about its realization.

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a policy of "unification by force" was advocated. In the second phase, lasting from the Cease-Fire Agreement of 1953 until the student revolution of April 1960, the DPRK advocated a policy of "peaceful unification" through free all-Korean elections under the supervision of neutral nations. In the third phase, beginning in 1960, the emphasis has been on immediate economic and cultural exchanges (including postal exchanges) ultimately leading to the formation of an all-Korean confederation by peaceful means.

A close examination of these three important phases of North Korea's unification plan will invariably reveal that they each developed from the internal political and economic situation in North Korea. Although the changes of policy must be closely related to the changing situation in the South, and the general climate of East-West relations with its ever shifting ideological lines, the most important factor in these shifts has been the strength or weakness of the northern regime.

During the Korean War the DPRK unification theme, "unification by force," was similar in purpose and style to Syngman Rhee's "March to the North" program. The appeal by Kim Il-Sŏng, premier of the DPRK, over Radio Pyŏngyang on June 26, 1950, clearly stated it: "[We, the Korean people,] must liquidate the unpatriotic Fascist puppet regime of Syngman Rhee which has been established in the southern part of the Republic; [we] must liberate the southern part of our Motherland from the domination of the Syngman Rhee clique; and [we] must restore the People's Committees—the real organs of power. Under the banner of the Korean People's Republic, we must complete the unification of the Motherland and create a single, independent, democratic state. The war which we are forced to wage is a just war for the unification and independence of the Motherland and for freedom and democracy. . . ."[2]

His threat of unification by the use of force was already on the record in a letter written October 14, 1949, to UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie. In it Kim Il-Sŏng made it clear that "the Korean people will not abandon the struggle and will reserve for itself the right to continue by measures at its disposal the struggle for . . . the removal of UNCOK (United Nations Commission on Korea) and for final unification of the country by its own forces into a united democratic state."[3]

This aggressive unification policy was gradually toned down after the failure of the DPRK military campaign in the South. With the intervention of United Nations troops, Kim's dream for military uni-

[2] *Pravda,* June 27, 1950.
[3] *New York Times,* October 18, 1949.

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fication became unrealistic. The official change from the militant policy to one of peaceful unification of Korea first appeared in Kim Il-Sŏng's speech at the Sixth Assembly of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party (KWP), the ruling Communist party in the North, on August 5, 1953. At that time he declared that "the unification of our Motherland must be achieved only by peaceful means without foreign intervention."[4] In fact, he warned that the militant unification policy would only serve the enemy, and he suggested that there still existed antiparty elements who had advocated the continuation of war. He praised the Cease-Fire Agreement as a positive first step toward peaceful unification and reaffirmed that the achievement of the Agreement indicated North Korea's victory in the war. Throughout his speech he mentioned the existence of antiparty elements who were still working for the prolongation of the war, thus supporting unification by military force. The correct line of the party, according to Kim, must be to reconstruct North Korea as a solid democratic base for peaceful unification and to force the withdrawal of American imperialism by fomenting social revolution within the South.

It is in the nature of modern Communist dictatorships that the proclamation of a new "correct line" frequently involves purging the old-guard "deviationists" who are no longer in step with their party chief. In fact, at the time of the speech, Kim Il-Sŏng was in the midst of a deadly purge of the followers of Pak Hŏn-Yŏng, then vice-premier and foreign minister of the DPRK. His accusations in the speech undoubtedly were directed toward this "antiparty" clique which had strongly advocated the continuation of the war.[5] Two days after Kim's speech to the Central Committee, the DPRK announced the arrest of Yi Sŭng-Hyŏp, Yi Kang-Kuk, Lim Hwa, Yi Wŏn-Cho, Yun Sun-Tal, Sŏl Chŏng-Sik, and five other officials for their antiparty actions. They had actually been arrested on July 30 (six days prior to Kim's speech) and charged with "treason against the state" by a special military court. Specifically they were accused of plotting to overthrow Kim's regime and to install Pak Hŏn-Yŏng as premier. It is significant to note that all of the accused were charter members of the South Korean Workers Party formed in 1946 by Pak and his followers.[6] All were sentenced to

[4] The speech is reprinted in Kim Il-Sŏng, *Subete-o Sengo Kokumin Keizai Fukkō Hatten no Tameni* [All Efforts Toward the Restoration and the Development of the Postwar National Economy] (Pyŏngyang 1961), 6-9.

[5] For an interpretation identifying Pak Hŏn-Yŏng with the "war-hawk faction," see Kim Sam-Kyu, *Konnichi no Chōsen* [Korea Today] (Tokyo 1955), 91-103.

[6] The South Korean Workers Party merged with the North Korean Workers Party in June 1949 under the new name, Korean Workers Party.

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death except for Yi Wŏn-Cho and Yun Sun-Tal who received fifteen and twelve years of imprisonment respectively. Pak himself was arrested later and sentenced to death in December 1955.[7]

This purge must be regarded as the result of a long-term power struggle between Kim's followers, mostly repatriates from the Soviet Union and Manchuria, and Pak Hŏn-Yŏng, the organizer of the underground Communist movement within Korea during the period of Japanese rule. Thus, Pak was to most Koreans better known than Kim Il-Sŏng, and he tightly controlled the Communist movement in the South even after he fled to North Korea in 1947.

At the time of the purge it was widely suspected that Pak was representing the war-hawk faction in the regime and was pressing hard to block the Cease-Fire Agreement, which Communist China and the Soviet Union were desperately seeking. From Pak's point of view the Agreement meant that he was finished as an important contender for power primarily because it made permanent the loss of his political base in the South. Furthermore, the armistice meant that his political followers who had fled from the South during the war would be without position or influence in the North.[8] In the South practically all of his underground cell network had been exposed during the brief occupation period, and rebuilding the southern branch of the party would take years of underground activity. In this frustrating situation, Pak and his followers had urged that unification be achieved by use of force, calling the Cease-Fire Agreement a policy of appeasement.

The new "peaceful unification" line reflected not only a bitter intraparty struggle in Pyŏngyang, but also mounting external pressures for peace from Moscow and Peking. The death of Stalin in March 1953 had left the Soviet Communist Party temporarily without a leader. The Beria-Malenkov-Bulganin-Khrushchev behind-the-scenes struggle necessitated less attention to foreign troubles during the period of intense intraparty strife and instability. No member of the "collective leadership" could advocate adventurism abroad before his political position had been consolidated at home. Communist China was equally anxious to avoid a more direct confrontation with the United States. After all, it had plunged into the Korean War scarcely one year after the proclamation of the People's Republic. After almost twenty years of continuous civil and foreign wars, China could no longer afford to wage war

[7] Kim Sam-Kyu, 100. See also Kim Chang-Soon, *Puk Han Sipo Nyŏn Sa* [Fifteen Years' History of North Korea] (Seoul 1961), 135-50.

[8] This was implied in Kim Il-Sŏng's speech of April 4, 1955, made at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP. See *Kim Il-Sŏng Senshu* [Selected Writings of Kim Il-Sŏng], IV (Tokyo 1962), 266-70.

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against the United States, especially not since Truman's and Eisenhower's threats of nuclear attack.[9] Kim Il-Sŏng must have been pressed both by the Chinese and by the Russians to accept the Cease-Fire Agreement, regardless of how strongly it antagonized Pak-led "Left adventurists." It is also likely that Kim Il-Sŏng was induced to follow a "peace" policy by offers of postwar economic aid from his allies.

In fact, because of internal economic difficulties, North Korea could no longer afford to continue the war without becoming wholly subservient to its northern neighbors. Three years of war had not only dislocated its industry but had also hopelessly displaced its people. It is now estimated that the war itself cost 420 billion *wŏn* ($3.5 billion), not including the cost of rebuilding and repairing the 8,700 factories that were destroyed. The mining industry lost eighty percent of its productive ability; 600,000 houses, 5,000 schools, and 1,000 hospitals were reduced to ashes. Industrial production decreased to forty percent of the 1949 level. In the metal, chemical, electrical, fishing, and construction-goods sectors of the economy, the drop in production varied from sixty percent to ninety-three percent. Destruction was almost complete in the fields of pig iron, copper, aluminum, alkali, and chemical fertilizers production.[10] Against this background of a completely debilitated economy, it is not difficult to see why Kim Il-Sŏng needed a cease-fire and why he advocated the new party line of peaceful unification of Korea. Simultaneously he accused the war hawks of being "Left adventurists." Thus, Kim used the ruthless purge to cover up his own failure in managing the Korean War and sent his opponents to the firing squad as scapegoats, labeling them (somewhat inconsistently) as "American spies."[11]

The DPRK's policy of peaceful unification was more fully developed by Foreign Minister Nam Il at the 1954 Geneva Conference. He proposed (1) general elections for a unified All-Korean National Assem-

[9] At a press conference on November 30, 1950, Mr. Truman remarked that the use of the atomic bomb was under "active consideration" (John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* [New York 1965], 166). For Eisenhower's threat to use the atomic bomb, see David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (New York 1964), 404-6. In this book Mr. Rees concludes that the death of Stalin and the threat by the United States government to carry atomic war to the Chinese mainland brought an end to the Korean War.

[10] The figures above are based on the report of Pak Ch'ang-Ok, Chairman of the National Planning Commission of the DPRK, at the seventh plenary meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) in April 1954. See Maruo Itaru, *Keizai Hatten no Futatsu no Ryukei* [Two Patterns of Economic Development: Two Germanys and Two Koreas] (Tokyo 1962), 50-51.

[11] See the statement of the prosecuting officer at the Military Court, in *Chosŏn Minjujui Innmin Kongwhakuk Chŏnbok Ŭnmo Haenguiē Kwanhan Kŏn* [The Case of Treason Against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] (Tokyo n.d.).

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bly; (2) the organization of an All-Korean Commission, composed of an equal number of representatives from North and South Korea to make the necessary preparations for these elections; (3) urgent measures for the economic and cultural rapprochement of North and South Korea; (4) the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Korea within six months; and finally (5) a guarantee of the peaceful development of Korea by all those countries most interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East. He specified that the members of the All-Korean Commission should be selected by the Supreme People's Committee of the DPRK and the National Assembly of the ROK and that it should include representatives of the largest democratic social organizations in South and North Korea. The primary task of the Commission would be to draft an election law and to take the measures necessary to guarantee freedom of assembly and of the press to the Korean people.[12]

The ROK delegate to the Geneva Conference, with the support of the United States, made a counterproposal that the elections should be conducted by secret ballot under the supervision of the United Nations and should be based on the principle of proportional representation.[13] North Korea refused to accept UN supervision on the ground that the United Nations, being a belligerent party in the Korean War, had lost the moral authority and competence to deal with Korean unification. Instead, its delegates proposed acceptance of the Communist Chinese idea of election supervision by a neutral nation's commission.

At a glance, the North Korean proposals would seem to be a reasonably sound and workable solution for the unification of Korea, but upon closer examination it can be seen that they concealed many points totally unacceptable to both the ROK and the United Nations. First of all, what was at stake was not merely Korean unification but the authority and competence of the United Nations. The acceptance of the North Korean proposal would, in effect, have negated all the actions taken by the United Nations for the unification of Korea since September 1947. The Communists not only denied the qualifications of the United Nations to act as an impartial international body in the settlement of Korean unification but also maintained that since the issue of unification was basically an internal problem the United Nations had violated the principle laid down in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter.

[12] U.S. Department of State, *The Record of Korean Unification 1943-1960* (Washington 1960), 158-59.
[13] *Ibid.*, 176.

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However, the ROK government and the United States persistently have held the position that DPRK should accept the authority and competence of the United Nations to deal with Korea and that the United Nations should have a primary role in bringing a peaceful settlement. In Walter S. Robertson's words, the North Korean attitude was "as if a policeman who had come to quell a riot should be told by the chief rioter, 'You have no authority here—you are just another rioter.' "[14]

Secondly, at the Geneva Conference the Communists rejected all alternative proposals for free and fair elections by insisting upon the formation of the All-Korean Commission on the principle of North-South equality. Thus, they would have retained a veto power in the drafting of an election law as well as on any measure guaranteeing free elections. Their position was in complete disregard of the democratic principle of proportional representation. In effect, the freely elected South Korean government, which represented three-quarters of the total Korean population, would have been forced by the All-Korean Commission proposal into combination with the Communist regime which controlled only one-quarter of the population, a situation totally unacceptable to the ROK.

Thirdly, the North Koreans insisted that the United Nations forces withdraw their troops from Korea as a condition of any agreement on the terms or methods of unification. If this proposal had been accepted, the United Nations forces would have withdrawn hundreds of miles from Korea while the Chinese Communists would have been but a few miles away—still posing a major threat to the peace of Korea. Fearing that the Communists might launch another sudden invasion if all UN troops were to withdraw, the Republic of Korea again refused to fall into such a trap.

As its own unification plan, the ROK originally proposed to hold, under United Nations observation, free elections only in North Korea to elect representatives to fill the vacant seats reserved for North Korea in the National Assembly of South Korea.[15] However, under pressure from the sixteen nations that had contributed military forces to the UN command, Pyŏn Yŏng-Tae, South Korean foreign minister, made a concession and placed himself on record as accepting all-Korea elections to be held in both the North and the South under the supervision of the United Nations within six months of the adoption of this proposal.[16] However, the DPRK did not retreat one step from its original

[14] *Ibid.*, 237; Robertson was then a member of the American delegation to the United Nations.

[15] *Ibid.*, 155.

[16] *Ibid.*, 176.

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stand and thus blocked further discussion of Korean unification at the Geneva Conference.

In the light of North Korea's political and economic situation it is certain that the North Korean Communists did not want a united Korea at that moment. Their true intention at the conference was to reject any proposal contrary to their Communist interest until such time as conditions favorable to the communization of all the country were created in both North and South. This interpretation can be substantiated by examining Kim Il-Sŏng's major speech of October 3, 1954, at the KWP's Central Committee meeting. Here Kim Il-Sŏng candidly recognized that peaceful unification on Communist terms could not be achieved in the near future because the United States was supporting the South Korean regime. To him "American imperialism" was the major enemy of Korean unification, and until American imperialism could be effectively isolated by revolutionary forces, the chance of unification was remote—"a long, difficult, and hard road" ahead. In this situation, he declared, the major task of the party must be the consolidation of North Korea as a base for the future revolutionary movement. He repeated that the only assured guarantee of the peaceful unification of Korea was "strengthening North Korea as a democratic base." He warned that without a rise in the living standard of the North Korean people and without rapid economic reconstruction in the North the unification movement would be doomed. He noted that the major reason for the failure of unification during the Korean War was the weakness of the KWP's organizational strength in the South. He emphasized that unification could be achieved only when the party was reorganized and had sufficient power to mobilize the masses for the cause of the revolution. These were the reasons he rejected the idea of "unification by force."[17]

In short, Kim Il-Sŏng was confessing that the Communists were not yet ready to carry out their goal of communizing all Korea nor were they strong enough to talk of peaceful unification until the economy of North Korea was sound enough to serve as a revolutionary base. At Geneva they had used the slogan of peaceful unification merely for propaganda effect. In the light of this speech, it is clear that all subsequent appeals for peaceful unification, which sometimes showed a slight variation from the Geneva proposals, were, in effect, nothing but ammunition for psychological warfare aimed at the South Korean people. These appeals included calls for an immediate meeting at either Seoul or Pyŏngyang to negotiate unification of the country (October 10,

[17] *Kim Il-Sŏng Senshu* [Selected Writings], IV, 187-94.

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1954) and for the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the South and North with simultaneous reduction of both nations' armed forces (March 7, 1955); the unilateral declaration of a reduction in armed personnel of 80,000 men (May 31, 1956); the call for an international conference of the powers concerned in a peaceful unification (June 2, 1956); and proposals for a mutual reduction of armed forces to 100,000 (September 20, 1957, and again on February 2, 1958).[18] At first sight, these proposals may seem plausible, and even politically realistic, but a closer examination uncovers the uncompromising nature of the terms, which were totally unacceptable to the South Korean government. The major goal of the proposals still remained the reconstruction of North Korea as a politically and economically sound revolutionary base for the future.

To achieve this goal the first long-range economic planning was introduced in 1954. This Three-Year Plan placed the greatest emphasis on the development of heavy industry with little stress on light industry and agriculture. In his 1955 New Year's message Kim Tu-Bong, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), declared that in 1954 the people had overfulfilled the goal of the plan.[19] This development and rapid increase in production could not have been attained solely by means of the meager Korean capital available. Much of the money and technical know-how was supplied by the Soviet Union and Communist China in the form of economic and technical aid. By an aid agreement signed in September 1953 the Soviet Union granted North Korea one billion rubles ($250 million) for rehabilitation purposes.[20] The aid was concentrated mostly in the rebuilding of heavy industries such as the Kim Ch'aek iron works, the Sŏngjin steel mill, the Hŭngnam fertilizer factory, the Nampo smelters, the Sŭngho cement factory, the Soopung power plant, and the Pyŏngyang textile mill. The Chinese also granted eight billion *yuan* ($320 million) payable in goods to North Korea. The goods were materials needed for the Three-Year Plan's goal of developing major industries such as building materials, communication equipment, machine tools, coal, cloth, milling, and agricultural tools. The Chinese also canceled all war debts incurred by North Korea up to January 1954.[21] In addition, some aid

[18] For a summary of all these proposals, see Kongbopu, *Han'guk T'ongil Bangan e Kwanhan Charyo* [Materials on Korean Unification] (Seoul 1964), 10-21.

[19] Catherine Porter and William Holand, "North Korea's Economic Development," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXIV (November 1955), 171. See also Maruo, 48-50.

[20] *Ibid.*, 50.

[21] *Ibid.* See also Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *North Korea Today* (New York 1963), 61.

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also came from East European Communist countries as well as from the Mongolian People's Republic.

Although the Three-Year Plan was quite a success in reconstructing basic industry, the living conditions of the people were not made easier by it. The extreme shortage of consumer goods and poor grain production intensified discontent among people almost to the boiling point. The cry arose for better living conditions, and the demands for more consumer goods mounted. The party itself was hopelessly divided on what measures to take. Thus, economic policy became the key issue in the Third KWP Congress held in April 1956. Kim Il-Sŏng wanted to use the next Five-Year Economic Plan to lay the foundation for an independent, self-supporting national economy by pushing the development of heavy industry. The opposition, mainly from the Yenan group, wanted to place more emphasis on light industry and to develop the agricultural sector of the economy by reducing the emphasis on heavy industry.[22] The opposition felt that the people had sacrificed enough for heavy industry and that some advance should be made in producing consumer goods. It is reported that the opposition was so strong that an official vote could not be taken on the Five-Year Plan until December of that year. Kim's use of his revolutionary-base theme for Korean unification must have been useful to him in pressing for continued emphasis on heavy industry at the expense of the production of consumer goods.

Subsequently Kim Il-Sŏng went to the Soviet Union and other East European nations, hoping to find more cooperation and assistance among the Communist nations to ensure the successful implementation of the Five-Year Economic Plan. While he was away, two party theoreticians, Ch'oe Ch'ang-Ik, a vice-premier and an important leader of the Yenan faction, and Pak Ch'ang-Ok, another vice-premier and the leader of the pro-Soviet faction, rallied fellow members to form an anti–Kim Il-Sŏng force.[23] After Kim's return, they attacked him openly on August 30, 1956, in the KWP Central Committee for his "dictatorial leadership" and his excessive emphasis on heavy industry.[24] They also demanded formation of collective leadership in the party. There is no

[22] Kim Il-Sŏng, *Chosŏn Rodongtang Chungang-wiwŏnhoe 1956-nyŏn 12-wŏl Chŏnwŏn Hoe-i Kyŏlchŏng Silhaeng Ch'ongwar-ŭl wihan Kyŏngkŭongŏp-sŏng Yŏlsŏngcha Hoiesŏhan Yŏnsŏl* [Speech at the meeting of the Ministry of Light Industry in order to evaluate the decision made at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party in December 1956] (Pyŏngyang 1958), 3-5.

[23] Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Communist Strategies in Asia* (New York 1963), 238.

[24] Kim Sam-Kyu, *Chōsen Kindai Shi* [History of Modern Korea] (Tokyo 1963), 177.

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doubt that this revolt was heavily influenced by the de-Stalinization movement at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. However, Kim Il-Sŏng and his followers, who had superior numbers, denounced the critics as "reactionary and antiparty elements" and demanded their expulsion from the party. Since then, both Ch'oe Ch'ang-Ik and Pak Ch'ang-Ok, as well as Yun Kong-Hum, Minister of Commerce, Kim Sŭng-Hwa, Minister of Construction, Sŏ Hi, Chairman of the Trade Union Association, and Kim Kang, Director of the Cultural and Public Information Service, have disappeared from the public scene. In effect, the abortive coup served to strengthen Kim Il-Sŏng's power because it gave him the chance of weakening both the Yenan and pro-Soviet factions.[25] The purge was, however, rather slow and gradual. It was not completed until 1958 because Chinese forces were still stationed in Korea and also because there were pressures from both the Soviet Union and Communist China. In fact, after Mikoyan's and P'eng Te-huai's trip to Pyŏngyang in September to investigate the incident of August 30, Ch'oe Ch'ang-Ik, and Pak Ch'ang-Ok were temporarily restored to party membership but they were relieved of their official positions.

After this purge, Kim and his group vigorously conducted an intra-party movement to denounce their opponents as "antiparty elements, factionalists, and sectarians." In March 1958, Kim Tu-Bong, the indisputable leader of the Yenan group, was expelled from the party along with Ch'oe Ch'ang-Ik and Pak Ch'ang-Ok, who were expelled for a second time. The last resistance of the Yenan group was the attempted coup d'etat on May Day of 1958 by General Chang P'yong-San, a returnee from the Eighth Route Army and commander of the North Korea Fourth Corps. However, the attempt was prematurely exposed and resistance to Kim Il-Sŏng ended.[26]

All these internal developments in North Korea clearly showed that during the period from the cease-fire to 1958, Kim Il-Sŏng was preoccupied with economic development and factional strife within the party. His leadership was strong, but it was not solid enough to keep his followers under tight control. In Kim's own words, North Korea had not yet become "a solid base for democratic unification of Korea." The stationing of Chinese forces had apparently become a great burden, politically and economically, to his regime. Understandably, therefore, Kim's major emphasis in his calls for unification from 1956 on was the

[25] Kim Il-Sŏng's Report of September 11, 1961, published as *Chosŏn Rodongtang 4 ch'a Taehoe-esŏhan Chungang-wiwŏnhoe Saŏp Ch'onghwa Boḳo* [The Comprehensive Report on the Task of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress of the KWP] (Pyŏngyang 1961), 121-24, hereafter cited as *Saŏp Ch'onghwa Boḳo*.

[26] Kim Sam-Kyu, *Chŏsen no Shinjitsu* [Truth of Korea] (Tokyo 1956), 67-68.

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demand for simultaneous withdrawal of both United States and Chinese forces from Korea. After the unilateral withdrawal of the Chinese forces from Korea in 1958, Kim Il-Sŏng's leadership finally became so firm that no one has since challenged his political leadership or economic policies.

Kim's Five-Year Plan, aimed at "rapid overall expansion of industrial production on the basis of the priority development of heavy industry and technical equipment,"[27] was to raise the total industrial output by an average of 350 percent during the planning year—that is, a 360 percent increase in the means of production and a 330 percent increase in consumer goods. For this purpose, between 1957 and 1960 alone a capital investment of about two billion *wŏn* was made. Following the example of Communist China's Great Leap Forward movement, Kim initiated the "Flying Horse Movement" (*Chŭllima Undong*) in 1958 as an effort to surpass the goals of the Five-Year Plan before its target year. People were forced to work more than fourteen hours a day and all available manpower was mobilized for production.[28] In January of 1960, he announced that the Five-Year Plan had been fulfilled at the end of the fiscal year 1959. If this was true, North Korea achieved the goals of the Five-Year Plan after only two and a half years.

With the "successful fulfillment" of the Five-Year Plan the DPRK moved into the ambitious Seven-Year Plan. Kim declared that the "fundamental task of the Seven-Year Plan [was] to carry out overall technical reconstruction and cultural revolution and to improve radically the livelihood of the people."[29] The new plan envisaged rapid progress for North Korean industry, not only in quantity but also in quality. It called for an annual increase in the total industrial output of eighteen percent.[30] Even if the accuracy of Kim's statistics is doubted, one must admit that he had achieved a remarkable success in his economic policy. According to Ch'oe Yong-Kŏn, Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, in 1961 the North Korean economy produced 10 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity; 12 million tons of coal; 930,000 tons of pig iron; 800,000 tons of steel; 700,000 tons of chemical fertilizer; 2.3 million tons of cement; and 190 million meters of fabrics. In other words, the industrial output in North Korea grew 8.7 times in compari-

[27] *Documents of the Fourth Congress of the Workers Party of Korea* (Pyŏngyang 1961), 18.

[28] See Sakurai Hiroshi, "Kita Chōsen ni okeru Senriba Undo" [The Flying Horse Movement in North Korea], *Chōsen Kenkyu Geppo* (Tokyo), XVI (April 1963), 1-11.

[29] Kim Il-Sŏng's Report to the Congress of the KWP in September 1961, in *Chosŏn Rodongtang Che 4-Hoe Taehoe Munhŏnjip* [Materials on the Fourth Congress of the KWP] (Pyŏngyang 1961), 48-49.

[30] *Ibid.*, 50-53.

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son to that of 1944. Ch'oe also stated that the country was producing 4,000 tractors every year as well as large quantities of various machine tools and heavy and light industrial equipment.[31] He boasted that the total grain output had reached 4.8 million tons, literally twice as much as in the days of Japanese rule. The following chart shows the economic output of South Korea compared to that of the North in 1961. As one can readily see, by 1961 North Korea had reached a position of considerable economic power vis-à-vis South Korea, especially in contrast with the situation that had existed at the end of the war.

ECONOMIC OUTPUT OF SOUTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREA, 1961*

	SOUTH KOREA	NORTH KOREA	RATIO S:N
Population	24,990,000	10,780,000	2.4:1
Area, sq. km.	96,000	124,000	1:1.3
Coal, tons	5,888,000	11,788,000	1:2
Electricity, kwh	1,770,000,000	10,418,000,000	1:5.7
Steel, tons	46,000	776,000	1:16
Cement, tons	522,000	2,253,000	1:4.3
Fertilizers, tons	64,000	662,000	1:10
Tractors	0	3,996	—
Textiles, meters	133,000,000	256,000,000	1:1.7
Rice, Wheat, tons	4,534,000	4,830,000	1:1
Fishing, tons	434,000	620,000	1:1.4

* SOURCE: Matsumoto Hiroichi, *Gekido suru Kankoku* [Korea in Turmoil] (Tokyo 1963), 161. Statistics for South Korea are based on the Annual Report of the Korean National Bank and the statistics for North Korea are based on the *Far Eastern Review* of 1963.

During the postwar period the DPRK also completed the so-called "gradual cooperativization of individual farming"—the collectivization of the farming population. Thus, three types of cooperatives were initiated by the KWP for the effective utilization of available farming equipment and labor forces. The first was "a shared labor cooperative," the second was a "pooled land cooperative," and the third, a "socialist cooperative" in which all land, farming equipment, and cattle were communally owned by the members, with each member's share determined by his labor and skill. By August 1958 the entire farming population of North Korea was grouped into the third type of cooperative. Now all land in the North belonged to the state. About a million farming households were first grouped into 13,309 agricultural cooperatives,

[31] See "Report of President Ch'oe Yong-Kŏn at the Eleventh Session of the Second Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK on June 20, 1962" in the pamphlet *On Waging a Nation-wide Struggle for the Withdrawal of the U.S. Army from South Korea* (Tokyo 1962), 17-18.

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then later in October 1958 were regrouped into 3,843 cooperatives so that each cooperative was conterminous with the lowest administrative unit, the *ri*. The director of the *ri* agricultural cooperative became the chairman of the *ri* people's committee. The average size of the agricultural cooperative thus increased to approximately three hundred households from the average of seventy-nine before the reorganization.[32] In short, Kim Il-Sŏng established a social system by which regimentation of the people and utilization of farm labor became more effective and more ruthless than before. However, not only did Kim's agricultural program consolidate his power and increase his control of the people, it also succeeded in making North Korea agriculturally self-sufficient. This was certainly a great leap forward, for in essence it overcame most of the critical economic problems that the division had created in North Korea.

After consolidating his own power within the party through successive purges, through establishing collectivization for more effective regimentation of the rural population, and, most of all, through achieving a considerable success in North Korea's economic reconstruction, Kim Il-Sŏng had created the adequate socialistic-revolutionary base required for his unification plan. Now, from a position of considerable strength, he could move on to emphasize the third phase—the proposal for a confederation of the two Koreas.

On August 15, 1960, Kim Il-Sŏng presented his new unification proposal in a speech celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of Korean emancipation from Japanese rule. This plan called for the establishment of a "confederated government" by combining the existing North and South Korean governments.[33] A Supreme National Committee organized by representatives of the two governments would be created to administer such common state functions as foreign relations, currency, postal service, and cultural functions. However, during this transitional period each government would maintain its own political system. The Supreme National Committee would be composed of an equal number of representatives from each side and would deal with various prob-

[32] Barnett, 244; Maruo, 43. For detailed information, see Chōsen Minshushugi Jinmin Kyowa Koku Kagakuin Keizai-Hōgaku Kenkyusho [Research Institute of Economics and Law, Academy of Social Sciences, DPRK], *Chōsen ni okeru Shakaishugi no Kiso Kensetsu* [Construction of the Foundation of Socialism in Korea] (Tokyo 1962), 33-41. See also Terao Koro, "Kita Chōsen ni okeru Nogyo ni kansuru Shomondai" [Problems of North Korean Agriculture], *Chōsen Kenkyu Geppo*, XX (August 1963), 11-18.

[33] Kongbopu, 18. See also Kim Il-Sŏng, *Chōsen Minshushugi Jinmin Kyowakoku Seifu no Tōmen no Kadai ni tsuide* [On the Present Task of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] (Pyŏngyang 1962), 25-36. This is Kim Il-Sŏng's speech delivered at the Supreme People's Assembly on October 23, 1962.

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lems on the basis of equality—that is, each side would have veto power.

The scheme was further explained by Ch'oe Yong-Kŏn, Chairman of the SPA, in his speech at the Assembly meeting of 1962. He explained that this system would be different from "a coalition government" because neither member could impose its own system upon the other. But he added that the confederation plan did not preclude the speedy development of a unified government. The plan was proposed as a transitional step toward ultimate ratification because unity could not be gained easily. He emphasized that the differences between North and South had become too great and that the two countries were too far apart politically and economically. He hoped that the confederation plan would facilitate bridging the gap between the two nations and would promote a common culture, essential to future unification.[34]

Kim Il-Sŏng's proposal also demanded that the two governments conclude an agreement that would expedite the speedy withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. Furthermore, each government was to renounce the use of armed force against the other. Another of Kim's proposals called for the reduction of the armed forces of each nation to 100,000 or less on the condition that all foreign troops withdraw from South Korea.

Finally, Kim Il-Sŏng suggested a Joint Economic Committee to coordinate only economic and commercial matters in case the confederation plan was not acceptable to the South Korean regime. This committee was to be composed of business and industrial representatives from both sides. He also reiterated his previous offer for the exchange of scientific, artistic, athletic, and cultural missions, and other nonpolitical groups. The place for negotiations on these proposals was to be Pyŏngyang, Seoul, or Panmunjom. Kim emphasized, however, that the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea still adhered "to the unshakable principle that the unification question should be solved by peaceful means among the Korean people without any outside interference and should be achieved by holding free all-Korea elections on a democratic basis."[35]

These proposals for peaceful unification of Korea still continue to be repeated with little variation. The same proposals are presented to every session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in the

[34] See Ch'oe Yong-Kŏn's Report to the SPA (October 19-24, 1960), in *Chōsen Mondai Kenkyu* (Tokyo), IV (December 1960), 10-13. See also Nam Il's Report to the SPA (October 26-29, 1959), *ibid.*, III (December 1959), 8-10.

[35] *Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,* reprinted by the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Tokyo 1962), 54-55.

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form of a memorandum from the North Korean government. The same proposals were also repeated in the DPRK's appeal for a nonaggression pact (June 20, 1962), in Kim Il-Sŏng's demand for the immediate negotiation of the cultural and economic exchange (October 24, 1962), in Ch'oe Yong-Kŏn's message to the South Korean people (July 1963), in the Supreme People's Assembly's appeal to the Korean National Assembly (March 2, 1964), in Kim Il-Sŏng's letter to Kim Yong-Jun, the chairman of the Korean Affairs Institute in Washington (January 8, 1965), and in various other speeches, messages, and appeals from the North Korean leaders. On practically every ceremonial occasion, at every mass meeting, in every important speech made in North Korea, and during every night of radio broadcasting to South Korea, the North Koreans have parroted these proposals as if they were the only solution for the peaceful unification of Korea.

Upon close examination of all the speeches and statements listed above, it will first be noticed that the North Korean regime has quietly dropped the idea of supervision of the elections by neutral nations, which had been repeated from the Geneva Conference until the 1959 session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Instead, the regime is now emphasizing the theme that "as the unification is fundamentally the internal problem of the Korean people it should be settled by the Korean people themselves through negotiations between the North and South Korean authorities without outside interference."[36] This implies that any supervision, whether by the United Nations or by neutral nations, is "outside interference" in the internal affairs of the Korean people. It is also interesting to note, in this connection, that since 1961 the DPRK has not demanded "international conferences of the nations concerned with Korean problems," which they had persistently demanded in the past. This sudden change in the DPRK's attitude must be interpreted as a substantial change in its unification policy.

The change might be interpreted as an indication that in the future the DPRK would not accept any international organization—the United Nations or the neutral nations—as the supervisory body of the elections. In short, the only method of unification they seem to have in mind is one that would guarantee the existing socialist system in North Korea—that is, confederation, or a method that would enable the expansion of their own system to the South without endangering the security of the northern regime. This position actually reflects an inten-

[36] "Report of President Ch'oe Yong-Kŏn," in *On Waging a Nation-wide Struggle*, 21-26. See also "Memorandum of the DPRK to the United Nations" (issued October 23, 1962), in *Chōsen Tsushin Shiryo* (Tokyo), No. 5 (January 1, 1963), 36-49.

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sification of "struggle for national liberation in the South" by a well-organized subversive movement. The regime might also have dropped the idea of supervision by neutral nations in order to make a stronger appeal to the nationalist spirit of the South Korean people. Certainly the words "Chaju T'ongil" (independent unification) have greater appeal to the minds of Koreans than "unification under supervision." Indeed, many South Korean students were intoxicated with the slogan after the April revolution and organized the North Korea–oriented Minjok Chaju T'ongil Yŏnmaeng (National Independent Unification Association).

Secondly, it is notable that the new proposals stress economic and cultural exchange rather than the organization of a unified government. We have to admit that North Korea has achieved considerable success in its economic development while in South Korea the growth of the economy has been severely impeded by an unstable political situation.[37] The DPRK, since 1961, has striven to achieve an image among the Koreans that North Korea is a paradise of workers and South Korea is the living hell of the people. In other words, the DPRK does not want to create a "Berlin Wall" between the North and the South but, on the contrary, desires to reduce the barriers in order to increase the sympathy and support in the South for the DPRK.

The DPRK's emphasis on this policy has been expected ever since the regime successfully completed its first Five-Year Plan, when cultural exchange became the major theme of North Korean propaganda.[38] The slower the growth of the South Korean economy the more attractive the proposals for economic trade and cultural exchange have become. In 1962 when South Korea faced an extreme shortage of grain, the DPRK offered 10,000 tons of rice for relief. In March 1964, the government again proposed to offer annually to the ROK 300,000 tons of rice, 100,000 tons of structural steel, one billion kilowatt hours of electricity, 10,000 tons of chemical fiber, as well as cement, timber, machinery, and so on. It further proposed that the DPRK receive all unemployed South Koreans should the ROK allow them to leave South Korea.[39] Whether the DPRK was really in a position to offer such goods,

[37] Since 1964, however, the South Korean economy has shown an upswing, especially in the fields of coal, cement, power, textiles, rubber processing, and oil refining. During the 1964-1965 period it attained an average annual growth rate of eight percent in its GNP.

[38] Chōsen Daigaku [Chōsen University], *Chōsen ni kansuru Shiryo* [Materials on Korea], No. 6 (Tokyo 1962), 45-53. This monographic series was compiled by the North Korea–oriented Chōsen University in Tokyo.

[39] Statement of Ch'oe Yong-Kŏn, in *One Korea* (Tokyo), No. 36 (April 1964), 21. This monthly journal is published in Japan by an advocate of Korean neutralization.

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which are almost equal in amount to the goals of the South Korean Five-Year Plan, is doubtful, yet the offer had great psychological appeal to the politically sensitive public in South Korea in view of the existence there of more than two million unemployed.

Thirdly, in the new proposals Kim did not mention whether the future election to accomplish Korean unification should be based on the principle of proportional representation or on the principle of equal representation of the North and the South. The North Korean official statements remain vague on this point. They have asserted that general elections should be conducted by universal and equal suffrage and that they must be democratic elections fully guaranteeing the secrecy of the ballot.[40] Only once, at the time of the Geneva Conference, did the DPRK suggest that the representatives of the proposed All-Korean National Assembly be elected "on the principle of proportional representation." Nam Il stated that "the representative character of the All-Korean National Assembly will be guaranteed by establishing throughout Korea electoral districts with the same number of inhabitants and with equal representation in the future National Assembly."[41] Acceptance of this statement at face value is misleading because in the North Korean proposal the real power to settle the procedure of unification as well as to draft an election law was not given to the All-Korean National Assembly but to the *All-Korean Commission* where the North Korean representative could exercise veto power. However, since the Geneva meeting, the DPRK's official statements have been persistently vague on this issue of representation. Since the North Korean population is only eleven million compared to the twenty-eight million of South Korea, the DPRK would certainly be placed in a disadvantageous position if the elections were based on the principle of proportional representation. In case the unified Korean government was formed by the All-Korean National Assembly, whose members would be elected on the principle of proportional representation, under the supervision of the United Nations or a commission of neutral nations, the chance for Communist domination in the government would be very small, to say the least. This must be one of the key reasons why Kim Il-Sŏng proposed a confederation plan. Even in this new proposal he did not forget to emphasize the point that the Supreme National Committee, the key organ of the confederated government, should be composed "on the principle of equality." In effect, the Supreme National Com-

[40] *Documents of the Fourth Congress of the KWP*, 391.
[41] U.S. Department of State, 174. See also Chōsen Daigaku, 36-37.

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mittee in the new proposal is simply a replica of the All-Korean Commission in the DPRK's Geneva proposal.

Fourthly, Kim Il-Sŏng in his new proposal and his subsequent statements still refused to accept the authority and the competence of the United Nations in any settlement of the Korean unification problem. Yet the General Assembly has been adopting resolution after resolution on Korea in every session and has called for unification through an all-Korean general election conducted under the auspices of the UN. Furthermore, the ROK has claimed to be and actually is the legitimate child of the United Nations. Thus the South Korean government cannot morally separate its unification policy from the United Nations. In short, the North Korean government's rejection of the United Nations is unacceptable to the South Korean government.[42]

Lastly, in Kim's new proposal and subsequent statements related to the issue of unification, the general tone has become more bellicose and aggressive than ever before. This may be closely related to the DPRK's ideological shift from the Kremlin's peaceful coexistence line to China's more aggressive "war of liberation" line. At the end of 1962 the DPRK began its open attack on "modern revisionism" and became a close ally of Communist China, which strongly advocates the war of national liberation. Beginning in March 1963 it was no longer unusual to read open criticism of the Soviet Union in *Nodong Shinmun,* the official newspaper of the KWP.

Furthermore, in his recent lecture given at the Indonesian Academy of Social Sciences on April 14, 1965, Kim Il-Sŏng clearly classified South Korea as an area to which the doctrine of the war of liberation is applicable.[43] In 1962, at the Fourth Congress of the KWP, he had already declared that "the South Korean people find themselves in the worst adversity in which the outrageous bayonet stifles everything, and the struggle of the masses for the country's peaceful unification and for existence is subjected to ruthless suppression. The South Korean people cannot live any longer in such a distressful situation. They should rise up in a nationwide struggle to repel and smash the reckless onslaught

[42] On October 20, 1965, Yi Tong-Wŏn, Foreign Minister of South Korea, suggested that in the future the Republic of Korea "would reconsider its policy of presenting the issue of Korean unification to the United Nations as the international organization might not be able to discuss the matter effectively." The South Korean Prime Minister, Chung Il-Kwŏn, also expressed the view that "the South Korean government would not accept a United Nations unification plan if the organization could not guarantee fair elections in the North." These statements indicate a possible change in South Korea's unification policy in the future (*Dong-A Ilbo* [Seoul], October 20, 29, and December 9, 1965).

[43] *Chōsen Shiryo,* No. 48 (May 1965), 9-11.

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of the counterrevolution."[44] In almost the same speech to the members of the Central Committee of the KWP, Kim defined the U.S. occupation of South Korea and its aggressive policy as the main obstacles to the peaceful unification of Korea and the democratic development of South Korean society. Since 1960 his central theme for the unification drive has been "to effectively wage a national liberation struggle" by forming a united front encompassing all the patriotic forces in North and South Korea.

Another reason for this hard line must be Kim Il-Sŏng's realization that as long as American forces are stationed in Korea the achievement of unification on his terms will be impossible. He and his followers must be frustrated by the fact that even after the April revolution of 1960, regime after regime in South Korea has promoted an anti-Communist line. Furthermore, the unexpected military coup (May 16, 1961) and the subsequent development of its leaders' extreme anti-Communist program in South Korea drove the North Korean leaders to conclude mutual defense and friendship treaties with China (July 11, 1961) and the Soviet Union (June 6, 1961). Very recently it was even reported that the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea favors the conclusion of a new alliance between Communist China, Indonesia, Cambodia, North Vietnam, and North Korea.[45]

In light of these developments we can conclude that the true unification policy of the DPRK is, indeed, the policy of overthrowing the South Korean regime by waging an intensified national liberation struggle. The proposals for confederation or for economic and cultural exchange can be interpreted as mere tactical instruments for the strategy of national liberation struggle. This line of analysis can be easily substantiated if we examine Kim Il-Sŏng's Report to the Fourth Congress of the KWP (September 11, 1961) and his recent lecture on "socialist construction in the DPRK and South Korean revolution" (April 14, 1965).[46] Although these two lectures were delivered four years apart, the content and thesis are remarkably similar.

In these lectures Kim Il-Sŏng clearly states that the ultimate goal of the Korean Communists is the realization of communism through the process of socialist revolution, and the duty of the Communists must be the achievement of this goal. He states that at the present mo-

[44] *Documents of the Fourth Congress of the KWP,* 384. See also Kim Il-Sŏng's Report to the Fourth Congress on the unification of Korea, in *Saŏp Ch'onghwa Boḳo,* 99-118.

[45] Associated Press release, September 29, 1965.

[46] *Chōsen Shiryo,* No. 48, 9-33; and Kim Il-Sŏng's Report to the Fourth Congress on Party, in *Saŏp Ch'onghwa Boḳo,* 118-60.

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ment the revolutionary task in North Korea is the construction of socialism while the task in South Korea must be "an anti-imperialistic and antifeudal democratic revolution." In the KWP meetings of 1953 and 1956, Kim's emphasis was on making North Korea "a solid democratic base" for future unification. In 1961 he declared that the DPRK had achieved the 1953 goal by successfully completing the first Five-Year Plan. He proudly declared in the Fourth Party Congress that "in the northern part of the country, a solid foundation for everlasting prosperity of the nation has been laid." In other words, North Korea had acquired a solid revolutionary base for South Korean revolution. Kim Il-Sŏng is thus urging the North to aid the revolution of the South Korean people until the North can unify the country by liberating South Korea.[47]

As for the course of the South Korean revolution, he seems to suggest that it will take five stages. The first stage must be the awakening of the South Korean people so that they can be easily mobilized for a revolutionary movement. The second stage must be the reorganization of the KWP and its front organizations. He points out that "owing to the absence of the political party of the working people, the South Korean people failed to gather the fruits of costly struggles in the past period."[48] He further points out that the failure of the April student revolution was mainly due to the lack of a vanguard party. The third stage is the formation of a united front with all the "progressive and democratic elements who support the expulsion of American imperialism." During this period, Kim says, the Communists will work "hand in hand with anyone who comes out for peaceful unification of Korea, regardless of his past activities, class status, social position, political views, and religious belief." The fourth stage is positive action to expel "the American imperialists and their running dogs" by sabotage and noncooperation. The final stage is the overthrow of all reactionary forces in South Korea by an intensified struggle for national liberation. Kim Il-Sŏng's evolutionary analysis and program for the South Korean "liberation" seems to assume that the first four stages may be accomplished simultaneously. That is, a united front will expel the American imperialists, by force of arms if necessary, thus accomplishing the first four stages. He concludes that the unification of Korea ultimately depends on three important forces: (1) the strength of North Korean socialism as the political, economic, and military base

[47] *Chōsen Shiryo*, No. 48, 14. See also Kim's letter to Kim Yong-Jun, *ibid.*, No. 44 (January 1965), 12-13.

[48] *Saŏp Ch'onghwa Boḳo*, 106; *Documents of the Fourth Congress of the KWP*, 388.

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for South Korean revolution, (2) the strength of South Korean revolutionary forces, and finally, (3) the strength of the unity between the Korean people and international revolutionary forces.[49]

From Kim Il-Sŏng's analysis of the revolutionary situation in South Korea, we can safely conclude that his appeal for peaceful unification through a confederation is not the true North Korean plan of unification. The true policy appears to be expansion of the North Korean socialistic system into South Korea by fomenting a war of national liberation through subversive action.

As far as official proposals for unification are concerned, the basic differences between the North and the South seem to lie only in the following three points: (1) the acceptance of the authority and competence of the United Nations, (2) methods of election supervision, and (3) withdrawal of American armed forces. However, we should note that these basic differences might be resolved without too much difficulty in the event of the admission of Communist China or the DPRK into the United Nations. As a member of the United Nations each would be obliged to assume a moral obligation to accept the authority and competence of the United Nations for the settlement of peaceful unification of Korea. North Korea's repeated statements that it would not accept any measures taken by the United Nations in the absence of a North Korean delegation implies, in a sense, that they would respect an acceptable resolution of the United Nations if the DPRK could actively participate in the debate. As to the problem of an international supervisory commission, it could be solved by forming the commission with only the representatives from neutral nations that did not participate in the Korean War and are acceptable to both sides. This line of solution was suggested in the Seventeenth General Assembly of the United Nations by several Afro-Asian nations including Indonesia, Ghana, Tunisia, and Ceylon. The problem of the withdrawal of U.S. forces could also be solved by replacing the present UN forces in Korea under American command with United Nations security forces drawn from neutral nations that did not participate in the Korean War. This was also suggested by the representative of Ghana at the Assembly session of 1962 in the debate of the First Committee (the political committee) of the United Nations. In short, the admission of Communist China and the subsequent invitation of the North Korean delegation to the debate on Korean problems would quite likely change the North Korean policy for peaceful unification of Korea. At this point the North Koreans might be forced to define clearly their attitudes toward the

[49] *Chōsen Shiryo*, No. 48, 33.

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militant policy of a national liberation struggle as well as toward the possibility of Korean neutralization.

It is reported that the August 1956 purge of Ch'oe Ch'ang-Ik, the vice-premier, and his group took place partly because they had advocated Korean neutralization but the whole story is still unknown.[50] The DPRK's official statements have not explicitly rejected neutralization because the regime probably recognizes the immense popularity of neutralization among students and intellectuals in the South. In South Korea the government and most of the opposition parties (except for a few minor progressive parties) also reject the idea of neutralization. Since neutralization as a means to evolve peaceful Korean unification has already been suggested by Senator Mansfield, Krishna Menon, and President de Gaulle, the issue will certainly become one of the key problems that the North Korean regime has to face in the future. However, at the present moment the North Korean leaders seem to believe that unification should be achieved only by more effectively waging the national liberation struggle in South Korea. The appeal for economic and cultural exchange and for the confederation plan is used as an instrument of strategy in this national liberation struggle.

In summary, we can see that from 1950 until 1960 the unification propaganda emanating from North Korea was influenced primarily by the internal economic problems and politics of North Korea itself, although the prevailing Communist ideological line and the world situation also affected the propaganda to a considerable extent. The peaceful unification line beginning with the Cease-Fire Agreement occasioned the purge of the Pak Hŏn-Yŏng group. The secondary theme of North Korean policy, that the construction of a revolutionary base in North Korea was necessary for peaceful unification, conveniently linked North Korean nationalist aspirations with the materialistic goals of North Korean Three- and Five-Year Plans. It also served to eliminate the last opposition of the Yenan-Soviet factions.

Since the consolidation of the North Korean political and economic power was completed, the tone of unification has become increasingly bellicose. With the announcement of the confederation plan and the economic-cultural exchange proposals, the unification propaganda has become more frequently influenced by changes from outside North Korea, especially by the fluid political situation in Seoul and by the Communist Chinese ideology of the war of national liberation. As long as the seemingly independent-minded Kim Il-Sŏng group (the so-

[50] Ministry of Public Information, ROK, *Neutralization Is Impossible for Korea,* The Unification Study Series (Seoul 1965), 45.

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called Kap San faction) remains firmly in control of North Korea, it can be expected that the possible admission of China to the UN, the possible alliance between China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Cambodia, and Indonesia,[51] the normalization of South Korea–Japan relations, and the course of the war in South Vietnam (especially with the participation of South Korean troops) will readily influence the unification propaganda. Regardless of the propaganda, however, the ultimate goal of North Korea is still, first, the expulsion of the United States from South Korea, and secondly, the subversion and subsequent socialization of South Korea.

[51] The recent takeover in Indonesia by General Suharto will, of course, certainly affect relations between North Korea and Indonesia.

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Research Note

ON THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COMMUNISM

By ROBERT C. TUCKER*

FOR good historical reasons, scholarship on communism grew up within Russian area studies. As communism came to power in more countries after the Second World War, the expanded study of it proceeded, to a large extent, in similar established branches of scholarship, most notably East European studies and sinology. But now Communist studies seem to be outgrowing area studies, to be transcending their very perspective.

It becomes increasingly clear that communism, despite its Russian origin, is not inherently a local phenomenon but a form of society or civilization that can spread and take root in virtually every part of the globe when circumstances are propitious. It likewise becomes more and more clear that it is the contemporary social sciences rather than area studies in the traditional sense that provide most of the promising concepts and methods for the study of Communist societies. These two basic facts point to the comparative study of communism as the most hopeful direction for scholarship in Communist studies to take in coming years. My aim in what follows is to amplify this thesis and to formulate some of the problems that arise in reorienting research toward "comparative communism."

First, a word on where we now stand. In a survey of the history of Russian studies in this country published in 1959, Philip Mosely observed: "An important task which has hardly been tackled at all is the comparative study of Communist systems. . . ."[1] Since then, however, the comparative study of communism has ceased to be a mere gleam in scholarship's eye. The new trend has been born and is showing vigorous signs of early growth.

* This article was prepared for a conference on the status and prospects of comparative Communist studies, held in New York in May 1966 by the American Council of Learned Societies with the assistance of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. In revising it for publication, I have taken account of a number of points raised in the discussion. I have also benefited from comments on the original paper by Professor Glenn D. Paige.

[1] H. H. Fisher, ed., *American Research on Russia* (Bloomington 1959), 18.

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Historians like Theodore von Laue,[2] Cyril Black,[3] and Robert Daniels[4] have examined the Russian and other Communist revolutions in comparative perspective rather than as strictly national events. In *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power*,[5] Chalmers Johnson, a political scientist, has investigated the important role of nationalism in communism's rise to power not alone in China but likewise in Yugoslavia, which he treats as a comparable case in the category of "independent Communist states." Economists have begun to contribute to a comparative study of communism by constructing general models of "Soviet-type economies" and their characteristic institutions, such as central planning.[6] Increasing interest in the comparative study of Communist legal institutions is reflected in John Hazard's "Unity and Diversity in Socialist Law."[7] And the comparative study of Communist politics has been progressing quite rapidly in the 1960's.

In *The Soviet Bloc*, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski explored divergent institutional and policy patterns as well as the interrelations of Communist states.[8] Richard Burks contributed in an important way to comparative communism with *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe*.[9] In *Communist Strategies in Asia*, edited by A. Doak Barnett, a collaborating group of scholars looked at Asian Communist movements in relation to two major Communist models—the Soviet and Chinese.[10] A subsequent collaborative volume, *The Communist Revolution in Asia*, edited by Robert Scalapino, continued the comparative analysis of Asian Communist movements.[11] Still more recently, Gordon Skilling has produced, in *The Governments of Communist East Europe*, a systematic comparative politics of communism in Eastern Europe.[12] Meanwhile, at the Tahoe conference of June 1965 on "Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences," held under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies, an

[2] *Why Lenin? Why Stalin?* (Philadelphia and New York 1964).
[3] *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York 1966).
[4] "The Chinese Revolution in Russian Perspective," *World Politics*, XIII (January 1961), 210-30.
[5] (Stanford 1962).
[6] See, for example, David Granick's "An Organizational Model of Soviet Industrial Planning," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXVII (April 1959), 109-30; Gregory Grossman's "Notes for a Theory of the Command Economy," *Soviet Studies* (October 1963); and John Montias' "Planning with Material Balances in Soviet-Type Economies," *American Economic Review*, XLIX (December 1959), 963-85.
[7] *Law and Contemporary Problems*, XXX (Spring 1965), 270-90.
[8] (Cambridge, Mass., 1960; rev. ed. New York 1961).
[9] (Princeton 1961).
[10] (New York 1963).
[11] (Englewood Cliffs 1965).
[12] (New York 1966).

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attempt was made to set going a scholarly dialogue between specialists in these two principal fields of area studies relating to communism.[13]

We are speaking, then, not of a hypothetical future possibility but of a developing intellectual movement and an already emergent new kind of scholarly inquiry in Communist studies. What I wish to contend is that the prerequisites now exist for a rapid and fruitful *expansion* of this kind of inquiry. First, we face the fact that communism itself has proliferated—not only geographically but likewise politically, economically, culturally, and even ideologically. The processes of differentiation that have been going on for a long time inside the Communist world have now reached a point where we must speak of communism in the plural, recognizing that we are no longer dealing with a single, simply identifiable entity even though there continue to be broad uniformities and continuities that give different Communist systems a common character. But to recognize the existence of diverse *communisms* is implicitly to adopt the perspective of comparative communism in scholarly work.

If data growing out of Communist diversity are one prerequisite for expanded comparative study of communism, the accumulation of area studies is another. Without a solid base of country studies to build upon, comparative analysis of communism may hang inconsequentially in the rarefied atmosphere of theoretical speculation. But we may have such a base today, or something approximating it. Especially in Soviet area studies there has grown up a very extensive scholarly literature on the history of institutions, economics, politics, law, culture, society, and ideology. Being younger, the scholarship on communism in Eastern Europe, China, and elsewhere in Asia, and on Communist movements in other places, is less extensive, and some specialists in these areas are understandably concerned to enlarge it as their first-priority task. Whether our present base in area studies is sufficient to support a full takeoff into comparative communism is therefore uncertain. But even if one takes the optimistic view that it is, much more area work will undoubtedly be needed as comparative communism progresses.

And as this implies, there is no real opposition, or should not be, between area studies and comparativism despite natural differences in outlook between those whose interests run in the one direction and those who gravitate toward the other. Area studies naturally point toward comparative analysis, and the latter in turn presupposes and makes use of the former. Far from depressing area studies, therefore,

[13] Donald Treadgold, "The Two Communist Giants Compared: A Report of the Conference on Soviet and Chinese Communism," *ACLS Newsletter,* XVI (November 1965), 1-4.

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the swift future growth of comparative communism may well have a highly stimulating effect upon them by suggesting fresh lines of useful area research and enriching its analytic content. We may, in fact, see something of a convergence, with differing emphasis as the chief surviving distinction between an area scholarship that is characteristically hospitable to comparative inquiry and comparative studies that are solidly anchored in area knowledge.

A third and final prerequisite for rapid advance in the new direction is subjective. Here, as in other departments of life, prospects for extensive change are usually dependent upon a spreading sense of the need for change, a serious dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs. Signs of such dissatisfaction among social scientists specializing in Communist studies have been multiplying in the recent past. There is a feeling among some scholars that area studies as such, unguided by the generalizing impulse that always lurks in the comparative approach, are in a blind alley. The gap between challenge and response in Communist studies appears to many to be not only great but also disturbingly constant. Two or three representative recent statements may serve to convey the mood. A specialist in Soviet politics complains that "political scientists in the West have failed, by and large, to apply the rich store of concepts developed for the comparative study of political systems to the communist world."[14] A China specialist, observing that much of the work done so far on Chinese communism has been in the nature of intelligence-collecting rather than social science research, comments on "the conceptual underdevelopment of our subdiscipline."[15] And noting that "the anecdotal exposition of Soviet organizational behavior eventually palls," an economist writes: "Too often our discussion of the Soviet economy goes along the lines, 'this is the way they go about it' and 'this is what happens,' which eventually evokes the retort, 'so what?' "[16] I take these various statements to be indicative of a spreading movement of thought that is critical of the traditional area approach in Communist studies and is in search of a new focus for scholarly inquiry in this field. The existence of this movement seems to reinforce

[14] Alfred Meyer, "The Nature of Communist Systems," a paper prepared for presentation at the Midwest Political Science Conference, Chicago (April 1966), mimeographed. For a much earlier criticism of the same kind and a plea for comparativism, see H. Gordon Skilling, "Soviet and Communist Politics: A Comparative Approach," *Journal of Politics*, XXII (May 1960), 300-313.

[15] Chalmers Johnson, "The Role of Social Science in China Scholarship," *World Politics*, XVII (January 1965), 256-57.

[16] Robert W. Campbell, "On the Theory of Economic Administration," in Henry Rosovsky, ed., *Industrialization in Two Systems: Essays in Honor of Alexander Gerschenkron* (New York 1966).

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the belief that the time is ripe for development of the subdiscipline along comparative lines.

Levels of Comparative Study

But what, broadly speaking, will it mean to develop along comparative lines? What, in other words, is "comparative communism" as a focus for scholarly inquiry?

It is probably best to let the answers to such questions emerge from much more accumulated experience in comparative scholarship. At the present stage of creative groping and experimentation, concentration on the methodology of comparative communism may be premature and unwise. Above all, it seems undesirable to lay down some particular approach as the one to be followed. The fact is that there are several different ways of pursuing the comparative study of communism, and the best hope for progress may lie in the encouragement of scholars to go in any and all of these directions. The watchword should be methodological pluralism.

Perhaps we might usefully distinguish different *levels* in the comparative study of Communist society. At the simplest level, comparative communism is simply area studies artfully juxtaposed. This might be called "aggregative comparison." A good example would be the above-mentioned volume *Communist Strategies in Asia*, which juxtaposed studies of different Communist movements by area specialists and did so in such a way as to bring out, comparatively, the several relationships of these movements to the two competing Communist great-power "models." Comparative communism at this level is a relatively simple kind of cooperative enterprise. It enables the area specialist to go on doing pretty much what he has been doing, but brings out a larger pattern. On the other hand, comparative communism on this plane is low in analytic content and makes only a minimal contribution toward overcoming the limitations of the area approach.

A second level of comparative inquiry may be termed "empirical comparison." Daniels' article "The Chinese Revolution in Russian Perspective," comparing the developmental pattern of Communist China with that of Soviet Russia since 1917, is an illustration. Empirical comparison in this case was directed to two Communist societies in their total policy configuration. It could, alternatively, be directed to particular institutions, policies, ideological doctrines, or economic processes. And comparisons of this type may be made not only across space, between communism in two or more areas, but also over time, e.g., as between Stalinist and post-Stalinist communism within the USSR.

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Such empirical comparison of Communist societies and their institutions offers a very rich field for cooperative efforts in which area specialists would pool their linguistic skills. For example, a systematic study by cooperating specialists of the treatment of a particularly important theme by the press of three different Communist regimes over a period of time could yield results of much greater value than three isolated studies conducted on a noncomparative basis.

It is at the next level that comparative communism shows its theoretical bent. This is "generalizing comparison," in which the object is not just to compare societies or aspects of them but to build on such empirical comparisons a structure of generalizations concerning the characteristic tendencies of communism as a form of society, economy, polity, ideology, or cultural system. Such generalizations may, of course, refer to variations as well as to uniformities in the Communist pattern. Alternatively and less ambitiously, the aim may be to generalize about communism as it exists in a particular geopolitical setting, such as Asia or Eastern Europe. Thus in his general introduction to *The Communist Revolution in Asia*, Scalapino has offered a series of generalizations, based on comparative study, concerning Asian communism. Both Burks and Skilling move from empirical comparisons to generalizations about communism as such and about East European communism in particular. And as Skilling's work brings out very well, comparative communism at this level tends to carve up the subject matter along topical or functional lines. Data concerning the several East European Communist states were ordered comparatively in terms of such topics as constitutional structures, political leadership, the decision-making process, interests and their representation, force and legality, and so on.

Generalizing comparison leads naturally to a still higher level of comparative inquiry at which the work takes the form of model-building and the study of Communist societies in relation to the theoretical models. To generalize about Communist systems on the basis of comparative data is to move toward the formulation of an ideal-type concept or theoretical model of a Communist society, economy, political system, and so on. Such models, moreover, can be either static or dynamic, i.e., they can endow the Communist system with constant characteristics or, alternatively, with a certain built-in developmental pattern. And here is where the comparative perspective becomes enormously significant. It signifies the recognition on the theoretical plane of the need for a multiple model of communism. There is presumably a unity-pattern in communism which makes it possible to formulate certain generalizations about all Communist systems and in this sense to construct a

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uniform ideal type. But within this context communism may be plural in the sense that there are diverse possible patterns of communism, e.g., orthodox Leninist-Stalinist communism, Maoist military communism, reform communism, and so on. If so, we must incorporate into the agenda of comparative communism the task of working out a typology of communisms and then applying it to the study of existing Communist systems.

Since, moreover, Communist systems have arisen at different times and at any given time are therefore likely to be at different stages of their internal development, variations over space may be closely linked with typical variations over time. To a greater or lesser extent, that is, the differences between one Communist system and another may reflect systematic changes that communism tends to undergo from one stage of its development to another. Some of the differences between Maoist Chinese communism and post-Stalin Soviet communism may, for example, lend themselves to analysis in such terms. It follows that in the quest for a multiple model of communism, comparativists may well address themselves to the task of constructing a dynamic or developmental analysis of the Communist system. Instead of endowing communism with a set of stable characteristics, in other words, we must strive to conceptualize it as a system with a built-in life cycle, a sequence of typical stages of development. So far we have no more than the bare beginnings of such a developmental analysis, partly because the use of the "totalitarian model" has militated against that way of thinking about communism.

Systems and Movements

If we take the proclaimed adherence of the ruling party and regime to "Marxism-Leninism" as a decisive criterion of being Communist, there are presently in existence fourteen Communist systems. So far in the discussion, we have been speaking of these systems as the subject matter of comparative communism. But what of the nonruling Communist parties, which now exist, legally or illegally, in nearly eighty different countries and have an aggregate membership of about four million, of which Indonesia accounted (at least until recently) for nearly a half?

Such works as Franz Borkenau's prewar history of the Comintern, *World Communism*,[17] attest that Communist movements as such have long been an object of scholarly inquiry. Much of the earlier research in this field was concerned with Communist movements in their relation to Soviet foreign policy or as parts of a Moscow-directed interna-

[17] (New York 1938).

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tional Communist movement. But more recent studies, of which Lucian Pye's *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* is a pioneering example,[18] show a shift of scholarly interest to indigenous factors in the emergence and development of Communist movements. This approach seems destined to persist in the present era of polycentric communism. The question is whether such study of Communist movements not in power should be considered an integral part of comparative communism. In my view, it should.

Although an individual scholar may properly confine himself to the study of communism in power, study of these movements that have not come to power can scarcely be excluded from the subject matter of comparative communism. If we view Communist regimes as being in some sense "movement-regimes," then the movement itself, and the party as its core and organizing nucleus, is the embryo of communism as a political and social system, and the usefulness of studying phenomena in the embryonic stage has often been established. To this it should be added that for various reasons the movement may be more accessible to study before coming to power than afterwards. Further, the comparative study of communism will always be directed in part to the problem of how communism comes to power, and data for its solution are found in movements that have not come to power as well as in those that have. Indeed, it may be scientifically as well as practically important to improve our understanding of why it is that certain Communist movements have failed to achieve power or to grow strong. Such understanding may point to critical variables in the successful cases.

Comparative study of nonruling Communist parties may be useful likewise as an independent form of research. It could throw light on the question of what happens to Communist movements when they exist for a long time *without* attaining power, or what characteristics nonruling Communist parties tend to take on in various political cultures precisely as a consequence of their nonruling status. One such project in the comparative politics of nonruling Communist parties has recently been initiated by Jan Triska and his associates in the Stanford Studies of the Communist System.[19]

Cross-System Comparison

An objection advanced against the proposal to develop the comparative study of communism is that the result may be to divert attention from the task of comparing Communist systems and their institutions

[18] (Princeton 1956).

[19] "The Non-Ruling Communist Parties: National or Cross-National? Prospectus for a Symposium," Stanford Studies of the Communist System (June 1965), mimeographed.

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with their non-Communist counterparts. To some the latter seems the most pressing item on the agenda of scholarship in Communist studies.

Efforts at such cross-system comparison are of course no novelty; they preceded comparative study of communism itself. Beginning in the later 1930's the Soviet Communist system in its Stalinist form was coupled with German national socialism and Italian fascism under the broad heading of "totalitarianism," and the latter concept greatly influenced the postwar development of Soviet studies in this country. It has lately come under criticism, however, owing to post-Stalin Soviet changes, the growth of Communist diversity, multiplying evidence that Communist systems are not the internal monoliths that this concept suggested, and so on. The comparative uses of the notion of totalitarianism have been questioned on the ground that it makes no provision for significant likenesses between, for example, Communist systems and some nationalist single-party systems in the new nations, and that it tends to obscure significant differences between communism and fascism on the one hand and between different Communist systems on the other. To meet such theoretical difficulties, some would incorporate diversity into the concept of totalitarianism by distinguishing different forms of the phenomenon, ranging from terrorist to voluntarist.[20] Others would redefine the base concept for a comparative theory of modern authoritarian systems in terms of "mobilization systems" and the like. According to one such scheme, the novel form of authoritarian system in the twentieth century is the revolutionary mass-movement regime under single-party auspices ("movement-regime"), which exists in Communist, Fascist, and nationalist varieties that share certain basic characteristics while differing significantly.[21]

An important characteristic shared by most Communist and some nationalist single-party systems is the commitment of the authorities to the goals of internal development and modernization of backward societies. This commitment raises the question of the relation between Communist studies and the study of the "developing countries." The past decade has seen a veritable burgeoning of research and theorizing on economic and political development and the processes of modernization. But there has been relatively little theoretical contact between this

[20] See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Nature of the Soviet System," *Slavic Review,* XX (October 1961), 351-68.

[21] Robert C. Tucker, "Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes," *American Political Science Review,* LV (June 1961), 281-89. On "mobilization systems" see David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965). For a review of the recent criticisms of the concept of totalitarianism, see Skilling's "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics,* XVIII (April 1966), 435-51.

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new scholarly front and Communist studies. The general theory of modernization has not had a great deal to say on communism as a mode (or modes) of modernization. In *The Stages of Economic Growth*,[22] for example, W. W. Rostow was willing at most to allow that communism is a "disease" of modernization, a pathological form of the process. And theorists of the politics of developing areas have concentrated all but exclusive attention upon the non-Communist new nations of Asia and Africa.[23] A potential field for cross-system comparison thus appears to have been relatively neglected. Communist studies and the comparative study of modernization remain to be brought fully into relation with one another. This is not to suggest that the former should be incorporated into the latter, but simply that Communist countries should be included for certain social science purposes in the category of "developing countries" and that Communist forms of modernization belong within the purview of the comparative study of modernization. Modernization theory has a significant place in Communist studies, and vice versa.

Reference has been made to conceptual bridges for comparative study of Communist and nationalist single-party systems. Now something further should be said about comparative study and the communism-nationalism dichotomy. Especially in an era of Communist polycentrism, this old dichotomy breaks down. Since "communism" and "nationalism" can no longer be viewed, if indeed it was ever proper to do so, as mutually exclusive sociopolitical forces, they should not be treated as mutually exclusive conceptual categories. Not only have Communist movements in various places sought to capitalize upon nationalist emotion in their drives for power and in policies followed after coming to power; communism and nationalism have in various ways undergone a fusion process in the course of Communist political development. As a result, nationalism has reappeared in Communist forms, ranging from great-power chauvinism to "national communism" as a tendency in certain small Communist countries. This has a bearing not only upon the comparative study of Communist societies, but also upon cross-system comparison between "Communist" and "nationalist" states.

[22] (Cambridge 1960).

[23] See, for example, Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960). The concept of totalitarianism may have been an inhibition upon comparative treatment of non-Communist and Communist "developing areas." Thus in an earlier fourfold classification of political systems, Almond characterized the developing countries under the heading of "pre-industrial political systems" while placing communism in the classification "totalitarian political systems." See his "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (August 1956), 391-409.

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What may linguistically loom as a chasm in kind may be a rather subtle difference in reality.

The publication in 1964 of the study by Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR*, has done much to open up still a further sphere of fruitful cross-system comparison. The authors collaborated in a systematic comparative study of the Soviet and American political systems in terms of political beliefs, the individual, leadership, and policy-making. It was supplemented with a series of case studies comparing, for example, the paths to power of Kennedy and Khrushchev, the dismissals of MacArthur and Zhukov, and the behavior of the two systems in the Cuban and Hungarian crises. Even its critics have recognized this book as a breakthrough. Although its tendency is to stress the depth of differences between the two systems, by the very fact that it finds them empirically comparable it departs from the old habit of thinking of American and Soviet society as totally contrasting examples of the polar opposites "democracy" and "totalitarianism." By breaking down the absolutism of that dichotomy, the study has given impetus to cross-system comparison of a difficult but important new kind.

Empirical comparison of the United States and the Soviet Union raises deeper theoretical problems of comparison of the types of society or civilization that they represent. Brzezinski and Huntington address themselves, in particular, to the question of "convergence." Are Soviet and American societies, as two expressions of advanced industrial civilization, evolving along converging lines? Does industrialism wear away differences and foster a gradual rapprochement of advanced industrial civilizations? In his wartime book, *Russia and the United States*,[24] the Russian-born American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin argued that Russian and American societies were converging. Other American and West European thinkers have likewise argued the affirmative case. Still others, including Inkeles and Brzezinski and Huntington, have criticized their position.[25] Soviet scholars have in the recent past vigorously joined the debate, championing the anticonvergence position and contending that there is no uniform type of advanced industrial soci-

[24] (New York 1944).

[25] Sorokin reaffirmed his wartime position in a later article, "Mutual Convergence of the United States and the U.S.S.R." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* I (September 1960), 143-76. For a critique of his position, see Alex Inkeles, "Russia and the United States: A Problem in Comparative Sociology," in P. J. Allen, ed., *Pitirim Sorokin in Review* (Durham, N. Car., 1963). Skilling has given a useful review of the literature of the convergence debate in "Soviet and American Politics: The Dialectic of Opposites," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Politics,* XXXI (May 1965), 278-80.

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ety.[26] Here, then, is a challenging field of inquiry in cross-system comparison between Communist and non-Communist society. As a stimulus to further discussion and research, might it be desirable to organize in the near future an international scholarly conference on the convergence problem, to be attended by scholars from all relevant disciplines and from Communist as well as non-Communist countries?

Cross-system comparison includes not only the comparative study of systems in their totality but also comparison of particular kinds of institutions or social processes. Some examples might be the comparative study of Communist and non-Communist political parties or of the processes of urbanization as found in the two types of society. A further interesting vista for such microcomparative work is suggested by a remark made in conversation some years ago by Mikhail Pervukhin, a former member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist party: "You call it General Electric; we call it the Ministry of the Communications Equipment Industry." As this very remark suggests, however, in undertaking such comparative study it is essential to bear in mind the anthropological principle that different institutions may serve similar functions and similar institutions different functions. For example, it might be both more appropriate and more fruitful to compare a non-Communist political party with a faction of a Communist party rather than with the Communist party as such. Again, a comparative study of the legislative process in Communist and non-Communist societies might do well to take the party central committee rather than the formal state legislature as the institutional setting of the legislative process in the Communist state.

The question was raised at the opening of this section whether cross-system comparison should take precedence over comparative communism. A formal way of resolving it would be to define the scope of the comparative study of communism more comprehensively, so as to embrace cross-system comparison too. The two kinds of study do seem to reinforce each other and to be natural accompaniments of one another. But even if we opt for the more comprehensive view, the question of priorities in theory and research still remains. Where should the principal emphasis be placed at the present stage? This may be one of those questions which each scholar must decide for himself and which different individuals will validly decide in different ways. If, however, we are in the process of creating a multiple model of communism, then

[26] See, for example, G. Khromushin, "Antisovetskaia sushchnost' teorii 'rastushchego skhodstva'" [The Anti-Soviet Essence of the Theory of "Convergence"], *Kommunist*, No. 11 (1965), 99-107.

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it may be that major new progress in cross-system comparison waits upon the emergence, through comparative inquiry, of this more sophisticated theory of Communist society.

The Role of the Humanities

As an approach, comparative communism grows out of the interests, concepts, and methodologies of the contemporary social sciences. It expresses the analytic and generalizing impulse felt by students of Communist society working in the various social sciences. But may not the humanities too have a part to play in the comparative study of communism? Considering the peculiarly vital position that literature, the theater, and the rest of the arts have in Communist society, the comparative study of Communist culture would seem to be a field in which scholars in the humanities, along with social scientists, have potentially very significant contributions to make.

Literary scholarship and criticism have established themselves as principal avenues of understanding of the trends in Communist society. Suffice it to say that the essay *On Socialist Realism* by Tertz-Sinyavsky uses literary criticism as the medium for what is probably the most sensitive portrayal yet given of communism as a civilization.[27] This suggests that a comparative literature of Communist revolution may represent one fruitful direction for scholarship in the humanities to take in coming years. It is, of course, to be neither expected nor desired that scholars working in such fields as Slavic studies and sinology should abdicate their traditional interests. But those who do find it challenging to approach the literature of Communist society comparatively may achieve results of wide scholarly interest. It may be, moreover, that scholars in Slavic studies are especially well qualified to pursue such study because of the fact that they normally master more than one of the Slavic languages.

May not philosophy too have a very significant role in the comparative study of communism? We hardly need remind ourselves that communism, as an ideological civilization, places enormous emphasis upon philosophy. Furthermore, the diversification to which reference has been made earlier in this article finds manifestation too in Communist ideology and philosophy. Despite official claims that Marxism-Leninism is one and indivisible, the Communist world is nowadays the scene of controversy and competition between different Communist ideologies and philosophies. Philosophical scholars share with political scientists and sociologists an interest in these developments. Powerfully assisted

[27] Abram Tertz, *On Socialist Realism* (New York 1960).

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by the relatively recent rediscovery of the early Marx and the emergence of an "alienation debate" inside Communist societies, the proliferation of Communist Marxisms is an event of profound significance and provides a field of comparative study in which philosophical scholars have much to contribute.

Mention should be made, finally, of the comparative study of education and science in Communist society. There has been a great growth of interest in these subjects during the past decade, and substantial studies have appeared. But so far very little of this work has been comparative in scope and approach. It may turn out, however, that comparative methods have fruitful potential application in the study of both science and education in Communist society. The comparative study of Communist educational systems, in particular, may be one of the roads to a better comprehension of the place of education in Communist society, its developmental trends, and its special problems.

The Teaching of Comparative Communism

The interest in comparative communism as a focus of research and theory has undoubtedly arisen in part out of teaching experience at the college level. Teachers of Soviet politics, for example, have found themselves reaching out for comparisons between the Soviet and other Communist systems and for generalizations about their similarities and differences. Such experience fosters awareness of the need for, and possibility of, a comparative politics of communism. On the other hand, the development of theory and research along comparative lines may in turn have implications for the curriculum and for the methods of teaching courses about Communist society.

Comparative communism already has a certain place in the college curriculum in the social sciences. Some social science departments, for example, have organized courses, at the undergraduate or graduate level, along comparative lines. Thus a course may be offered in Soviet-*type* economies rather than simply in Soviet economics, and some universities already offer graduate seminars in comparative Communist political systems. The question is whether this trend toward comparativism should be carried further and, if so, along what lines. It might be held, for example, that undergraduate first courses in this or that aspect of Communist society should best confine themselves to a single important society, such as the Soviet or the Chinese, and that the comparative approach should be introduced, if at all, at the more advanced level. On the other hand, some (including the writer) have found that undergraduates in first courses react quite positively to the introduction

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of moderate doses of comparative material and comparative analysis and, indeed, that their interest is more quickly engaged and more easily sustained when a course offers the increased intellectual challenge that comparativism brings. To this it might be added that courses of comparative orientation may be especially appropriate to the needs of the majority of undergraduate students with no relevant language skills and no particular interest in specialized area training.

Similar considerations may apply at the graduate level. For the minority of graduate students who intend to specialize in one or another branch of Communist studies in the social sciences, the need for area training will remain. But what of those who do not? By transcending an area approach, it may be possible for graduate departments to make Communist studies a more integral and widely chosen part of their curriculum. To the extent that they do so, knowledge about Communist society will become less a special possession of a limited group of academic people and more a general mark of literacy about a world that is now one-third Communist and may remain so. The atmosphere of the occult that still hangs over Communist studies may be dispelled.

Do the prospects for the growth of comparative communism mean that the imposing structure of Russian, Chinese, and other relevant area programs that now exist in our universities should be dismantled or significantly reduced in size? No such implication would seem to be present. The dependence of comparative Communist studies upon a solid base of area scholarship, and hence upon the language skills and expertise that area training provides, has already been emphasized here. To dismantle the area programs would undercut future progress in the comparative study of communism. On the other hand, it may be that comparative courses have a greater place in area programs than that so far accorded them. For example, major academic centers that have area programs in both Russian and Chinese studies may well find that a comparative course or seminar offers one relatively effective way of bringing both faculty and students in the two programs into greater intellectual contact and giving each group an education in what is going on in the other's field. Such courses could on occasion be a bridge between area programs in adjacent universities. It might also be fruitful to use cross-system comparison as a way of bringing, for example, a Soviet area studies program and a program in American civilization into at least temporary systematic interrelation. Finally, experience shows that area training programs have a potentially much more important place in the undergraduate curriculum than that so far generally accorded them.

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In conclusion, it may be useful to ponder the implications of comparative communism for the teaching of courses in communism at the high-school level. Such courses have mushroomed in the United States in the past decade and in many places have taken on from the beginning an aspect of ideological indoctrination in anticommunism. The unity and singleness of purpose of something sometimes called simply "international communism" is an underlying preconception in those cases. To the extent that the high-school courses follow this line of thought, the education that they give in communism is nowadays an education in unreality. On the other hand, for various reasons a comparative approach can rarely be introduced at this level. The result is an educational dilemma of large and troubling proportions. But college and university teachers can do something to assuage it by providing corrective education in comparative communism.

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Review Articles

THE POSSIBILITIES FOR DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By JOHN T. McALISTER, JR.

Victor Bator, *Viet Nam: A Diplomatic Tragedy*, Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publications, 1965, 271 pp. $7.50.

John F. Cady, *Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964, 657 pp. $10.75.

Arthur J. Dommen, *Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, 338 pp. $5.95.

Jean Lacouture, *Vietnam: Between Two Truces*, New York, Random House, 1966, 295 pp. $5.95, (paper) $2.45.

Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, 536 pp. $12.50.

B. S. N. Murti, *Vietnam Divided: The Unfinished Struggle*, New York, Asia Publishing House, 1964, 228 pp. $8.50.

Donald E. Nuechterlein, *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1965, 279 pp. $5.95.

Roger M. Smith, *Cambodia's Foreign Policy*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1965, 273 pp. $5.75.

I

AT Angkor, where the remains of an antique kingdom's abandoned capital are found deep in the Cambodian jungle, the exquisite bas-reliefs tell a story more compelling than written history. Battle scenes with a great cavalry of war elephants meld into episodes of river combat between handsomely carved fleets of oar-powered boats in an unending stone panorama of warfare as it was fought centuries ago in Southeast Asia. For one who has seen these carved panels it is not difficult to realize that when the Europeans arrived in mainland Southeast Asia in the early seventeenth century they found warfare endemic there. This conflict was not less bloody nor less protracted than that which Europe had already experienced or was about to endure in the Thirty Years' War. But this violent interaction in Asia did not seem to hold the prospect for the development of a nation-state system such as was emerging from European warfare. Rather than moving toward centralized states and configurations of alliances, the peoples of Southeast Asia in the seventeenth century appeared to be entering a phase,

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repetitious in their history, in which political fragmentation and spasmodic conflict were hallmarks.

Eventually this political atomization and strife were curtailed by the overarching power of Britain and France. At the beginning of the twentieth century, after nearly three centuries of competition for influence and territorial advantage, these two rivals had resolved their imperial differences by partitioning mainland Southeast Asia into colonial spheres. (See Map I for the configuration of these spheres.) Until their international monopoly of power in the area was broken five decades later, these two colonial nations were free to regulate local conflicts and to impose a peace as a consequence of their predominant strength. However, with the devastation of Britain and France during World War II, the Japanese occupation of their colonial areas in Asia, the rise of the Communist state in China, and the deeper involvement of the United States in the Far East, important changes occurred. International power now became more diffuse and more difficult to manage in Southeast Asia. At the same time it became clear that the indigenous sources of conflict in the region remained, despite attempts to repress them during the colonial hegemony. Indeed, the French and British had created tensions within the local states by destroying traditional social and political structures and neglecting preparations for self-government. Thus, when the weaknesses and hiatuses in international power permitted local rivalries to reappear, these rivalries were often reinforced by internal pressures generated by decades of colonial dominance.

The persistence of centuries-old antagonisms, now often found in modern ideological garb and intensified by anticolonial struggles, is increasingly being recognized as one of the chief sources of conflict in Southeast Asia. Therefore the publication of *Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development*, by John F. Cady, is an especially welcome event for those who feel that a knowledge of the historical antecedents is essential to an understanding of the contemporary strife. Today, as in the centuries preceding colonial control, international powers have become involved as advocates or opportunists in local conflicts. By its tight internal organization, careful examination of historical continuities, and generous use of maps, Professor Cady's book permits the Anglo-French rivalry in Southeast Asia to be followed in relation to the pattern of political conflict indigenous to the area. From the perspective of this earlier international competition the prospects for the resolution of contemporary rivalry can more easily be measured.

Since Southeast Asia was only one arena of a worldwide Anglo-French

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conflict, the focus of action between these European powers frequently shifted to other parts of the globe. Events in Southeast Asia were thus punctuated by the recurrent diversion of European attention and re-

Map I. (Reprinted from *Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development* by John F. Cady, by permission of the McGraw-Hill Book Company.)

sources elsewhere. But despite such discontinuities certain rather clear patterns of national interest and conduct emerged. What had begun in

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the seventeenth century as a competition for political and commercial influence, especially in Thailand, did not become a struggle for territorial acquisition until well into the nineteenth century. During these three centuries British interests in Southeast Asia developed within "the larger geographic context extending from India to China" (Cady, 304). The importance of the trading relationship between India, China, and Europe tended to overshadow interests and opportunities in Southeast Asia and to limit Britain in taking advantage of them. When territory was eventually acquired it was primarily to protect the eastern flank of India and to ensure control over the sea routes to China. By contrast, France sought influence in Southeast Asia as a compensation for her lack of success elsewhere, especially in India and China. Considerations of national prestige and domestic politics, rather than economic motives, were paramount in French imperialist activities (Cady, 406). Even the name, Indochina, given to their territorial acquisition was a sort of prestige-boosting semantic compensation for the position that Britain had obtained in eastern Asia.

The regional conflicts that were the provocations for the British intervention and the pretexts for that of the French resulted from an almost ceaseless movement of peoples from one portion of Southeast Asia to another. Although this movement had existed from earliest times, the antipathies relevant today were formed by pressures initiated during the thirteenth century. The events of this period mark a turning point: The Mongols, having overrun China, then began their forays into Southeast Asia; these attacks had an unsettling effect on the peoples of the area. They appear to have motivated certain Tai-speaking peoples to migrate into the Menam River Valley where they laid the foundations for the modern state of Thailand (Cady, 143-44).[1] In the process they ejected the Khmers, or Cambodians, from the fertile valley region where they had been for three centuries one of the strongest powers of Southeast Asia. The once-dominant Khmers became surrounded by aggressive peoples who severely reduced Cambodian territory, thus inaugurating a spirit of enmity that still persists. To the east of Cam-

[1] Cady accepts the widely held view that the Thai were stimulated by the Mongol intervention in Southeast Asia to move southward from their original homeland in south China into the Menam River Valley. The validity of this view has been challenged by two well-known scholars of Asian culture: Frederick W. Mote rejects the idea that the Thai originated in south China and migrated southward under Mongol pressure. He believes that "the region of origin of the Thai peoples has still not been established." See his "Problems of Thai Prehistory," *Social Science Review* (Bangkok), II (October 1964), 100-109. Also see William J. Gedney, "From Ancient Thai to Modern Dialects," *ibid.*, III (September 1965), 107-12, which supports Mote's assertion from the perspective of linguistic analysis.

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bodia were the Vietnamese. After having repulsed the Mongols, the Vietnamese had felt strong enough to move southward from their homeland in the Red River Delta in northern Vietnam. In their path was the kingdom of Champa, the traditional enemy of Cambodia, located along the central coast of present day Vietnam.

Following three centuries of warfare, in which Champa was finally eliminated in the late 1600's, the Vietnamese assumed the Cham's role in vying with the Thai for control over Cambodia, a contest the Khmers feel is still continuing. Much the same sort of competition for suzerainty and buffer positions was carried on by the Thai and the Vietnamese among the cluster of principalities in the region known as Lao country (approximating the present-day kingdom of Laos). This rivalry reached a climax in the early nineteenth century with the partitioning of the territory into separate spheres. Although intense, this three-centuries' rivalry between the Thai and the Vietnamese seemed susceptible to a carefully devised equilibrium, as was exampled by Cambodia's becoming a vassal to both rivals in 1685 as well as by a similar relationship at a later period in Lao. A test of the resiliency of the relationship came with the rupture of the equilibrium in the mid-eighteenth century. The Burmese overran the Thai, destroying their capital and cutting them off from their vassals to the west whom the Thai were trying to absorb into a centralized state. This weakening of the Thai did not prove to be a permanent advantage for the Vietnamese. They too were diverted from exercising total hegemony over Cambodia or the Lao principalities when the internal wars that had racked their country for nearly two hundred years flared up again in the late eighteenth century. Once the Thai and the Vietnamese had regained their strength in the early nineteenth century, the rivalry for influence over the peoples on their periphery was renewed with intensity. Another equilibrium was achieved, but only to be destroyed once again—this time by the territorial designs of the French in the mid-nineteenth century (Cady, 260-84).

The wars within Vietnam were one of the most important aspects of the regional conflict in Southeast Asia. Although other countries in the area periodically experienced internal instability that allowed rival states to challenge their hold over vassals, this instability was usually a result of succession problems that did not involve territorial divisiveness. In Vietnam the situation was quite different. As the Vietnamese began to achieve success in their southward expansion along the narrow coastal plain, they also began to experience strains on their tenuous monarchical political system. By 1620, the system had succumbed to

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regional pressures and Vietnam had become divided into two warring states, literally separated by a wall built across the width of the country at the eighteenth parallel near the town of Dong Hoi, north of Hue. Constructed by the leaders of the southern faction, the Nguyen family, the wall of Dong Hoi rose to a height of eighteen feet, extended eleven miles, and, in 1672, proved strong enough to withstand a major military test by the northern faction under the generalship of the Trinh family. Thereafter, an armed stalemate between the opponents persisted for nearly a century, until a new set of challenges broke the stalemate and brought unification.[2]

Because of the tenacity of the struggle between the Nguyen and the Trinh, each side sought assistance from Europeans in the hope of ensuring victory over their rivals. An initial alliance of the Trinh with the Dutch turned into a catastrophe when the Nguyen captured a Dutch ship and routed sea-borne Trinh attackers. This calamity ended Dutch involvement as well as attempts by the Trinh to seek outside aid. The Nguyen were substantially more successful in obtaining European help, a factor that turned their initial weakness into a strength sufficient to stalemate the war. From their trade with Macao, the Nguyen enjoyed the advantage of better weapons than did their adversaries. This was especially true in artillery, since in 1615 a Portuguese, Jao da Cruz, had established an arsenal for the production of cannon at Hue (Cady, 265).

Although the Dutch and Portuguese had become involved with the warring Vietnamese factions, neither of them had attempted to gain political influence in Vietnam. Politically, the most enduring aspect of the seventeenth-century European involvement was the strong foothold that Portuguese Jesuits were able to obtain in the country. The presence of some French priests in the Jesuit mission in turn led to the eventual involvement of France in Vietnam. Yet despite the French church's interest in Vietnam, more than a century passed before the Vietnamese conflict gave France the opportunity to gain influence within the country. In the 1770's, volatile internal tensions erupted, breaking the stalemate in Vietnam. A rebellion in the Nguyen area just south of the eighteenth parallel gave the Trinh the opening wedge they had previously lacked. However, the Trinh, through ineptness, alienated the southern rebels, known as the Tay Son, who then turned on the Trinh as well as on the Nguyen. By 1777, the Nguyen, except for the exiled heir to their familial leadership, had been eliminated, and

[2] Charles B. Maybon, *Histoire moderne du pays d'Annam, 1592-1820* (Paris 1920), 18-25. This work is the most thorough and well-researched study available in a Western language for any period of Vietnamese history.

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in 1788 the Trinh rule in the north was ended decisively by the Tay Son (Cady, 281-84).

While the Tay Son were engaged in the destruction of the Trinh in northern Vietnam, the surviving heir to the Nguyen dynasty capitalized on their preoccupation by returning from exile and recapturing the Mekong Delta and, in 1788, the Saigon area. The heir, Prince Nguyen Anh, was successful in the south partly because the Tay Son had left the area unprotected, but also because he had received assistance from the Thai who were repaying him for his earlier aid to them against a Burmese invasion in 1786-1787. Even so, the prince might have been unable to consolidate his territorial gain had it not been for the arrival of very substantial French naval and military reinforcements. These had been arranged by the French missionary prelate, Bishop Pigneau de Béhaine, who had adopted Nguyen Anh's cause in 1775. It was not, however, until the end of the American Revolution that France had the latitude to become involved in Vietnam, and when it did, the interval was short because of the outbreak of the French Revolution. By 1795, most of the French officers had returned to participate in revolutionary developments in France, and in 1801, when Nguyen Anh recaptured Hue (proclaiming himself in the process Emperor Gia Long), only four key French advisers remained (Cady, 284). Despite the timeliness of the French assistance, its decisiveness has been a matter of dispute. Professor Cady, however, feels that the French aid was invaluable because it "transformed a defensive effort on the part of a struggling vassal prince just returned from exile into a successful campaign to unify all of Vietnam" (p. 283).[3]

Whatever the results of future inquiry into the importance of French aid, the significance of Nguyen Anh's achievement and the closeness of his relations with the French can hardly be underrated. The achievements of the victorious prince were in fact unprecedented. As Emperor Gia Long, Nguyen Anh in 1802 unified the territory of Vietnam from the Gulf of Siam to the China border for the first time. Realizing that this had been essentially a military achievement, the new emperor attempted to consolidate his gains by creating institutions that might overcome protracted regional differences and lead to the political inte-

[3] Le Thanh Khoi, in *Le Viet-Nam: Histoire et civilisation* (Paris 1955), 313-22, tends to discount the importance of French aid because he feels that the Vietnamese carried the burden of the fighting. However, Professor Cady's outstanding study, *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia* (Ithaca 1954), shows him well qualified to offer a differing interpretation. However, Le Thanh Khoi's book is the most comprehensive history of Vietnam available; it is based on French and Vietnamese monographic sources.

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gration of the Vietnamese people. Unfortunately, this trend was ended by his death, and in 1820 his successors inaugurated an authoritarian as well as xenophobic policy.

Thus the French were denied the influence in Vietnam they had enjoyed during the fight for unification and had come to expect in the period of consolidation. Not surprisingly, it was the church that was hardest hit. Gia Long's successors proscribed Christian missions and eventually killed some French clergy. This attack on the church made protection of the missionaries by the Far Eastern fleet a major issue in France and provided a convenient opportunity for Napoleon III to solidify his tenuous political position at home. After initial setbacks, the intervention in Vietnam launched by Napoleon III in 1858, in response to domestic religious sentiment, became the special interest of the French navy, which in 1897 carried its objective to the extent of amalgamating Vietnam and the ethnically and culturally distinct areas of Cambodia and Laos into an administrative territory thereafter known as Indochina (Cady, 415-28).

Unlike Vietnam, Cambodia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had not been divided territorially by internal conflict nor had the country provoked France by abusing its missionaries or traders. Nevertheless, Cambodia had been brought under the control of France in 1864 through the unfettered enthusiasm of French naval officers. This extension of French political influence in Southeast Asia seemed to be based on the assumption that France "had fallen heir to the age-old suzerainty status as regarded Cambodia . . ." (Cady, 419). Later, the same assumption was to propel France into the acquisition of political control over the principalities of Lao. Ironically, through their adoption of Vietnamese ambitions and traditional relationships, the French created in Southeast Asia a colonial empire that was a fulfilment of long-standing goals of Vietnamese expansionism. No longer was there any need for an equilibrium. The power of France was equal to imperial dreams even greater than those of the Vietnamese.

Obviously, in adopting the Vietnamese expansionist goals along the Mekong River, the French confronted Thai expansionism, with its dream of a greater Thai state in Southeast Asia.[4] The most enduring basis for this dream has always been the cultural relationship between those Thai (Siamese) who had settled in the Menam River Valley in what is now Thailand and the numerous members of the Tai ethno-

[4] Luang Vichitr Vadakarn, *Thailand's Case* (Bangkok 1941), although specifically concerned with a discussion of the Thai-Laotian and Thai-Cambodian border controversies, gives a useful background on Thai goals in Southeast Asia.

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linguistic group scattered throughout Southeast Asia and adjacent areas of China. The distribution of the Tai-speaking peoples, the most populous language group in Southeast Asia, can be seen geographically by consulting the ethnolinguistic map published with the book *Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia*, by LeBar, Hickey, and Musgrave.[5] From this very informative map it can immediately be determined that large numbers of Tai-speaking subgroups are located in strategic and generally contiguous upland areas in Burma, China, Laos, and northern Vietnam, as well as in Thailand. They compose a major ethnic theme for Southeast Asia in a pattern whose counterpoint consists of the less numerous peoples of the Miao-Yao, Tibeto-Burman, and Malayo-Polynesian ethnolinguistic groups.

The actual territorial claims of the Thai were not in the past made directly on the basis of these ethnolinguistic identities. They grew out of a lengthy history of political relations with the principalities formed by these upland Tai-speaking peoples. The long-range object of these relations was the political integration of the principalities into the Thai state, as occurred with the principality of Chiengmai, which became a permanent part of Thailand in 1802 (Cady, 293, 325). In this continuing effort toward integration, tensions arose because other states, primarily Vietnam and Burma, also wished to absorb these principalities. The principalities themselves often attempted to maintain their autonomy by playing off one or the other of these states against the Thai. The intervention and territorial acquisitions of Britain and France altered significantly this competition over Tai-speaking peoples on the periphery of the three major states of mainland Southeast Asia. The gradual British occupation of Burma and Malaya (as can be seen by consulting Map I) lost for Thailand the possibility of absorbing some Tai-speaking principalities in the northwest as well as some vassal states in the south. These losses were, however, balanced by the important benefits to Thai security from the ending of Burmese raids into the Thai state.

The situation was quite different with regard to the French occupation to the east. The disputes over the territory between Thailand and Vietnam were more complex than those on the Burma frontier. They included the contested suzerainty over Cambodia as well as the rivalry for control over the principalities composing the present-day state of Laos. More protracted was the dispute over the cluster of Tai-speaking principalities in the highlands astride the Black River in northwestern

[5] Frank M. LeBar, Gerald C. Hickey, and John K. Musgrave, *Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia* (New Haven 1964).

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Vietnam, known collectively as the Sip Song Chau Tai.[6] The French played upon the desire of these upland principalities for autonomy by negotiating treaties with them, supposedly to offset Thai influence. But France used these agreements as a lever to force Thai recognition of French supremacy over the region to the east of the Mekong. In contrast to the previous pattern of Thai-Vietnamese competition, the French were able to put pressure to reinforce their demands directly on Bangkok by deploying French naval forces in the river off the Thai capital. However, in 1893 this pressure on Thailand to recognize a French protectorate over all of Laos alarmed the British. They feared that a militant confrontation with France in Southeast Asia might ensue. The British therefore extracted from the French a promise that Thailand would be regarded as a buffer between their respective territories. This agreement was followed in 1904 by a more thorough resolution of international rivalry in Southeast Asia with the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, which stabilized the political partition of the region for nearly half a century (Cady, 427).

Although these agreements brought a cessation of international rivalry and regional conflict, they were not complemented by policies to resolve the causes of local strife. Behind the pattern of regional turbulence that had been developing since the thirteenth century lay an uneven process of political centralization and cultural assimilation. Out of this process there had emerged by the early nineteenth century three major states—Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam—based in fertile, rice-rich delta areas. These states continued with renewed intensity a competition for control over smaller political communities on their periphery, a pattern that had characterized their rise to major-power status in the region. Eventually these peripheral political fragments of upland valley principalities were absorbed into the colonial states created by the European occupation, thus ending centuries of interstate competition. The colonial territories were represented on maps of the world as states, and when the interregnum of the 1940's brought the end of European dominance, the world expected them to act like nations. But they were still what they had been in the nineteenth century, and the peripheral fragments began to spin away while internal cleavages reappeared.

[6] A more comprehensive account of this nineteenth-century struggle over the Tai highlands is contained in D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (New York 1955), 591-98. The revised 1960 edition of this standard history of Southeast Asia is out of print.

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II

Fifty years after the Entente Cordiale another attempt was made to reach a general diplomatic settlement in Southeast Asia. During the intervening half-century, international power in the region had become much more diffuse as a result of two world wars and major revolutions in China and Russia. The disruption in colonial authority that this new era had brought meant that unresolved traditional antipathies and neglected preparations for self-government had offered extensive opportunities for the involvement of new international powers. These local and international developments had caused a new configuration of regional power to emerge. In the face of this emergent power, France, in contrast to Britain, adopted an inflexible attitude. Protracted warfare and the deeper involvement of a multiplicity of international rivals were the consequences of this unfortunate stance. The post–World War II rivalry in Southeast Asia became so intense and the possibilities of great-power confrontation so threatening that by 1954 a settlement was an urgent necessity in order to avert a larger conflict. But the diffusion of international power, when matched with both the fragmentation and the intensification of local power, meant that any harmony of diplomatic interests would be difficult to achieve. None was.

Because of many conflicting pressures, the product of the conference of 1954, known inappropriately as the Geneva Agreements, was a military cease-fire and not a diplomatic settlement. The conference ended seven years of bloody combat between France and the Vietnamese Communists but it did not reconcile the sources of conflict in Southeast Asia: it did not provide for an enduring peace. The basic document negotiated at Geneva was an "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam" between the military high commands of France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.[7] Similar cease-fire agreements

[7] The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) was proclaimed by Ho Chi Minh on September 2, 1945, in Hanoi; it was recognized as a "free state" by France on March 6, 1946, although the legal definition of this recognition was never agreed upon. On December 19, 1946, military operations between France and the DRVN commenced. France's adversary was popularly known as the Viet Minh, a short form of *Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi,* or Vietnamese Independence League, which had been organized by Ho Chi Minh in 1941; its leadership was synonymous with that of the Indochina Communist Party, also founded by Ho in 1930. On June 5, 1948, France agreed to recognize an independent Vietnamese government opposed to the Viet Minh; its leader was Emperor Bao Dai. This recognition paved the way for the creation in 1950 of the State of Vietnam. In October 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam as the successor to the State of Vietnam. The Republic was immediately recognized by France and other Western powers; it is the only Vietnamese government recognized by France. See Allan B. Cole, ed., *Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions: A Documentary History 1945-1955* (Ithaca 1956).

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for Laos and Cambodia were negotiated by the two antagonists. There were only three documents signed at Geneva and only four signatories were involved: France, the royal governments of Laos and Cambodia, and the Viet Minh. These agreements were not treaties and they were not formally ratified by any government by any process. They were simply agreements between the opposing military commands to stop the fighting in Indochina and to take measures to prevent the fighting from being resumed. Some confusion has resulted because the "Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference," which "noted" the key provisions of the various cease-fire agreements, seemed to emanate from all nine conference participants.[8] However, this "Final Declaration" was not signed by *any* of the participants. It was yet another cold-war device to mask the lack of consensus among the major powers—an "unsigned treaty."[9]

Numerous reasons have been cited to explain why the "agreements" reached at Geneva did not result in a more enduring peace in Southeast Asia. Yet none of these reasons has been measured against the basic requirements for establishing peace in the area. Unfortunately, few comprehensive studies of either the Geneva Conference or the relationship of its decisions to the contours of power in Southeast Asia have been made.[10] However, out of the popular concern for the problems of the area, two books have recently appeared which treat the Geneva Conference in the context of other issues. Victor Bator's *Viet Nam: A Diplomatic Tragedy* is an emotional and polemical book making no claims to be a scholarly work. Its subtitle is "Origins of U.S. Involvement." Actually Bator is most concerned with Indochina as an example of the Eisenhower-Dulles era in American foreign policy, which he feels was a return to the unsophisticated and moralistic "Wilsonian [universalist] ideology" and therefore a repudiation of effective diplomacy (pp. 6-7). He feels that Dulles' refusal to rely on diplomacy at Geneva produced conditions that have been the direct cause of current difficulties in Vietnam. While Bator feels that there is no way to terminate the war in Vietnam "but by political settlement using diplomacy"

[8] The nine participants in the Geneva Conference of 1954 were Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Vietnam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

[9] The phrase is that of Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, *La fin d'une guerre: Indochine 1954* (Paris 1960), 274.

[10] There are two exceptions: Lacouture and Devillers, *La fin d'une guerre* and "The Geneva Conference," in Cora Bell, *Survey of International Affairs, 1954*, F. C. Benham, ed., for the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London 1957), 42-72. The former is an unexcelled study by an impressive French team of scholar and journalist.

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(p. 228), he does not measure the prospects of such a settlement against either the experience of Geneva or conditions in Vietnam.

Written in a similar vein is *Vietnam Divided: The Unfinished Struggle* by B. S. N. Murti, an Indian formerly assigned to the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, which was established by the Geneva Conference. His is a study of the implementation of the "Geneva Agreements," as well as a discussion of selected political issues that have affected peace in Vietnam. Murti's book is not a scholarly analysis of Vietnamese politics nor is it a detailed treatment of the activities of the International Commission.[11] He is principally concerned with offering a possible solution for the problems of Vietnam, but he conceives of the solution in terms of legal formulas and not in terms of political relationships in the country.

Despite their very severe limitations as scholarly contributions, these two books are interesting, provocative, and, when abundant inaccuracies are discounted, informative. Paradoxically, these books provoke great interest in important issues by their very neglect to examine them thoroughly. For example, Bator's book leaves the impression that if only the American intransigence at Geneva had not existed, a general settlement would have been forthcoming. But subsequent events have indicated that it has been the autonomy of local power, both Communist and non-Communist, from international sanctions which has become a principal obstacle to enduring peace in Southeast Asia. There is virtually no evidence to suggest that, even had they wanted to, the major Communist nations—China and the USSR—could have made at Geneva a binding agreement guaranteeing as a basis for peace the actions of the local Communists. Despite the fact that the Chinese appeared to be exercising a good deal of leverage, the Viet Minh was still an autonomous political force.[12] Similarly, the French were not making the effort to bring the non-Communist Vietnamese into a settlement, and it was clear to all that France no longer had the material

[11] An analysis of the International Commission is "Peace Observation in Indochina Through Three International Control Commissions, 1954-1964," in Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, *The Future Character and Role of Peace Observation Arrangements Under the United Nations,* a study prepared under contract ACDA/IR-34 for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Washington 1964), Appendix III, Part 2, 673-750.

[12] Between 1951 and mid-1954, aid from China is reported to have increased by ten to twenty tons per month, reaching a level of four thousand tons monthly (George Tanham, *Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina* [New York 1961], 68-69). Clear evidence of the autonomy of the Viet Minh development is contained in Tanham and in Bernard B. Fall, *Le Viet-Minh: La République Démocratique du Viet-Nam, 1945-1960* (Paris 1960).

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and financial resources to guarantee the actions of the Vietnamese south of the seventeenth parallel.

One diplomat recognizing that a diplomatic settlement had to be a carefully structured one was Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary who occupied the focal point between east and west in the negotiations at Geneva.[13] He had been anxious to secure a reciprocal arrangement among the major powers as a guarantee of peace in the Indochina area. His unfortunate choice of the name "Locarno" to describe the type of settlement he had in mind created a storm of protest in America where "Locarno" was quickly equated with "Munich" and "Yalta" as signifying a diplomatic sellout.[14] The essence of the American attitude was perhaps best summed up in a communiqué issued on June 28, 1954, at the end of a visit by Churchill and Eden to Washington. It stated that "as regards formerly sovereign states now in bondage, we will not be a party to any treaty which would confirm or prolong their unwilling subordination."[15] On Eden's other side were the Soviets, whose major interest at Geneva, it has been suggested, was to secure the defeat by France of the European Defense Treaty, in return for a generous armistice in Indochina.[16] While this speculation cannot yet be validated, it is clear that Molotov's denunciation of French Foreign Minister Bidault at Geneva contributed to the fall of the Laniel government and the accession of Mendès-France to power; that Mendès-France was able to achieve an armistice in thirty days, as he had promised, largely because of Communist concessions; and that Mendès-France, by proposing seven amendments to the EDC Treaty in August 1954, ensured its defeat by the French parliament.[17]

From what is known a decade later it is not clear either that a French agreement to defeat EDC brought the Indochina peace or that the Soviet influence in Southeast Asia was extensive enough to assure a settlement with reciprocal guarantees. One indication of the Soviets'

[13] "The Geneva Conference," in *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle* (Cambridge 1960), 120-63. In a brief volume just issued Eden has perceptively related his views of the Geneva Conference to the current crisis in Southeast Asia. See his proposal *Toward Peace in Indochina* (Boston 1966).

[14] Bell, 57-58.

[15] *New York Times,* June 29, 1954.

[16] This suggestion is put forth by Donald Lancaster, in *The Emancipation of French Indo-China* (London 1960), 336-37. Such a possibility is discounted by Cora Bell who says, ". . . There is little evidence that Mr. Molotov considered concessions in Indo-China necessary to secure the demise of the E.D.C., which was already *in articulo mortis* at this time. Nor, if he had desired to make such a bargain, was there any sign during the negotiations that he was enough in control of the situation to do so" (p. 72).

[17] Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, *France Defeats E.D.C.* (New York 1957), 162-63.

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degree of influence comes from Charles B. McLane's study *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia*, which documents through painstaking research the low priority given by Moscow to Southeast Asia (p. 479). Although limited to an analysis of the regimes of Lenin and Stalin and therefore not discussing the Soviet role at the Geneva Conference, McLane's work emphasizes that in Southeast Asia it is difficult to "escape the conclusion that the Russians articulated a more abrasive strategy . . . than they were willing to carry out" (p. 481). Since the Viet Minh had had to develop autonomously out of necessity, the Soviets were probably not free to negotiate on their behalf at Geneva.

In regard to affecting a general settlement in Indochina, the position of the Chinese was quite different from that of the Soviets. One of the principal features of the Geneva Conference was that the Chinese clearly demonstrated their position as a world power and their independence of the Soviets, and at the same time acted as the spokesman for Asian Communists. Many observers would assert that by providing vital military equipment the Chinese controlled the Viet Minh, but this matériel was supplied on a *quid pro quo* basis in return for cash or raw materials, not as a gift.[18] However, even though the Viet Minh had not in fact sprung up as a Chinese-created puppet, their freedom of action with regard to China was much less extensive than it was with the Soviets. Somehow Chou En-lai acquired the capacity and, more important, the desire to compromise at Ho Chi Minh's expense at Geneva.

It has been suggested that the Viet Minh got much less territory and political influence out of the Geneva settlement than they had a right to expect from their military success.[19] Although this disparity has been widely recognized, it has remained largely unexplained even in terms of China's fear of the retaliation threatened by Secretary Dulles.[20]

[18] The primary medium of exchange was opium. Approximately thirty-eight tons of opium were available annually for marketing in northern Indochina during the late 1940's and early 1950's. Had the Viet Minh controlled all thirty-eight tons they would have been able, at prevailing exchange rates, to acquire 12,800 rifles and 6,400,000 rounds of ammunition in one year—a quantity of supplies sufficient to equip a Viet Minh infantry division. In the period 1947-1952, the Viet Minh could theoretically have equipped the entire six divisions of their main force through the barter of opium alone! See John T. McAlister, Jr., "Mountain Minorities and the Viet Minh: A Key to the Indochina War," in Peter Kunstadter, ed., *Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations* (Princeton 1967).

[19] Bell, 70-72.

[20] Harold C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics* (Boston 1966), 249-54, refers to Dulles' speech at Los Angeles on June 11, 1954, in which the Secretary of State outlined conditions under which a clash between the Chinese People's Republic and the United States might occur. While Hinton feels that the effect of this speech was to bring concessions from Chou En-lai, he does not make this an unqualified assertion.

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Moreover, the concessions that led to this disparity are not convincing evidence that a more general settlement with reciprocal guarantees could have been achieved at Geneva. The concessions in territory could easily have been made with the idea that they could conveniently be recouped because of the absence of restraints in the resulting settlement. Bargaining on sanctions, however, would probably have required a closer definition of purpose than the Chinese and Soviets demonstrated at Geneva.

One authority on the problems of the area has offered an explanation of the Geneva settlement which is based on a possible divergence of interest between the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists in the Indochina region. This explanation makes Chou En-lai's willingness to compromise easier to understand. Paul Mus, a noted French scholar and formerly political adviser to the French High Commissioner for Indochina, believes that the Chinese were concerned lest the Viet Minh carry out their design to become the successor state of all French Indochina. In his view the Chinese opposed an Indochina under Viet Minh control because it would conflict with a principal Chinese goal in Southeast Asia: hegemony over the Tai-speaking peoples who inhabit southern China, the Shan states of Burma, and northwestern Tonkin, as well as Thailand and Laos.[21] During seven years of war, as Mus points out, there had been an unusual advantage to the Viet Minh in veiling their unspoken goals for hegemony in their stated determination to end French rule not only in Vietnam but throughout Indochina, thus enlisting the diverse peoples of the territory in this cause. Since the French in creating Indochina had surpassed Vietnamese designs for expansion and hegemony to the west and had consolidated these gains into a colonial state, the Viet Minh could, by succeeding to French rule over this state, fulfil age-old Vietnamese cultural and political goals.

If the Chinese were apprehensive about an Indochina reconstituted under Vietnamese control they had good cause: there was no lack of evidence to confirm that this was a priority Viet Minh goal. The Viet Minh, or what in 1954 was more correctly known as the Viet Nam Dang Lao Dong (the Vietnam Workers' Party), was merely another name for the Indochina Communist Party founded in 1930 under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh.[22] From its founding this party was committed to forming a workers' and peasants' government over all of

[21] Interview with Professor Mus, May 1, 1965.

[22] A detailed history of the founding of the party is found in Gouvernement général de l'Indochine, Direction des affaires politiques et de la sûreté générale, *Contribution à l'histoire des mouvements politiques de l'Indochine française* (Hanoi 1933), Vol. IV, *Le Dong-Duong Cong-San Dang (Parti communiste indochinois)*.

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Indochina because "the Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian proletariat have politically and economically to be closely related in spite of their difference in language, custom, and race."[23] Besides these and other long-standing party pronouncements, forceful evidence of Viet Minh interest in western expansion was provided by their operations during the Indochina War. Although they were able to sustain some guerrilla warfare throughout almost all of Indochina except Cambodia, it was in the mountains of Tonkin and the adjacent areas of Laos that the Viet Minh won their decisive victories. By adapting their unique political and military strategy to the social characteristics and topographical features of these mountains, the Viet Minh proved it unnecessary to obtain predominant military strength throughout Indochina in order to defeat the French.[24]

While it may have been possible for the Viet Minh to achieve decisive local superiority in other areas of Indochina, the northern highlands possessed characteristics singularly appropriate to Viet Minh strategy. Not only was this area in close proximity to the most heavily populated region in all Indochina, the Red River Delta, from which personnel and supplies could be drawn clandestinely, but also the nature of the terrain offered protection and ambush sites as well as easy access to adjacent areas of China and Laos. Standing above these factors is the consideration that the Viet Minh's impressive military capacities were dependent upon political bases among the widely diverse non-Vietnamese ethnic minorities who inhabited this mountain area. The ethnolinguistic map (Map II) shows clearly and somewhat dramatically the contrast between the concentration of the Vietnamese (designated by the number *1* on the map) living in the delta lowlands bordering on the South China Sea and the scattered groups forming the complex ethnic mosaic throughout the highlands of Laos and northern Vietnam. Despite centuries of contact and interaction, these culturally less advanced peoples of the mountains have firmly resisted integration into lowland polities and have maintained their antipathies toward each other as well as toward the lowlanders. Parochial in nature, these intramountain antagonisms have often been manipulated by outsiders, as

[23] Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Central Committee of Propaganda of the Viet Nam Lao Dong Party and the Committee for the Study of the Party's History, *Thirty Years of Struggle of the Party,* Book I (Hanoi 1960), 27. This is the official history of the Vietnam Workers' Party and an extremely valuable source on the history of communism in Vietnam.

[24] The details of this mountain combat are set forth impressively by Bernard B. Fall, *Street Without Joy: Indochina at War 1946-1954* (Harrisburg 1961), esp. chaps. 2 and 3. A more recent military history is Edgar O'Ballance, *The Indo-China War, 1945-1954: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare* (London 1964).

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

Map II. (Reprinted from *Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations*, edited by Peter Kunstadter, by permission of Princeton University Press.)

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the earlier Vietnamese and French experiences in winning Laos from Thailand demonstrate.

Initially, the Viet Minh had gained a foothold among the Tho (designated by the letter *L* on the map) by offering organization and leadership to an uprising launched by these people when the Japanese occupation forces entered Indochina in September 1940.[25] Airdrops of weapons into this forward position enabled the Viet Minh to establish a base area and to capitalize on the ultimate Japanese surrender by seizing Hanoi in August 1945.[26] In the face of French pressures in 1946, the mountain bases among the Tho offered the Viet Minh a convenient retreat and a staunch redoubt. In seven years of combat the Viet Minh expanded from their initial base area in the northeast, where in 1950 they won their first major victories, to the west.[27] Here in the uplands of the Black River Basin, the Viet Minh exploited the enmities of the populous Black Tai, Meo, and Yao (designated on the map by the letter *A* and numbers *3* and *4*, respectively) toward the less numerous White Tai whose political hegemony over the northwest territory, a remnant of the Sip Song Chau Tai, was being supported by the French.[28] While Viet Minh political bases were being established among the Black Tai, Meo, and Yao, and the recruitment of paramilitary forces was being carried out, a similar operation was taking place among peoples of the same ethnolinguistic identity in Laos. As is carefully set forth in the most impressive book yet to appear on the subject, Arthur J. Dommen's *Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization*,

[25] The story of the Tho uprising is told in McAlister, "The Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution," unpubl. diss., Yale, June 1966, 101-26.

[26] Robert Shaplen, "The Enigma of Ho Chi Minh," *The Reporter*, XII (January 27, 1955), 11-19. In addition to describing how the Viet Minh created a jungle base, Shaplen offers the opinion in this article, as well as in his *The Lost Revolution* (New York 1965), 27-54, that without French intransigence Ho might have established a government favorable to Western interests.

[27] Fall, *Street Without Joy*, 27-55.

[28] McAlister, "Mountain Minorities and the Viet Minh," Section V. The French also attempted to exploit antipathies among ethnic minorities living in Viet Minh–controlled territory. Recruiting members of dissident minorities, the French trained them for guerrilla operations and parachuted them as commando teams into Viet Minh mountain base areas. There they made contact with fellow tribesmen and rallied them in harassing the Viet Minh. Their goal was to reduce the strategic mobility of the Viet Minh by making their enemy's rear area insecure. Known as the GCMA (for *Groupement de commandos mixtes aéroportés*), the mountain guerrilla units numbered 15,000 men by mid-1954. Although able to tie down at least ten battalions during the engagement at Dien Bien Phu, the GCMA was powerless to shift the tide of battle. See Fall, *Street Without Joy*, 240-50. Overall, the Viet Minh had greater success than the French in exploiting mountain minority antipathies because they were able to meet demands for autonomy within a hierarchical political-military structure. The French thwarted aspirations for autonomy by recognizing the dominance of particular mountain groups; those alienated turned to the Viet Minh.

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the organization of the upland people of Laos under the leadership of the dissident Lao prince, Souphanouvong, was receiving Viet Minh support (pp. 70-71).

Until 1950 the Viet Minh had had only a limited political program among the mountain peoples of the northwest and apparently had had none among the uplanders of Laos. In that year Souphanouvong, the half-brother of Prince Souvanna Phouma, the present premier of Laos, presented the Viet Minh with an unusual opportunity to complement their embryonic activities in the Black River Basin. For nearly four years Souphanouvong had been in exile in Thailand with a nationalist, but traditionalist, Lao political elite that had refused to cooperate with the French until the country was granted meaningful independence. By late 1949 the Lao Issara, or Free Lao Movement, as the Bangkok exile group was known, had reached acceptable terms with the French and had returned to Vientiane to form a nationalist government. Souphanouvong, virtually alone among this Lao elite, decided against returning to the Lao capital and instead made his way to Tuyen Quang, the Viet Minh headquarters north of Hanoi (Dommen, 32-35). Presumably after detailed discussions on strategic objectives, Souphanouvong returned to the upland of Laos where, in August 1950, he organized splinter tribal elements into the Laos Liberation Committee, known as the Pathet Lao. Consisting primarily of Meo and Kha peoples but also including the upland Tai, the Pathet Lao became a focus for many parochial ambitions and antipathies. Significantly, with the exception of Souphanouvong and his lieutenants, there was virtually no participation in the Pathet Lao from the predominant ethnic group of the country, the lowland Lao. Through the volatile changes of the decade and a half since 1950, ethnic Lao participation in the Pathet Lao has been minor.[29]

As can be clearly seen from the ethnolinguistic map, the fragmented ethnic pattern in upper Laos is an approximate continuation of that in northwestern Vietnam. It was not, however, the continuity of these ethnic identities that facilitated the formation of the Viet Minh political bases so much as the ethnic groups' lack of ties to any central authority in either Laos or Vietnam and the intensity of their local antagonisms. From their base area among the minority peoples of northern Vietnam and Laos the Viet Minh derived a flexibility effective enough to subdue the French in Indochina. The character of the area meant that the existence of an international border was meaningless as

[29] Bernard B. Fall, "The Pathet Lao: A 'Liberation' Party," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs 1965), 173-77.

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a barrier to Viet Minh political and military operations. It meant that the Viet Minh could exercise substantial influence over the politics of lowland Laos by being able to operate at will in the thinly inhabited highlands of the country. And it also meant that the French had to increase their military forces in order to maintain the allegiance of those mountain groups who were already committed to the French cause. Since the French did not have the military initiative, this necessity resulted in gradually larger upland garrisons in fixed positions. Inevitably, these positions were located at substantial distances from French base areas in the Red River Delta and were accessible almost exclusively by air. It was out of these circumstances that the debacle of Dien Bien Phu developed.

Since this international mountain area encompassing Laotian and Vietnamese territories was so decisive in the Viet Minh victory, it seems logical that the terms of the Geneva settlement would have reflected its importance. Admitted, it would be difficult to restrain in peace what the French had been unable to control in war. But so long as the Viet Minh could move in and through Laos with impunity, the stability of any Laotian government, except a Communist one, was in question, and no matter what parallel was chosen to partition Vietnam, the adjacent mountains of Laos would leave an exposed flank. While concessions concerning Laos made for the Communists by Chou En-lai on June 16 saved the Geneva Conference from collapse, they did not give much hope for peace. Chou merely agreed to treat Laos and Cambodia on a different basis from Vietnam and to give recognition to the royal governments in the two countries.[30]

Although they had sent portions of three divisions sweeping through the country, the Viet Minh were not charged with aggression in Laos. They were required only to withdraw their troops and to observe the cease-fire. Moreover, the ensuing settlement left Laos exceedingly vulnerable to future Viet Minh operations in the country. In effect, Laos was partitioned. The two Laotian provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, almost exclusively inhabited by non-Lao upland minorities that spanned the Laos-Vietnam border, were designated as regroupment areas for the Pathet Lao. But in the Laotian cease-fire agreement, "it was not made altogether clear how the royal government was to resume control of this regroupment area pending the elections that were to be held during 1955 and which, it was hoped, would reintegrate the Pathet Lao supporters into the Laotian community.[31] As a result the Viet

[30] Bell, 57.

[31] *Ibid.*, 67.

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Minh retained a virtually unrestricted base area inside Laos and a useful corridor into southern Vietnam. Chou may have made concessions that stopped the Viet Minh from succeeding the French as masters of Indochina but he did not agree to restraints that would prevent them from achieving this goal in the future.

How could elections have been expected to reintegrate the upland minority adherents of the Pathet Lao into a political community to which they had never before belonged? It was more than the semantics of this question that remained unanswered at Geneva. There seemed to exist a belief that the best way to manage the many irreconcilable political issues confronting the conference was to put them off to the future, and elections seemed to be the best vehicle for such a postponement. As a further safeguard, the terms that described the future elections were left vague and imprecise. The only pertinent article (Article 14) in the Vietnam cease-fire agreement concerning elections reads: "Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet Nam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present agreement" (quoted in Murti, 208). Moreover, as Article 14 indicates, elections also served to justify the territorial partition that was settled on as being the most convenient means for expressing the relationships of power that had emerged from seven years of war.

In no sense was an expression of these power differentials in Laos and Vietnam the structure of an enduring peace; nor was it meant to be. If the seven years of the Indochina War had in fact been a reflection of the parochial antagonisms of the diverse peoples of the region then it was entirely correct, as the cease-fire agreement clearly implies, that peace would lie in political integration and unification. Yet elections to be held shortly after the fighting stopped plainly could not achieve what had been unattainable through centuries of political interaction. Moreover, French colonial policies had created formidable obstacles to unification because of their reliance on the well-worn concept of "divide and rule." French programs had tended to exacerbate the divisiveness latent in Vietnamese society, and their colonial legacy did not include institutions for overcoming regionalism in Vietnam or parochialism among the mountain peoples. It was for these reasons that the most striking feature of the Geneva settlement was the partition of Indochina along lines similar to those that had existed in the precolonial period of the region's history. While the division of Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel in 1954 did not have the same immediate causes

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as the division of the country from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, it was the lack of integrative political institutions in Vietnamese history that lay behind both experiences.

If political unification and integration were accepted at Geneva as the only long-range solutions to the problems of peace in Indochina, then it would seem that some overarching power, as in the Entente Cordiale, would again have to bring local conflicts under control. Eden's proposal for a "Locarno type" reciprocal agreement had been formulated to provide such an overarching structure. However, the unresolved antagonisms in other parts of the world between the United States and the Communist powers was too intense to permit a consensus on guaranteeing the peace in Southeast Asia. Within the limits imposed by the antagonism of the great powers, there were manageable factors that could have made the cease-fire more effective but, because they were neglected, weakened it. The most significant of these was the French neglect to bring their client, the State of Vietnam, into the negotiations at Geneva or to involve it in the cease-fire agreements. The deliberate exclusion of the non-Communist Vietnamese from the Geneva settlement was a response to the Viet Minh threat not to participate in the cease-fire negotiations if the State of Vietnam were represented by an independent delegation (Murti, 16-17).

The omission of the State of Vietnam from the Geneva cease-fire agreements meant that France would have to guarantee the political actions of the non-Communist Vietnamese if the Indochina peace were to have durability. Of major significance in this task was the fact that the cease-fire was framed in terms of "regrouping zones" for military commands and not in terms of sovereign governments. If one of these military commands ceased to exist, its absence would render ineffective the guarantees for elections. This loophole exposed the flimsy quality of the truce, for ostensibly the elections served as the main justification for the partition or "regrouping of forces." Moreover, in pressing for a settlement without the State of Vietnam, the Viet Minh were embarrassing the Americans who were the principal financial and material supports of the French command in Indochina. The embarrassment arose because the United States had made the recognition of Vietnamese independence a condition of its aid in the fight against the Viet Minh. Although it had been recognized by forty-three nations, the State of Vietnam was not being treated as an independent government or as a party to the conflict. If this embarrassment should cause American military aid to be withdrawn, it would be virtually impossible for the French military command to persist, and upon its dissolution the

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guarantees for elections to unify the country would cease to exist. Without elections, some other basis for the partition of the country would have to be found if the war were not to be resumed.

Still, once the cease-fire went into effect, the resources for political action remaining to the non-Communist Vietnamese were not inconsiderable. South of the seventeenth parallel there were about twelve million people, including about 860,000 refugees from the north, and 65,000 square miles of territory; the Viet Minh had about three million more people living on slightly less land.[32] Despite the long-standing inability of the non-Communists to overcome French obstacles to meaningful independence or to form a viable political structure of their own, there was nevertheless widespread participation in the politics of the State of Vietnam and in the military operations against the Viet Minh. About a million people had registered to vote in the elections of 1953, and by 1954 there were more than 300,000 Vietnamese fighting alongside 70,000 regular French troops and about 68,000 Legionnaires and Africans against approximately 400,000 in the Viet Minh ranks.[33] But the interest in a political alternative to communism had not brought any coherent response; southern Vietnam was in political chaos in 1954.

It was through this chaos that the French maintained their influence over non-Communist Vietnamese politics. The turmoil had resulted essentially from the French offer of parochial autonomy to the many political fragments of Vietnam, together with the French failure to allow any centralized institutions to emerge with the substance of power. For example, the political-religious sects of southern Vietnam—the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen—had been a major bulwark of the French opposition to the Viet Minh because the sects' demands for political autonomy had been satisfied. With the war stopped, they were naturally unwilling to yield this autonomy.[34] Similarly, the Vietnamese national army had not developed as an instrument of the State of Vietnam but had been organized by the French army. In 1954, it was under the command of a Vietnamese of French citizenship who did not recognize any indigenous authority. There appeared to be little

[32] Bernard B. Fall, *Viet-Nam Witness, 1953-66* (New York 1966), 64.

[33] Voting statistics are from Bernard B. Fall, "Political Development of Viet Nam: V-J Day to the Geneva Cease-Fire," unpubl. diss., Syracuse, October 1954, 662. Military personnel figures are from Henri Navarre, *Agonie de l'Indochine (1953-1954)*, rev. ed. (Paris 1956), 46.

[34] Roy Jumper, "Sects and Communism in South Vietnam," *Orbis*, III (Spring 1959), 85-96; Bernard B. Fall, "The Political-Religious Sects of Viet-Nam," *Pacific Affairs*, XVIII (September 1955), 235-53; and A M. Savani, *Visages et images du sud Vietnam* (Saigon 1953).

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possibility that any civilian political group could bring these French-oriented military forces under centralized Vietnamese control.

Into this environment of disorder Ngo Dinh Diem returned from four years of self-imposed exile to become prime minister of the State of Vietnam. He had been appointed by the vestigial emperor, Bao Dai, with the approval of France but largely at the instigation of the United States. If Diem's twin goals of political unity and independence for southern Vietnam were to be achieved, he had to establish a popular base and gain control over the military units of the country. Obviously, these objectives would clash immediately with those of the French, and if Diem could not attain them he would find himself in the same powerless position occupied by previous French-chosen premiers. American backing was Diem's major advantage. Instead of channeling all of its military aid through the French as it had done during the war, the United States now gave it directly to the Vietnamese. By recognizing Diem as the authority to whom the aid should be given, the United States ensured that autonomous groups would slowly be sapped of military supplies.[35] Unfortunately, this led to an armed struggle within the national army, and a more tenacious battle with the political-religious sects, which raged throughout the winter and spring of 1954-1955. The methods that Diem used to impose his will on the national army and the dissident sects caused an instability that was to limit his effectiveness in future years, but, in 1955-1956, Diem's victory over his enemies was hailed as a sign of strength.[36]

As his control over the diffuse military groups was increasing, Diem launched a "revolution" whose goal was the establishment of a republic free of Bao Dai and independent of France. His popular base for this revolution consisted of refugees from the north, members of the Catholic faith who regarded Diem as a leader of their church, and urban political groups that his activist brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, had been able to bring together. On October 8, 1955, Diem announced that a referendum would be held on the twenty-third of the month to choose between him and Bao Dai and between the existing State of Vietnam and a new republic. Although Diem's victory was assured, "the final results surpassed even the most sanguine expectations, as the votes in some cases exceeded the number of names on the electoral roll."[37]

If this was in fact a revolution it affected only the superstructure of

[35] This determination was made clear by General J. Lawton Collins upon his arrival in Saigon as a special envoy on November 17, 1954; see Lancaster, 352.

[36] William Henderson, "South Viet Nam Finds Itself," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXV (October 1956), 283-94.

[37] Lancaster, 398-99.

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southern Vietnamese politics; it did not reach to the villages where the Viet Minh had been based before their regulars were evacuated northward. This limitation should not be surprising; there has long been a basic asymmetry in the revolutionary character of Communist and non-Communist Vietnamese. The latter have been preoccupied with an intraelite struggle among pluralistic groups, while the Communists, being relatively free of elite squabbles, have concentrated their attention on creating a new social and political infrastructure. Perhaps this attitude among non-Communists is the price that must be paid for pluralism, or it may suggest that only a totalitarian force can effect a revolution in an underdeveloped society and that pluralism is irrelevant to the task. In any case, this focus on the surface of society may be why Diem's successful "revolution," which brought order to the superstructure of southern Vietnam, was so deceptive to Western observers.[38]

B. S. N. Murti, however, attributes a special importance to Diem's "revolution." He feels that with the proclamation of the Republic of Vietnam, southern Vietnam became a sovereign state for the first time. This made it possible, he argues in a chapter-long, detailed analysis based on international legal precedents, for the existence of two sovereign states to be recognized in Vietnam (pp. 162-77). More significant than international precedents in Murti's view is the fact that Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, have recognized the two governments in Vietnam as sovereign states. On this basis Murti suggests, "If both the states are given membership in the United Nations it might pave the way for peaceful co-existence of these states" (p. 177). But he neglects to mention what international guarantees this peaceful coexistence might require.

While it may have increased the possibilities for a recognition of two states in Vietnam, Diem's "revolution" brought the withdrawal of the only international guarantor of the cease-fire. By April 28, 1956, the French High Command had departed from Saigon at Diem's request and shortly thereafter most of France's combat troops left Vietnam. These actions were a consequence of both the increased need for military resources in Algeria and the decreasing French influence over affairs in Vietnam. Nonetheless, as Murti points out, the French did not mask their enthusiasm for divesting themselves of responsibilities in Vietnam. They argued that with the withdrawal of their troops French responsibility for a political settlement under the "Geneva

[38] Wesley R. Fishel, "Free Vietnam Since Geneva," *Yale Review*, XLIX (September 1959), 68-79; also Henderson.

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Agreements" had come to an end. As France was the only significant guarantor of the elections scheduled for July 1956, they were not held.[39]

After the departure of the French, the United States assumed the role of guarantor of peace in Indochina. Through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the United States expected to maintain the peace through the deterrence of Communist aggression. Yet the recent history of warfare in Indochina had shown that there were few meaningful deterrents effective against Communist revolutionary warfare. The kinds of restraints that might have prevented the Vietnamese Communists from taking advantage of the political vulnerabilities in the region would have required diplomatic arrangements with the major Communist powers, the Chinese or the Russians. Nothing had occurred since Geneva to make such a reciprocal arrangement a greater possibility. Thus the pursuit of a structured peace in Southeast Asia through diplomacy remained unfinished business.

III

The sanctionless "peace" secured by the Geneva cease-fire endured for a little more than five years. Then came the outburst of fighting in both northern Laos and the Mekong Delta of southern Vietnam in the late summer of 1959. These battles appeared on the surface as isolated events; but they marked the reopening of a conflict that has been aptly called the Second Indochina War.[40] Since Indochina as a political entity ceased to exist in 1954, it might seem inappropriate to speak of the present conflict in terms of the earlier war. Yet this title has been a convenient shorthand to express a relationship difficult to define. Underlying this renewal of hostilities were efforts by newly independent

[39] The fear of a Communist victory is frequently given as the reason for the absence of American support for these elections. In particular, President Eisenhower is quoted, out of context, to the effect that Ho Chi Minh would win eighty percent of the vote in any election. What Eisenhower intended was to call attention to Ho Chi Minh's wartime popularity as contrasted with that of Emperor Bao Dai: "I am convinced that the French could not win the war because the internal political situation in Vietnam, weak and confused, badly weakened their military position. I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of fighting, possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai. Indeed, the lack of leadership and drive on the part of Bao Dai was a factor in the feeling prevailing among Vietnamese that they had nothing to fight for. As one Frenchman said to me, 'What Vietnam needs is another Syngman Rhee, regardless of all the difficulties the presence of such a personality would entail'" (Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-56* [Garden City 1963], 372).

[40] Bernard B. Fall, "The Second Indochina War," *International Affairs,* XLI (January 1965), 59-73.

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governments to consolidate their political positions. While these efforts were initially distinct, their consequences embroiled the states of Indochina in a conflict with one another which has now become the focus of world politics. Because of the protracted quality of the First Indochina War and the tangled cultural background of the region, the formation of separate yet viable states was certain to be difficult. However, the unresolved positions of international powers aggravated the problems of the new states and contributed to making their regional difficulties into a world crisis.

After Geneva the problems of internal consolidation in northern Vietnam involved the volatile issues of land reform, peasant rebellion, and an intellectuals' revolt.[41] These controversies seem to have preoccupied the Viet Minh's successors, as they perfected their Communist regime, until at least 1958. Obviously the political consolidation of the other states of Indochina was a major concern of the northern Vietnamese, but the beginnings of the military crises in Laos and Vietnam appear not to have originated from Hanoi's political action. But once these two battles were raging they gave the Vietnamese Communists unusually fine opportunities to expand their influence in Indochina.

Ironically, the Laotian conflict resulted from efforts originally aimed at the peaceful integration of the Pathet Lao into the Royal Lao government. Out of a desire to avoid military action in gaining control over the two-province "regroupment area" of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, Premier Souvanna Phouma formed a coalition government in November 1957. Prince Souvanouphong and his key lieutenant were given cabinet posts and two battalions, or roughly twenty percent, of the Pathet Lao mountain-minority armed force were incorporated into the Royal Lao Army. While this brought the two provinces under central government control, it also brought the opposition of the United States to a Lao government with Communist participation. The American anxiety had been steadily increasing since Souvanna Phouma had, in August 1956, made trips to Hanoi and Peking to win international backing for a coalition with the Pathet Lao. As the United States ambassador in Vientiane, J. Graham Parsons, described his efforts at the time: "I struggled for sixteen months to prevent a coalition" (Dommen, 85).[42]

[41] P. J. Honey, "Revolt of the Intellectuals in North Vietnam," *The World Today*, XII (June 1957), 250-60; Honey, *Communism in North Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963); and Bernard B. Fall, "Crisis in North Viet Nam," *Far Eastern Survey* (January 1957), 12-15.

[42] ". . . The growth of Communist strength in Laos was due [according to Souvanna

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Bringing down the coalition took much less time than did the struggle to block its formation. Following the National Assembly elections of May 1958, in which Souvanouphong won more votes than any other candidate in the country, the United States held up the monthly deposit of foreign aid funds in the Lao government's bank account in New York. A parliamentary crisis was precipitated in which Souvanna Phouma was voted out of office and Phoui Sananikone, a "hardliner" against the Pathet Lao, formed a cabinet free of Communist taint. Thereafter, the Pathet Lao were regarded simply as agents of the northern Vietnamese; compromise was rejected. As the pressure against the Pathet Lao mounted, one of their armed units, the Second Battalion, escaped in May 1959 from government surveillance and made its way northward to Sam Neua where it attacked Royal Lao Army detachments. Since Sam Neua and the adjacent province of Phong Saly were Pathet Lao base areas, it was not difficult for the Second Battalion to overwhelm the Royal Army, which had been on the scene only since 1957 and was still in fixed defensive positions (Dommen, 111-18).

A United Nations investigating team sent to northeast Laos in the autumn of 1959 concluded that aid from the Vietnamese Communists had reached the Pathet Lao. However, there was no evidence of invasion, as the Laotians had charged. Perhaps the most important external aid in 1959-1960 was that from the United States. This aid permitted the Royal Lao Army to expand by more than twenty percent. Both its increased size and the increased tempo of operations made the Lao army more important politically. The first major expression of this political role came in an abortive coup d'etat by General Phoumi Nosavan in December 1959. This event signaled Phoumi's emergence as a political force in Laos with his power base being control over the American-financed Royal Army. But Phoumi's eminence was soon checked by another coup in August 1960, led by the sassy little parachute captain, Kong Le, whose troops had pressed the fighting against the Pathet Lao in 1959. Kong Le was tired of seeing Lao fighting Lao; the purpose of his coup, he said, was to find a way toward peace and to bring fighting to a stop. Apparently sincere in its intentions, Kong

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Phouma] to 'the stubborn refusal' of United States officials in the 1950's 'to admit neutrality. . . . Unfortunately . . . the policy of our United States friends at the time of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was, "If you are not with us you are against us."' The Prince said he was forced to resign in 1958 after continued United States opposition to Lao neutrality." The Prince charged that by 1961, when the United States agreed to Laotian neutrality, the Pathet Lao had grown from 2,000 to 15,000 men (*Christian Science Monitor,* April 14, 1966).

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Le's coup ironically set the stage for the most protracted battle in Laotian history (Dommen, 145-46).

With Kong Le's appearance, the political spectrum of Laos widened to include three distinct groupings, each with its own military units. By identifying himself with Souvanna Phouma and supporting him as premier, Kong Le gave those in the center of the spectrum the armed forces they had previously lacked. Not only did this provoke a three-way split, but it also caused political positions to become identified with geographic regions of the country. Both the regional and political identities were conveniently symbolized by three princes from traditionally opposed family groups. Moreover, in this political fragmentation the traditional kingdoms that the French had brought together at the turn of the century to form Laos now reappeared. In the south there was Prince Boum Oum, a member of the royal family of the old Kingdom of Champassak, who was allied with the military forces under the command of General Phoumi Nosavan. To the north there was Prince Souvanouvong, whose father, the king of Luang Prabang, had been selected by the French as king of Laos. By his leadership of the Pathet Lao, Souvanouvong's role could be interpreted as reasserting the old Luang Prabang claim of hegemony over the non-Lao mountain peoples in the area of the Sip Song Chau Tai. Finally, in the center was Prince Souvanna Phouma, who was also of the royal family of Luang Prabang but who was nonetheless trying to bring the disparate factions together rather than let the country be divided.

The struggle among these factions created opportunities for external involvement in Laotian politics on a scale never before approached in mainland Southeast Asia. The Americans in late 1960 supported General Phoumi's faction in recapturing Vientiane and driving Kong Le's forces northward into the Plaines des Jarres. Both in Vientiane and in the north the Soviets, for the first time directly aiding any group in Indochina, provided airlifted supplies for the Kong Le faction. Between December 15, 1960, and January 2, 1961, Soviet aircraft flew 184 supply missions into Laos from logistic bases in northern Vietnam (Dommen, 178). With this cover, portions of two regular Communist Vietnamese divisions made up mostly of mountain minorities were reported to have entered Laos. As tensions mounted, an uneasy truce between the rival Laotian factions was worked out in early May 1961, and before the end of that month a conference was convened at Geneva to reconcile the international pressures that had built up within the country.

Because the direct intervention of the Soviet Union in Laos was one of the most significant events in the area since 1954, it is important to

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understand the motivation behind it. Dommen believes that the Soviets acted to retain the allegiance of the northern Vietnamese in the deepening Sino-Soviet controversy. Since the Lao Dong Party Conference in Hanoi in September 1960 seems to have indicated a Vietnamese shift toward the Chinese, the Soviet moves can be seen as a compensatory action.[43] Whatever their purpose, the presence of the Soviets in Laos made easier a settlement in the country once the futility of supporting Phoumi's faction against Kong Le became apparent to the new Kennedy administration.[44] Recognizing Souvanna Phouma as the best hope for reducing external influences and increasing political stability in Laos, the Soviets and Americans were able to support him in forming a coalition government. It took more than a year, until the summer of 1962, for Souvanna to achieve something resembling his 1957 coalition and, ironically, it endured for less than twelve months. Once more Souvanouvong left a cabinet post in Vientiane and returned to the mountains of northern Laos to lead his armed forces against the central government. Rather than trying to overturn Souvanna's government and gain control of all Laos, Souphanouvong now appeared content with consolidating his hold over the mountains and acting as the handmaiden of the northern Vietnamese. By denying the Royal Lao government access to the country's eastern mountains, Souvanouvong preserved the area as a sanctuary and corridor for the northern Vietnamese, who are reported to have had in 1964 a minimum of eleven battalions in Laos to keep the trails southward open (Dommen, 253).

It was already clear to Souvanna by December 1963 that the Soviets did not have sufficient leverage over Hanoi to prevent the northern Vietnamese from aiding the Pathet Lao and using them for their own purposes. And to Dommen it seems that the Soviets have been willing to sanction northern Vietnamese actions in Laos so long as they do not bring down Souvanna's coalition government. This is far from what Dommen feels is required. In his judgment, "Laos must depend on an *external* balance of forces. It is not strong enough to compel its neighbors to recognize its right to pursue any foreign policy it chooses. . . . Laos [must be] *neutralized* by international agreement. . . . [It cannot become] a neutralist by its own volition and power" (p.

[43] P. J. Honey, "The Position of the DRV Leadership and the Succession to Ho Chi Minh," *China Quarterly*, No. 9 (January-March 1962), 24-36; and Honey, *Communism in North Vietnam*, 76-96.

[44] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston 1965), 512-18; Theodore C. Sorenson, *Kennedy* (New York 1965) 642-48.

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203). Yet in 1964, Dommen recognizes, the large powers were too much at odds to strike much more of a balance than had already been achieved. The Pathet Lao realized that a military push into the ethnic Lao lowlands not only would upset Souvanna's government and bring Soviet displeasure but would also create the risk of United States intervention. Thus the external balance of forces could guarantee only a partitioned Laos whose Pathet Lao uplands facilitated Communist operations in the southern portion of a partitioned Vietnam.

Unlike the First Indochina War, the Laotian crisis that was the opening round in the Second Indochina War brought the involvement of Thailand and the other nations of Southeast Asia who became signatories to the Geneva settlement of 1962. It was obvious that these nations would for their own security be concerned by an internationalization of the conflict in Laos. Yet in their response to the situation in Laos it seemed that the neighboring countries were acting in patterns reminiscent of the early nineteenth century: as colonial power withdrew, traditional rivalries seemed to reemerge. In particular, Thailand was looking upon Laos as part of the greater Thai nation and its legitimate sphere of influence, as is noted by Donald E. Nuechterlein in his book *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia*. In contrast to the nineteenth-century rivalry with the Vietnamese over the Sip Song Chau Tai, Thailand in the twentieth century had an important ally, the United States. Nuechterlein, a veteran of fifteen years' service with the United States government and of two years in Thailand, appears more as an apologist than as an analyst of Thai foreign policy. He tends to see the problems of the country through the eyes of the current leaders of Thailand, viewing their claims for the legitimacy of Thai influence in Cambodia and Laos as valid without question. This leads him to make unsupported assertions about the necessity of the United States support for Thai claims in Southeast Asia. For example, in discussing the American decision to back General Phoumi Nosavan in driving Kong Le out of Vientiane in late 1960, Nuechterlein says, "If the United States [had] failed to support General Poumi in his effort to restore a pro-Western government in Vientiane, Thailand would seriously question whether the United States would be firm in the event the Communists menaced it" (p. 160).

Nuechterlein does not stop to question that defending Thai interests in Southeast Asia might embroil the United States in larger conflicts. Nor does he assess how local conflicts in the region might be brought under control while an effective alliance with Thailand is maintained.

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Nuechterlein's discussion leaves the impression that if the United States does not back Thailand's position with force the country will adopt a neutralist posture—an analogue of its collaboration with Japan in the 1940's. Although he acknowledges that the 1962 political settlement in Laos assuaged the Thai, he does not suggest how other political actions could reduce the reliance on force in Southeast Asia and achieve a structured peace in the region.

A totally different view of international relations in Southeast Asia is found in Roger M. Smith's *Cambodia's Foreign Policy*. This is understandable because Smith, too, tends to look at regional problems through the eyes of the leaders of the country he is studying. Thus Professor Smith's presentation leads one to the conclusion that the foreign policy problems of Cambodia have not changed in their essentials over the past four centuries. The colonial interregnum meant, of course, that Cambodia was protected for nearly fifty years from her historic fear of encroachment by Thailand and Vietnam. However, Thailand's annexation of western Cambodia during the Japanese occupation left little doubt about what the end of colonial protection would bring.[45] Yet the way in which Cambodia obtained its independence from France was such a contrast to the militancy of the Indochina War that it is an important key in understanding the country's postcolonial policies.

In Cambodia's fight for independence there was no major dichotomization of its political elite. There were few opportunities for defectors from the elite, like Souphanouvong in Laos, to find ethnic or traditional antipathies within the country on which an insurgency could be based. Perhaps of greater importance to the cohesion of the Cambodian elite was the political shrewdness of Prince Sihanouk. As Professor Smith describes in his section on the winning of Cambodian independence, Sihanouk simply cajoled the French into concessions that no other Cambodian could secure. At the same time he acted forcefully to stamp out any elite opposition (pp. 24-51). Molded in his nonviolent struggle for independence, Sihanouk's talents for external cajolery and internal control distinguish him from the military figures who hold sway in neighboring countries.

These talents were tested immediately after the Indochina War when the Cambodian chief of state had to find guarantees to com-

[45] The territory of Laos and Cambodia annexed by Thailand in 1941 can be seen on the end map in Amiral Decoux, *À la barre de l'Indochine: Histoire de mon gouvernement général (1940-1945)* (Paris 1949), and it is virtually identical with the territory ceded by Thailand to French Indochina in 1904-1909. See also Map I.

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pensate for the inadequacies of the "Geneva Agreements" and the end of the French protection. Professor Smith chronicles expertly how Sihanouk first considered seeking stronger ties with the United States and more definite coverage from the protective mantle of SEATO (pp. 68-73). Specific American guarantees for Cambodian security were not forthcoming because, under Secretary Dulles, the United States was reluctant to make bilateral arrangements in mainland Southeast Asia for fear they would weaken SEATO. Consequently, Sihanouk sought protection for his country through a struggle for neutrality that was as active as his fight for independence. Playing off the United States in much the same way he had cajoled France, Sihanouk established cordial relations with the major powers of the Communist world as well as with the "neutrals" that Dulles detested. An early result of this policy was a 1956 financial grant of $22 million from the Chinese for industrial development, the first made by Peking to a non-Communist country (Smith, 95). The Chinese, Sihanouk hoped, would provide the guarantee against Vietnamese Communist exploitation of Cambodia's vulnerabilities just as, he hoped, the United States would check the southern Vietnamese. And in view of the increasing international commitment to Cambodian neutrality it appears that Sihanouk's policies could have attained the protection he sought had the Second Indochina War not broken out.

Once the Laotian and Vietnamese conflicts had intensified, it was difficult for Cambodia to avoid being involved. In contrast to the chaos in Laos, Sihanouk's forceful leadership prevented internal factions from being successfully manipulated from outside Cambodia. However, he was virtually powerless to prevent violations of the country's thinly inhabited northern and eastern border area by opposing Vietnamese forces. From the experience of the First Indochina War, when the Viet Minh resupplied their southern forces by routes through Laos and Cambodia, Sihanouk realized that his small, 25,000-man army could not possibly control its Vietnamese border of more than five hundred miles. Yet unless he took some action, his country faced the possible embarrassment of accusations that it was providing a sanctuary for the antagonists in the Vietnam conflict.

Taking a diplomatic approach, Cambodia made strenuous efforts to secure recognition of its borders as part of an internationally supervised neutralization of the country. This proposal was addressed in the summer of 1962 to all the nations that had participated in the Geneva Conference on Laos; but it was from the United States that Cambodia expected the greatest help. Preceding this suggestion of neutralization,

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President Kennedy had increased United States personnel in Vietnam from 685 men to 2,000 by the end of 1961 and to 15,500 at the end of 1963 and had dispatched more than 5,000 Marines to Thailand in the spring of 1962 as the situation in Laos had deteriorated.[46] Sihanouk's fear was that this military backing of the traditional adversaries of the Cambodians would involve the United States in a conflict with Cambodia apart from the crises in Laos or Vietnam. For this reason, President Kennedy's lack of interest in guarantees for Cambodian neutrality as expressed in a letter of August 31, 1962, came as a disappointment to Sihanouk (Smith, 190-93).

Soon thereafter Cambodia's worst fears were realized: in October 1962 two of its border villages were bombed and strafed by southern Vietnamese forces. This attack, though termed accidental by Saigon, caused Sihanouk to renew his diplomatic efforts by proposing a draft treaty for the neutralization of Cambodia. Now the United States was confronted more directly with the issue of guarantees for Cambodian neutrality. Professor Smith feels that American reluctance to participate in such guarantees was based on fears that Thailand and southern Vietnam would be alienated and that neutralization of Cambodia might be followed by proposals for the neutralization of southern Vietnam (pp. 196-97). Yet as the Second Indochina War intensified, and violations of Cambodia's border became more frequent, these reasons appeared superficial aspects of a more profound problem. Although the United States was primarily concerned about the border as a sanctuary and corridor for northern Vietnamese infiltration, and the Cambodians were most anxious about incursions from American and southern Vietnamese forces, their problems were in functional terms identical. Neither party was able to secure the border by military means and both were unable to find acceptable diplomatic guarantees to prevent its violation.

While France and the Communist nations, including the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, were willing to sign the draft declaration of Cambodian neutrality, they had also been quite willing to sign the agreement for Laotian neutrality in 1962. This agreement did not bring neutralization to Laos; there was no indication a similar treaty would make Cambodian neutrality effective. Yet behind the problems of both Laotian and Cambodian neutrality lies the same issue: an international guarantor for the Vietnamese Communists. In Laos the Soviets had not been able to guarantee that the Vietnamese would respect the neutrality

[46] Sorenson, 654 (for forces in Vietnam), 647 (for forces in Thailand).

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of the country, but only that they would not bring down Souvanna Phouma's government. However, as Professor Smith suggests, the Cambodians seek guarantees for a future situation much changed from the present. Cambodia, he says, "is looking ahead to the day when the balance of power in Indochina has shifted in favor of the Communist bloc and she can no longer count upon the American presence to check aggressions by a neutral Thailand and a united, Communist Vietnam" (p. 196). It may be true that Cambodia expects the future of Southeast Asia to be decided between a neutral Thailand, or even a Thailand allied with China, and a Communist Vietnam. But even if in the long run China were to try to block a reconstituted Indochina under Vietnamese Communist control by allying with a neutral Cambodia and Thailand, that would come only after the Second Indochina War had run its course. In the interim Cambodia would suffer because neither China nor the Soviet Union appears able to guarantee her neutrality free of northern Vietnamese infiltration and southern Vietnamese and American incursion.

As the Cambodian experience suggests, the Vietnam conflict has overshadowed all other crises in the Second Indochina War. Although complex, the issues in Vietnam become clearer when seen from the perspective of the First Indochina War. In that earlier conflict, the Viet Minh controlled key areas south of the seventeenth parallel which they had developed into political-military bases. From the outset the French had been unable to reoccupy a vital rice-rich strip of coastal plain from a point just north of Nha Trang to a point just south of Da Nang.[47] This region contained almost 2.6 million persons who constituted approximately twenty percent of the population south of the seventeenth parallel.[48] Complementing this coastal enclave were three other less important base areas, two of which were uninhabited swamps on the northern and southern peripheries of the Mekong Delta. Unable to duplicate their brilliant strategic victories in the north, the Viet Minh could not push out from these southern bases, although as the war ended in 1954 they were making great progress in the south-central plateau. A principal explanation for this contrast was the more complex social-political environment in the south, with its political-religious sects in the Mekong Delta and amorphous groups of primitive mountain peoples on the plateau.

[47] See map, Navarre, 4.

[48] Union Française, Haut-Commissariat de France en Indochine Affaires Economiques, *Annuaire statistique de l'Indochine*, XI, 1943-1946 (Saigon 1948), 27.

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In the autumn of 1954, the Viet Minh indicated to the International Control Commission that it had 130,000 persons to evacuate from four locations in the south. These included 87,000 combatants and 43,000 political cadres and families (Murti, 224). Half the total were to come from the central coastal region; about 50,000 from the two bases in the Mekong Delta, and the balance from a minor base on the coast just north of Saigon. Before the evacuation was completed, nearly 150,000 Viet Minh had been brought north, although the laxity of control over the movement left authorities unsure of the exact number of persons transported out of the south. Except for a number of key leaders, most of the evacuated troops had been recruited locally and had extensive family ties with the areas they were leaving. While their progress in military development had not been as spectacular as that of the Viet Minh in the north, the units from the south-central coast had, at least, been organized into a division, the 305th, the only one to emerge from the southern guerrilla forces.

The regions formerly under Viet Minh control obviously required careful attention if they were to be integrated politically into the Republic of Vietnam. In some respects this problem was not unlike that facing the Lao government in the "regroupment area" of Phong Saly and Sam Neua. Since there was no ethnic differentiation among the population of the central coast of Vietnam and since the adversary troops had been withdrawn, the task should have been much simpler than in Laos. However, the thrust of Diem's "revolution" to gain control over the rural society of southern Vietnam by military strength rather than political action was exampled in his fight against the political-religious sects. This fight had long-range consequences, as Bernard B. Fall shows in an article included in a book of rather diffuse materials entitled *The Viet-Nam Reader*.[49] He asserts that four Hoa Hao battalions that had eluded destruction by the Communists in 1955 were among those forces designated as Vietcong by Diem and that after Diem's assassination these battalions joined hands with the new Saigon government (pp. 253-54).[50]

[49] "Viet-Cong—The Unseen Enemy in Viet-Nam," in Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall, eds., *The Viet-Nam Reader* (New York 1965), 252-61.

[50] The term "Vietcong" was adopted by the Ngo Dinh Diem government through a shortening of the phrase *Viet Nam Cong San,* which means "Vietnamese Communist." This designation has proved most unfortunate because of its imprecision, its inappropriateness, and its lack of psychological impact. It is imprecise because, since 1930, there has been no group called the Vietnamese Communist Party; there has been only the Indochina Communist Party and its successor organized in 1951, the Vietnam Workers' Party. "Vietcong" has been an inappropriate designation because the term does not describe what the insurgents are trying to do; in Malaya the guerrillas were called

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With such a policy toward the anti-Communist sects it could hardly be expected that Diem would adopt a more flexible attitude toward the former Viet Minh areas. Fall states that after their evacuation the Viet Minh left behind "an elite guerrilla cadre force of perhaps less than 5,000 . . ." (p. 254). The accuracy of this number is extremely hard to assess, but more easily understood is the fact that the Viet Minh stay-behind forces did not openly oppose Diem. They didn't have to. While Diem was consolidating his "revolution" at the superstructure of Vietnamese politics, the talented Communist cadres were at work at the substructures. Paradoxically, Diem aided their effective process of political organization. In opposing the sects he had driven them into the hands of the Communists, at least temporarily. In 1957, a highly respected American anthropologist reported to the United States mission in Saigon that Diem's resettlement of Vietnamese refugees displaced by the Indochina War was alienating the mountain minorities of the central plateau. He considered the situation a dangerous vulnerability when measured against the potential return both of five to six thousand Rhadé tribesmen who had gone north in 1954 and of Vietnamese Communists who had adapted themselves to tribal customs.[51] Moreover, no special political programs were initiated for the former Viet Minh base area along the central coastal plain; it became the fief of Diem's younger brother, Ngo Dinh Can.

In Fall's view the reopening of the war was inevitable once Diem had refused to hold elections in July 1956. Only if Hanoi had judged its "southern rival too strong for overthrow through subversion" could war have been avoided. But Fall thinks Hanoi saw the Saigon government "in the process of alienating its own people to such an extent that even a modestly encouraged and supported guerrilla movement could well succeed in overthrowing it."[52] Fall implies that the anti-Diem insurgent movement, the National Liberation Front, arose through a multiplicity of factors, that it represents a broad spectrum of political sentiment, and that it is capable of making a settlement without reference to Hanoi. Much of Fall's interpretation is shared by

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"Communist terrorists." Finally, the term demonstrates psychological insensitivity: it includes the name of the country ("Viet"), which unwittingly gives legitimacy to the insurgents. More attention to the accuracy and psychological impact of the designation of their enemy might have resulted in a more effective response on the part of the Republic of Vietnam.

[51] Gerald C. Hickey, *Preliminary Research Report on the PMS [Plateau montagne du sud]*, Field Administration Division, Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group (Saigon, June 1957), 26-30. Hickey is the author of a major work of anthropological literature, *Village in Vietnam* (New Haven and London 1964).

[52] "Viet-Cong—The Unseen Enemy in Viet-Nam," 255-56.

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the noted *Le Monde* correspondent Jean Lacouture in his book *Vietnam: Between Two Truces*. They differ in that Lacouture attributes a greater role to Hanoi in the evolution of events in the south. For example, Lacouture states that "the Lao Dong [Workers' Party] was to authorize the creation in the Southern zone of a genuine revolutionary organization: the National Liberation Front. This organization was to be autonomous, but was evidently going to be tied rather closely to the Lao Dong in order to be able to demand from it aid against the Saigon regime" (pp. 54-55).

Another well-known observer of Vietnamese politics believes that Hanoi's relation to the insurgents in the south is much closer than either Lacouture or Fall suggests. P. J. Honey, of the University of London, cites evidence that members of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong party are actually directing military operations in southern Vietnam.[53] Honey's view that "the Viet Cong armed revolution in South Vietnam is organized and directed by the North Vietnamese Communist authorities" adds support to the U.S. Department of State's charge that the war is "North Viet Nam's effort to conquer South Viet Nam."[54] Lacouture regards the State Department White Paper as "very unconvincing." In February 1965, he estimated that Hanoi's aid to the south amounted to less than ten percent of that available to the insurgents, and in response to this estimate the Pentagon stated that the aid was "on the order of 15 to 20 percent," which Lacouture regarded as likely (p. 182).

There is nothing in Lacouture's view of the autonomy of the southern insurgents that would rule out the reintroduction of the 150,000 Viet Minh evacuees native to the area. In fact, he feels that Hanoi's aid is justified for "how could a revolutionary state permit the repression of revolutionary compatriots separated from it only by an artificial demarcation line, by a great foreign power? Such passivity is unimaginable, even where a neighboring foreign state is concerned. The Soviet Union did not permit the crushing of Republican Spain without reacting . . ." (p. 182). Such a justification is, of course, also being used by the United States in defending actions that Lacouture strongly opposes. The implications of his analysis are that long-standing political ties

[53] "North Vietnam's Workers' Party and South Vietnam's People's Revolutionary Party," *Pacific Affairs,* XXV (Winter 1962-63), 375-83.

[54] U.S. Department of State, *A Threat to Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort to Conquer South Viet-Nam,* Publication 7308, Far Eastern Series 110 (Washington 1961); U.S. Department of State, *Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam,* Publication 7839, Far Eastern Series 130 (Washington 1965); for an interesting critique of the latter see *I. F. Stone's Weekly,* XIII (March 8, 1965).

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of the southern insurgents with Hanoi sanction the introduction of evacuees and other troops into the south and that the magnitude of the United States response creates the risk of a wider, self-defeating war.

Lacouture's solution to the controversy, like that of many others, is based on political and diplomatic action. His key point is that Hanoi is not anxious to eliminate the Republic of Vietnam or to have reunification achieved soon. In his view, Hanoi does "not want to precipitate a reunification that would saddle them with a ruined country in the throes of the convulsions of war" (p. 246). A corollary to this point is the autonomy of the National Liberation Front. Lacouture quotes an NLF representative as being opposed to rule by Hanoi because "we have not been fighting for many years only to end up with having one dictatorship replaced by another" (p. 173). Against this background Lacouture believes a political settlement must take place on three planes: (1) among southern Vietnamese, (2) between Saigon and Hanoi, and (3) among the great powers (p. 277). At the heart of Lacouture's solution are the requirements that the NLF be integrated "into the legal fabric of the South" and that peaceful coexistence be established between Hanoi and Saigon (p. 279-80). The realization of these steps will be conditioned by the cooperation among the great powers, and in his view this means that the United States must be willing to negotiate and to persuade the Republic of Vietnam to negotiate with the NLF.

Even if one rejects P. J. Honey's analysis and accepts Lacouture's views that the NLF is an autonomous force and that the war is primarily one between southerners, a solution does not seem closer. Integrating the NLF, the Buddhists, the sects, or any other nonmilitary group "into the legal fabric of the South" appears a dim possibility simply because no resilient fabric, legal or otherwise, exists in southern Vietnam. Diem's successors continue within the army and among political groups a struggle for power that has characterized the revolutionary progress within the superstructure of non-Communist Vietnamese politics. Until some mechanism is devised that will permit the southern leaders to regulate and institutionalize their bids for power, this infighting will continue to consume the energies and attention of the Republic of Vietnam. Meanwhile, a revolution at the village substructure, led by the successors of the Viet Minh, continues to develop a viable though localized political structure.

Lacouture is suggesting that the two revolutionary processes be fused so that the violent struggle between them can be ended. While he

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acknowledges that this solution would encounter significant difficulties, he does not say what they are. One major reason for the political instability in southern Vietnam since 1954, it seems clear, is that the army has been the only viable, country-wide, political institution. However, unlike the Viet Minh armed force in the First Indochina War, the army in the south has not been a useful instrument of political integration. In the absence of competing or complementary political institutions the army has been the key to power. It was not the Buddhists who deposed Diem and killed him, but, paradoxically, the very same military leaders who had paved his way to power in 1955.[55] However, while it has been able to predominate in the superstructure and shows some signs of being able to share power with nonmilitary groups, the army has not been able to extend its power into the village-level substructure except by force. In part the United States' generous aid and the advice that has gone with it have raised the army's expectations of compelling, through military protection or force, popular compliance with its programs. Yet the rapid expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces has created an increased potential for coups d'etat and lesser squabbling without at the same time solving the problem of political stability in rural Vietnam. In order to buy time for political development to occur and to blunt the rapidly escalating infiltration, it has been necessary for American combat forces to carry the brunt of the fighting.

In Vietnam, in contrast to Laos, it does not seem possible to solve the problems of the country, even temporarily, by a coalition government and the amalgamation of opposing armed forces. While Lacouture's proposals for an integration of the NLF are obviously correct in principle and desirable as a long-range goal, they merely emphasize the great need for developing a broader structure of politics in southern Vietnam. Such a task was neglected by the French; its neglect was the underlying cause of the First Indochina War; and a new political structure remains the age-old unfulfilled requirement for peace among all peoples of Indochina. Sponsoring political growth of this kind is obviously more difficult than training and equipping an armed force

[55] General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") in May 1955 was instrumental in Diem's successful bid to gain control over the Vietnamese army and thereafter to defeat the political-religious sects. Associated with "Big Minh" were, among others, Generals Tran Van Don and Tran Van Minh. Eight years later, "Big Minh" was the leader of the coup d'etat that ended in Diem's assassination. See Lancaster, 393, and David Halberstam, "*Coup* in Saigon: A Detailed Account," *New York Times,* November 6, 1963. For a discussion of the role of the Buddhists, see Charles A. Joiner, "South Vietnam's Buddhist Crisis: Organization for Charity, Dissidence, and Unity," *Asian Survey,* IV (July 1964), 915-28.

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or building the infrastructure to transform a stagnant economy. In the aggregates on which American operational thinking is based, the requirements for political development are hard to measure and even harder to achieve through foreign assistance. Increased literacy, urbanization, facilities for mass communications, and social mobility are being recognized as requisites for political progress; but in themselves these factors do not assure stability. Foreign economic and military assistance have often stimulated the growth of these social factors without anticipating their political consequences. In fact, much of the instability underlying the Second Indochina War and frustrating the formation of viable states in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam can be attributed to consequences of this kind. Political integration of the type that Lacouture proposes, or of any other kind, awaits an examination of the internal effects on these countries of past policies and a determination of how future policies can promote stability. Until then, one of the important initial steps toward peace in Indochina will not have been taken.

IV

Resilient nation-states participating in diplomatic agreements for neutrality are the ultimate solution to fratricidal conflict in Indochina; but they will take a long time to develop. Yet the need for peace is immediate. In addition to taking its human and material toll, the war's continuation is, of course, making a political solution more difficult to achieve. As the insurgent forces in southern Vietnam grow in strength, it becomes progressively more difficult to integrate them "into the legal fabric of the South." Despite the southern insurgents' pronouncements that they do not wish either to eliminate the Saigon government or to come under the control of Hanoi, the heightened tempo of their military operations brings both these results closer.

Even though the National Liberation Front has not proclaimed itself as a government nor asked for international recognition, its success in rural politics and combat could make it synonymous with government in the south. Were this success to occur, the NLF would face a task of postwar consolidation of staggering proportions. For stability of any sort to be approached in southern Vietnam under the NLF, a human liquidation on the scale beyond that of Cuba or Indonesia would probably be necessary. Relocation of the two to three million refugees outside of Vietnam (there are already a million refugees inside the country) would undoubtedly be an impossibility.[56] Even if they did not

[56] Eric Pace, "Million Refugees Listed by Saigon," *New York Times,* July 5, 1966.

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oppose the NLF regime politically, the refugees would consume scarce resources without offering much prospect for productivity in a period of postwar reconstruction. Obviously, this would be reason enough for their liquidation by the NLF; without foreign assistance the present government could not support them either.

As this postwar problem is an outcome that both sides wish to avoid, it may serve as a brake to further escalation and provide an opening for peace. Providing there is a mutuality of interest that can help bring the conflict under control, the issue of northern Vietnamese participation is obviously the first problem to be confronted. One aid in dealing with this problem is that it appears not to be in Hanoi's interest to increase the rate of introducing men and matériel into the south. A massive invasion by the regular armed forces from the north would change the character of the conflict, increasing the vulnerability of the Hanoi regime to ground action north of the seventeenth parallel and exposing its own units needlessly. At the present level of conflict, Hanoi's aid to the southern insurgents is helping them achieve a politicization of the rural populace of the south, especially in the areas controlled by the Viet Minh prior to 1954, which seems to be their top priority goal. Effective limits on this aid do not appear to exist, although the United States has tried to check the resupply by air strikes at northern Vietnam and at communications routes in Laos.

The ineffectiveness of these air strikes has dramatized that asymmetries in combat can limit a great power in working its will on a smaller country. Air attacks have been unable to eliminate aid to the south because the weapons supplied are not manufactured in the north, depots in the north are widely dispersed and well protected, and transport is often by nonvehicular means. These factors, obviously clearer to those on the scene than to distant observers, indicate that the bombing is continued for reasons other than the interdiction of supply lines. Despite harassment, Hanoi's will has not yet been broken, and in fact the bombings probably have allowed the northern regime to bring the population more firmly under its control.[57] Thus the technical asymmetry of strategic air strikes being inappropriately used against targets in the north is reinforced by the asymmetry of air strikes being used as a bargaining mechanism between a great power and a small country. What the United States wants from Hanoi is essentially a political decision: to use its influence over the southern insurgents to bring the

[57] On July 17, 1966, Radio Hanoi, "was quoted as having said that North Vietnam would never surrender and would continue fighting until victory was won" (*New York Times,* July 17, 1966).

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conflict to a halt. At a minimum it is hoped that Hanoi will cease its aid and therefore make it easier for the insurgents to be defeated on the battlefields of the south. Military means of persuasion may not be the best way to secure this political decision; but the United States appears to lack other means. The asymmetrical relationship produced by this situation may continue unless the war hardens into a stalemate or expands into a wider conflict.

Perhaps the most important consequence of the air strikes was unintended. The Soviet Union has become more deeply involved in Vietnam than it probably wished to because it is the only friendly country capable of aiding Hanoi in antiaircraft defense.[58] Incomplete evidence suggests that the Chinese have imposed obstacles to rail shipments of Soviet supplies. Clearer evidence is Peking's chiding of Moscow, warning against a settlement in Vietnam with the "imperialist world."[59] While the Vietnam issue has come to the forefront of the Sino-Soviet controversy, this ideological notoriety in itself should not rule out a settlement of the war. In fact, the best prospects for a settlement lie in persuading the Soviet Union to become a guarantor of Hanoi's actions. Although Moscow assumed such a role in the Laotian crisis, it did so with reluctance and with no thought of permanence. Whether Moscow can be maneuvered into accepting a long-range role as a guarantor of peace in Southeast Asia is a question of much complexity. Can the threat of saturation bombing of northern Vietnam's industrial complex, including its coal mines and its infant iron and steel industry, cause the Soviets to intercede? Or can promises of indefinite cessation of the air strikes bring Moscow to the conference table with the intent of guaranteeing Hanoi's future moves? Are military instruments of only tangential importance in achieving a diplomatic settlement and are extra–Southeast Asian diplomatic moves, dealing with, say, nuclear proliferation and the German question, required to get peace agreements for the region?

The answers to these questions must be measured against the advan-

[58] See Peter Grose's perceptive analysis of the Russians' dilemma, "Moscow's Choice: For Peace or War," *New York Times,* July 17, 1966.

[59] "In close coordination with the counter-revolutionary 'global strategy' of U.S. imperialism, you [Russians] are now actively trying to build a ring of encirclement around socialist China. Not only have you excluded yourselves from the international united front of all peoples against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, you have even aligned with U.S. imperialism, the main enemy of the people of the world . . . in a vain attempt to establish a Holy Alliance against China, . . . against the national liberation movement and against Marxist-Leninists" (quotation from a letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, dated March 22, 1966, in *Peking Review*, IX [March 25, 1966], 6).

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tages to be gained from a Soviet commitment to a structured diplomatic agreement in Southeast Asia. With the Soviets capable of negotiating for Hanoi, one of the basic asymmetries in the bargaining—now taking place on a crude, unsystematic basis between Hanoi and Washington—would be ended. The way could be opened for an Indochina-wide settlement that need not require a confrontation of the complexities of Vietnam at the outset. For example, the interests of the Chinese and the Soviets are probably more congruent in Cambodia than in any other area of Indochina. It seems probable, too, that the United States would not pass up an opportunity to regain its influence in Cambodia, despite the problems such an initiative might raise with Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam. An international conference and, it is hoped, a treaty, on Cambodian neutrality would serve numerous important purposes without confronting the Vietnam issue directly. Ideally, it would end the use of Cambodian territory by the insurgents and stop incursions by American and Republic of Vietnam forces. Moreover, an agreement on Cambodia, where interests among the great powers are roughly similar, would increase the international confidence required for a reexamination of the abused neutrality of Laos and for a confrontation of the issues in Vietnam.

An effective neutrality for Cambodia and Laos could do much more toward bringing the conflict in southern Vietnam under control. Another limit would be placed on the already limited aid to the southern insurgents. Such neutrality treaties would engage both the Soviets and the Chinese as guarantors for Hanoi. Without their participation as guarantors it seems unlikely that a durable cease-fire can be attained in Vietnam. Yet thus far these two Communist powers have not been persuaded that a cessation of the war is in their interest as well as in the interest of the United States. Even with their participation, a modern-day Entente Cordiale in Southeast Asia will not easily be achieved if the Geneva Conference is reconvened. Many options will be ruled out as unfeasible: a geographic partition, as in 1954, would not be viable in the south unless a portion of the territory were joined to north Vietnam; the political fabric of the south is too weak at present to absorb the southern insurgents in a cabinet or in the armed forces; and elections, as in 1954, are a long-run mechanism for stability, not a short-run solution for peace. This paucity of options will make peace more difficult to attain; but if peace is to be had at all those options remaining must be acted upon.

Perhaps the most complex question for negotiations is the identity of the southern insurgents and the terms of their representation at the

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bargaining table. Unlike the Viet Minh in the First Indochina War, who proclaimed themselves the sole legitimate government for all Vietnam, the insurgents in the present war have publicly demanded only the reorganization of the existing government in the south.[60] But compromising with the insurgents under present conditions seems clearly more difficult than it did with the Viet Minh in 1954. Then the situation was more clear-cut; now it is extremely fluid. In contrast to 1954, there are now no areas of significance where the insurgents have unchallenged control, and there have been no resounding insurgent victories such as those that led up to Dien Bien Phu. Another and more important contrast is that in 1954 the political origins and background of the Viet Minh leadership were widely known. The French had negotiated with them extensively prior to 1954; their popular roots were discernible. By comparison, the NLF leadership is obscure. While its president, Nguyen Huu Tho, is doubtless a dedicated patriot, he is by no means a popular leader on the order of Ho Chi Minh. Neither he nor any of his lieutenants is a military commander capable of directing the more than 300,000 insurgents now estimated to be operating in the south.[61] This incapability reflects a major incongruity: the known NLF leadership is the flimsy facade of a very substantial political-military organization.

Whether or not Professor Honey is correct in his assertion that Hanoi is directing the insurgents, their identity will have to be more clearly established before meaningful negotiations can be conducted. The obstacles to broader political success facing the southern insurgents should help in establishing their identity. Whoever really leads the NLF will have to develop a more popular and comprehensive appeal if political strength is to be won in urban Vietnam. Despite all the turmoil of the past three years, none of the essentially urban groups opposing the Saigon government has turned to the NLF as an alternative. None of the many demands for political reform has echoed the program of the NLF. If the NLF is to transform itself into a movement that can gain political power through overt popular appeals as well as exclusively through military force, then more about its identity will have to be known. At present the NLF's acceptance of combat assistance from regular army units of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam does not add substance to its announced fear of being domi-

[60] The program of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, originally issued on December 20, 1960, has not been revised from its essentially anti-Diem character; Diem's departure makes the program out-of-date. For the text of the program, see Raskin and Fall, 216-21.

[61] *New York Times,* July 11, 1966, for the estimated size of the insurgent force.

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nated by Hanoi. Whatever advantages it provides on the battlefield, this aid cannot popularize the NLF image among the politically conscious city dwellers in the south.

As the identity of the NLF becomes clearer and its objectives more precise, the prospects for negotiation can be measured more accurately. Two aspects of the current bargaining situation are important in this assessment. These are the NLF's demands of December 1960 for changes in public welfare, foreign policy, and governmental structure (as proclaimed in a ten-point program and restated in a Hanoi proposal for negotiations issued on April 14, 1965) and for a return to the Geneva "accords" of 1954. Because of the effectiveness of the insurgency now based primarily in the thinly inhabited plateau and the rice-growing coastal plain of central Vietnam, these demands must be taken seriously. Yet many of the NLF's domestic reforms have already been achieved over the past six years through the popular agitation of the Buddhists and other antigovernment groups and through the overthrow of Diem by the army. Moreover, if it is determined that the Viet Minh evacuees of 1954, natives of the now embattled central province, have returned as major participants in the southern insurgency, the NLF claims for autonomy and separate representation would be greatly diminished.

Whatever status is eventually accorded the NLF will be best determined through negotiations, so that the identity of the organization can be established. Because of its "authorization" of the NLF, as Lacouture phrases it (p. 55), Hanoi will obviously play a key role in negotiations. Besides mentioning the program of the NLF, the April 1965 declaration indicates that Hanoi is interested in a settlement that covers all of Vietnam. However, in raising the issue of the Geneva "accords," Hanoi has avoided the question of reciprocal guarantees and other weaknesses of the 1954 cease-fire. Thus behind all of the questions of useful negotiations lies the issue of a guarantor for Hanoi and the willingness of the Soviets and the Chinese to accept this role. Once guarantees can be found, a settlement would likely follow the lines of a phased withdrawal of United States forces as northern Vietnam regulars and former Viet Minh cadres are returned northward. Participation in politics by indigenous insurgents would then be both necessary and feasible as the cessation of combat allowed the political fabric of the south to be strengthened.

Progress toward negotiations will be gradual. In the meantime, the NLF may be achieving a major objective despite the increasing effectiveness of allied military operations in the south. Although unable to

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interdict the southward flow of reinforcements, the allies are capable of dealing with them once they arrive. But this brutal combat is probably leading to the politicization of much of rural Vietnam, as it did to strategic portions of the Chinese countryside during the Japanese occupation.[62] Village Vietnam is being forced to choose sides out of necessity, and with the country's lack of rural political institutions, this confrontation works to the disadvantage of the Republic of Vietnam. The NLF program may appear too demanding on the basis of its existent power, but continued organization of rural Vietnam into a political structure will certainly strengthen the NLF bargaining position. Moreover, it will make the NLF's integration into postwar governments a necessity if political stability is to be achieved. Thus, if military operations merely destroy combat formations without concern for the political consequences, they may also destroy the possibility of successful resolution of the conflict.

The possibilities for diplomacy are few and difficult to exploit. Many options are long-range; thus immediate courses of action are part of an even narrower spectrum. However, in this nearly inflexible situation, existing opportunities for flexibility are being neglected. Efforts to achieve a genuine neutrality for Cambodia might demonstrate mutual interests that now appear dormant. Guarantees that the Vietnamese from the north would not violate Cambodian and Laotian territory could lead to guarantees on the cessation of Hanoi's aid to the southern insurgents. The assumption of the role of guarantor by the Soviet Union and the Chinese could serve to initiate negotiations. A more precise identification of the NLF could guide the negotiations to an effective solution. The mutual willingness for a phased withdrawal of United States forces as north Vietnamese troops and cadres are returned could help to "de-escalate" the conflict. With steps of this character achieved, a reopening of the questions left unresolved at Geneva in 1954—including recognition of the Republic of Vietnam, reciprocal agreements on the cessation of hostilities, sanctions concerning international supervision, realistic procedures for a unification of Vietnam, and a host of other issues—would be possible. The framework of a structured and resilient peace in Indochina could be the culmination of these negotiations and the resolution of centuries of political conflict.

[62] The process of this politicization in Japanese-occupied China is analyzed in detail in Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945* (Stanford 1962).

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OLD DRAGONS IN NEW MODELS

By DAVIS B. BOBROW*

Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, *Communist China and Arms Control*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, xi, 191 pp. $7.50.

THIS review tries to contribute to and accelerate a dialogue about directions of intellectual effort in the analysis of Communist China and its external interactions. Its antecedents are earlier contributions to *World Politics* by Boorman, Halpern, Johnson, and Lewis, and thus my comments are not addressed primarily to the work of particular individuals nor designed to show the way to an analytic Mecca.[1] They do try to develop the implications of the following three judgments.

The first is that we should not be satisfied with our current abilities to describe the present and predict the future nature of Chinese behavior and its determinants. The second is that major improvements in our descriptive and predictive capabilities would seem to require some rather fundamental restructuring and innovation in our tools of concept and method. The third is that there is a hidden fallacy in the argument that China's relevance to world peace and to American policy gives research priority to immediate, specific questions. This fallacy, to use Herbert Simon's distinction, is that we can produce *satisfactory* analytic findings about Communist China without trying to optimize our analytic capability. This assumption, it seems to me, rests on an underestimate of the extent to which Chinese behavior presents a profound, long-lived, and, relative to other challenges of the postwar period, different set of descriptive, predictive, and action problems.

In *Communist China and Arms Control*, prepared as a report to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and written under the auspices of the East Asian Research Center and the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University, Professors Halperin and Perkins survey a wide range of Chinese arms-control behavior and possible determinants. It seems useful, first, to note the areas of descrip-

* The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory or the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

[1] Howard L. Boorman, "The Study of Contemporary Chinese Politics: Some Remarks on Retarded Development," *World Politics*, XII (July 1960), 585-99; A. M. Halpern, "Contemporary China as a Problem for Political Science," *ibid.*, XV (April 1963), 361-76; Chalmers Johnson, "The Role of Social Science in China Scholarship," *ibid.*, XVII (January 1965), 256-71; and John W. Lewis, "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," *ibid.*, XVIII (April 1966), 503-24.

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tion and policy commentary in the volume and, second, to view it in terms of the concepts and methods used and assessed for other analysts. Since the volume is oriented to descriptive and policy commentary, the issues of conceptual framework and methods of data collection and analysis may seem peripheral. However, obviously there is significant intellectual dependence between concept and method decisions and empirical descriptions and policy analyses. The basic set of concepts and methods which we choose to entertain determines what we think we need to know to describe and predict Chinese behavior. Our descriptions constrain the range of policy options considered and the dimensions of their costs and gains which we try to estimate. This process of constraint applies whether we have a highly explicit set of concepts and methods, e.g., class analysis, or a vague and implicit set, e.g., a model of aggression expressed in historical analogies such as Munich. Further, as Lasswell has pointed out, policy evaluation must treat "dynamic" situations and "manipulative" strategies.[2] That is, policy questions can be viewed as requests to analysts to complete "if . . . then . . ." statements and to assign probabilities to courses of action which represent the possibilities of desirable or undesirable responses by target actors. On one level of generalization, these demands can be viewed as basically congruent with the need for predictive theory, dynamic models, and concepts and methods whose results at least can be ordinally scaled.

The authors describe those elements of Chinese behavior and their determinants which they assume to be relevant and try to predict, i.e., describe for future points in time, the operations of these elements and determinants. These are the central purposes of the chapters devoted to (1) China's foreign policy objectives, (2) the relationship between domestic politics and economics and Peking's foreign policy, (3) China's strategic posture, doctrine, and past actions across a broad military spectrum, (4) Chinese statements on and attitudes toward arms control, and (5) Chinese attitudes toward international agreements, organizations, and inspection. Halperin and Perkins draw on this descriptive material to suggest alternative American arms-control policies toward the People's Republic and to clarify their respective costs and gains. Policy commentary is the central purpose of the final two chapters which discuss "making China arms control minded" and planning U.S. arms-control policy to take account of its possible effects on China.

The authors' selection of variables and concepts is most clear with

[2] Harold D. Lasswell, "The Relation of Ideological Intelligence to Public Policy," *Ethics*, LIII (October 1942), 25-34.

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regard to arms control, as is their evaluation of the fruitfulness of those they have used. We are urged to "rethink the notions of arms control and perhaps develop a whole new set of concepts and assumptions based on a very different kind of military confrontation than exists with the Soviet Union" (p. 160).

In their analysis of Chinese behavior the authors use less clarified variables and concepts and give less attention to assessing the utility of those that they do use. In the Foreword, John Lindbeck indicates that the reader can expect a somewhat frightening array of variables to be manipulated: "relevant political, ideological, economic, technological, military and cultural factors, as well as predisposing historical and traditional influences . . ." (pp. vii-viii). In the text itself, however, the relative utility of different concepts is of major concern only in the first chapter. Here Halperin and Perkins seek to establish the compatibility of Chinese defense behaviors with what they infer to be the Chinese "national interest" and the ruling variant of Communist "ideology." Given the apparent consensus on the importance of this distinction as a major, and perhaps the major, source of uncertainty in analyzing Chinese intentions, it would seem important to establish the bases for stability and change in the Chinese goal framework.[3] However, the authors feel that an attempt to analyze the "psychological and historical elements" that affect the goal structure of the Chinese elite would be premature. They do not indicate whether or not such analysis would be important. In the book as a whole, the role of psychological variables, whether perceptual or motivational, is unclear. Words and phrases such as motive, attitude, real attitude, and perception are used frequently, but their interdependence and relative importance or lack thereof do not receive substantial attention. Perhaps some indication of a tacit weighting of variables is provided by the disciplinary affiliations of the participants in two conferences that preceded the publication of *Communist China and Arms Control* (pp. 179-81).[4] Although affiliations with academic disciplines are poor indicators of almost anything, it is still interesting to note that the roster includes no psychologists, social psychologists, psychiatrists, or anthropologists, and only one sociologist. In sum, the reader primarily interested in arms control receives a clear suggestion about the need for conceptual work; the reader interested in China finds neither an unambiguous expression of satisfaction or dis-

[3] See Secretary Rusk's statement of March 16, 1966, to the Far East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, reported in the *New York Times,* March 17, 1966.

[4] I had the pleasure of participating in the first of these conferences and of commenting on an early draft of the final report.

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satisfaction with existing frameworks nor clear suggestions about future directions of effort.

Appropriate methods for analyzing either arms control or China are not explicitly discussed in the volume under review. The authors themselves seem to have opted for qualitative content analysis, qualitative analysis of past Chinese conflict behavior, comparisons of gross military capabilities, and aggregate and sectoral measurement of economic resources and production growth rates. However, we cannot tell whether this was the choice of necessity or of intellectual conviction.

The rest of this review discusses concepts and methods appropriate to the treatment of (1) China as a national actor, (2) Chinese elites as decision-makers, and (3) possible means to increase our ability to assess the utility of different concepts and methods to describe and predict Chinese behavior.

China as a National Actor

In a recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Lucian Pye noted the problem of "trying to set appropriate standards for judging Chinese performance" and the related task of placing the People's Republic in a conceptually more useful context.[5] National actor analysis of China contributes to the accomplishment of these tasks. We can expect wise selection of national trait variables and careful collection of information about China and other nations for those variables to increase our ability to (1) measure the extent and direction of difference between national traits at different times; (2) establish empirically the extent to which China tends to cluster near to (i.e., be similar to) or far from (i.e., be different from) other nations; (3) assess the descriptive utility of alternative conceptual typologies and the limits of their applicability; (4) test hypotheses about the statistical co-occurrence of particular traits of nations; (5) determine the nature of the relationships between national traits (input variables to national elite decisions) and national policies (output variables from national elite decisions); and (6) on the basis of analyses of this fifth type select hypotheses about the reasons for policy choices. Obviously, these hypotheses must be tested in studies of elite decision-making.[6]

It seems particularly useful to examine some recent quantitative national actor analyses for their contribution to our knowledge about

[5] Lucian W. Pye, "Coming Dilemmas for China's Leaders," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIV (April 1966), 387-402.

[6] The national actor approach does not exclude the use of subnation data but does aggregate them to place the nation on a particular position for the relevant variables, e.g., similarity of political participation in urban and rural areas.

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the People's Republic. This review article restricts itself to the quantitative literature, because this literature experiments with methods fairly new in the China field and generates alternative concepts, the data bases used are sufficiently explicit to be checked, and the data are ranked in ways that facilitate cross-national comparisons. The work under review can be divided into that which deals with most nations of the world and that which deals with primarily Communist-governed states.

CHINA AMONG NATIONS

Three national actor data collections and categorizations are available, and each manipulates a different set of variables. Russett and Alker deal primarily with socioeconomic and demographic variables; Banks and Gregg and Banks and Textor with political system characteristics; and Ivanoff with indices of national power.[7] China does not cluster near to the same nations in any two, let alone all three, of these variable clusters. Taken individually, the socioeconomic-demographic analysis places China in the second from the bottom stage of "political and economic development," that of "traditional civilizations"; the political system analysis, on the "centrist" or totalitarian factor; and the national power analysis, in the second from the top category, labelled "major international actors."

The descriptive sufficiency of the categories used is of some concern, indicating that perhaps the full set of appropriate variables and variable positions is not reflected in the structure of the typology. Specifically, for stage of political and economic development, the Chinese positions on all variables used except gross national product per capita could place China in the range found for at least two other stages of development. For political system factor loadings, variance in Chinese political characteristics when compared with that of the other states that load most heavily on the "centrist factor" is accounted for to an unusually great extent by the "modernizing elite" and "personalist" political system factors and to an unusually small extent by the factor labelled "industrialized, broadly democratic." For national power level, China stands clearly below her fellow "major international actors" on the component

[7] In using the following sources, I do not intend any positive or negative judgment on the accuracy of their data. Bruce M. Russett and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, Harold D. Lasswell, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1964); Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems: Q-Factor Analysis of *A Cross-Polity Survey*," *American Behavioral Scientist*, IX (November 1965), 3-6; Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963); D. Ivanoff, *International Environment Evaluation System*, Douglas Missile and Space Systems Division, Report SM-51925 (Santa Monica, January 1966).

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political and economic performance indices and on the aggregate measure of performance capability.

Although much more investigation is needed before we can conclusively determine the statistical co-occurrence of national traits, some preliminary judgments are possible. There is no general behavior pattern obviously common to China and the other states categorized as "traditional civilizations." These other states include such diverse nations as Haiti, South Vietnam, Bolivia, and India. Similarly, there is no pattern of even foreign and defense behavior obviously common to the set of major international actors. These are—in addition to China—France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Canada. The immediate visibility of a general common pattern of behavior is greater for the set of states that load most heavily on the political centrist factor, particularly with respect to control of the domestic population. The relevant countries include all Communist-governed states, the dictatorships of the Iberian peninsula, and a few of the authoritarian states of the third world. At this time we can conclude that the power of national trait similarities as indicators of behavioral output similarities is not sufficiently great to justify giving them priority over analyses of the intervening variables of the decision-making process. Within the latter research area, some priority seems warranted for studies of foreign and defense behavior and modernization, as contrasted with political control and decision patterns.

The studies under discussion contribute most clearly to the last potential of national actor studies mentioned in the introduction of this section. In other words, they suggest some factors that would seem to affect the problem-solving environment of the Chinese elites and imply possible reasons for some Chinese behaviors.

The great differences found in the rank of China among nations on indices of military power, modernization, standard of living, and authoritarianism suggest a general hypothesis about Chinese elite decision-making and a number of specific subhypotheses about the relations of four policy orientations to this generality. The general hypothesis is that the Chinese elite find it necessary to seek justifications for these differences in rank and to mobilize a mixture of political loyalty and economic energy either to reduce or sustain them. In relation to this perceived need, we can see the possible instrumental value of four policy strategies. The first is to blame the rank differences on strong but not invincible external actors. The second is to make the differences and their relative uniqueness to the People's Republic a symbol of success rather than failure. The third is to make sizable efforts to maximize

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the use of economic resources and minimize demands on them. (It is interesting to note that the Chinese elite have kept an unusually high percentage of the civilian work force free for productive labor, put individuals not professionally engaged in production into production for certain periods of time, and kept the population growth rate below the median level of national actors.) The fourth method involves dramatic demonstrations of the feasibility of high rank in national power while economic and modernization ranks are low. From this point of view, Chinese nuclear development can be seen to validate, and acceptance of the test-ban treaty to lower, China's status as a "major international actor" to a greater extent than would similar actions by other more industrialized states in that category.

CHINA AMONG COMMUNIST-GOVERNED STATES

In view of the past tendency to group Communist states in a "bloc" and the tendency to assume special patterns of relationships among states governed by Communist parties, it seems fruitful to analyze China in terms of membership in the set of Communist nations.

Available data allow for comparisons in terms of political system variance (Banks and Gregg, Sievers), development (Pirages), nonmilitary international involvements (Sievers, Simon), and national power (Ivanoff).[8] Except for the national power and foreign aid aspects of the nonmilitary involvement variables, China seems to co-occur across variable clusters with this group of Communist states: North Vietnam, North Korea, Albania, and Outer Mongolia. However, specific points about her relationships to these and other Communist states in what seems to be a meaningful cluster should be noted. First, these states and other Communist states except Cuba exceed China in the ratio of party members to others in the population. Second, they and other Communist states exceed China in the proportion of the working-age population in paramilitary organizations and in the armed forces. Third, although they share with China the lower rungs of a number of modernization scales, Albania and North Korea rank higher than China on others. In sum, when we restrict ourselves to domestic, politi-

[8] In using these sources I again do not intend any positive or negative judgment on the accuracy of their data. Banks and Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems"; Bruce Sievers, *The Divided Nations: International Integration and National Identity*, Stanford Studies of the Communist System, Research Paper No. 11 (March 1966); Dennis C. Pirages, *Socio-Economic Development and Political Change in the Communist System, ibid.*, No. 9 (January 1966); Maurice David Simon, *Communist System Interaction with the Developing States, 1954-1962: A Preliminary Analysis, ibid.*, No. 10 (January 1966); Ivanoff, *International Environment Evaluation System.*

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cal, and modernization variables, we find that China clusters with the least developed and culturally least Western Communist states.

When we turn to variables that measure international interactions, new patterns occur. In terms of attenuated ties to the USSR, China resembles Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, and Rumania, but not North Korea, North Vietnam, or Outer Mongolia. In terms of formal non-military ties to the developing countries, China exceeds only those states clustered with it in the preceding paragraph. Of course, when we turn to national power rankings, China is exceeded only by the USSR among Communist states and clusters with non-Communist nations of the industrialized West.

In any extensive typology of Communist states we can see that China occurs in a category by itself. We can also see that Communist nations that are similar on a number of domestic variables do not necessarily have similar external attributes or behaviors, nor entirely similar internal behaviors. As in the preceding section, the data seem most fruitful in their implications for (1) factors with which Chinese elite decision-makers have to cope, and (2) possible reasons for some Chinese behaviors.

Although China ranks as a great power, it has few bases for unquestionable leadership status. China's objective domestic modernization achievements do not give it clear status over even the least-developed of the Communist states. The small percentage of the population under arms does not objectively support a role of leading militant, and its *objective* means (modern mass media and ratio of party membership to population) of mass mobilization do not give the Chinese party outstanding access to the population or special ability to communize it. We hypothesize that these inadequate bases of leadership represent reasons for the Chinese elite to locate substitute bases, particularly in the following three policy strategies. First, they can try to substitute scales of achievement relative to obstacles for scales of achievement, which involves them in statements about the stagnant nature of pre-Communist China, the problems inherent in China's volume, and the obstacles presented by external actors. Second, they can try to compensate for inadequate objective means of mass mobilization by elaborating on the monolithic control and reliability of those that exist and by eliminating alternative channels of communication and foci of loyalty that could affect their efficacy. Third, they can seek leadership by achievement in foreign and defense policies. The Chinese are constrained by attributes of other national actors in using this last avenue. For reasons of location and political history three of the four Commu-

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nist states clustered with China (North Korea, North Vietnam, Outer Mongolia) are particularly concerned with Soviet protection. Except on China's periphery other Communist states have swamped Chinese manipulations of foreign aid to become the dominant Communist influence. China can try to lead a cluster of currently non-Communist states experiencing severe political and economic development pains, if not by foreign aid, then by means of exporting doctrine, demonstrating the ability to inflict military loss on those who resist its leadership, and conducting shows of strength inside China but highly visible externally, e.g., nuclear detonations.

We have hypothesized three policy strategies that the Chinese elite can use to compensate for attributes of the People's Republic that are deficient relative to those of other Communist states. We also hypothesize that to the extent the first and third strategies do not work, the second becomes exaggerated in importance.

This section has discussed the appropriateness and implications of several sets of national trait data for Communist China. China does not cluster consistently with a particular set of nations in the typologies of national actor attributes, which implies the utility of a more differentiated typing of China according to types of attributes. Although its attributes do not co-occur with easily observed patterns of behavior, its attributes relative to other states do imply factors that might influence Chinese decision-making. Validating the presence and significance of these relationships is beyond the scope of a review article, but until we have done this it seems premature to contend that numerous Chinese behaviors have no reasons except those of "ideological fervor" or resolutions of internal power struggles. It also seems premature to foreclose the set of external actor policies which can affect Chinese behavior.

Chinese Elites as Decision-Makers

This review of national actor data implies the relevance of Chinese elite decision-making processes to understanding the relationship between the attributes of the People's Republic and Chinese behavior. There are three explicit reasons for studying the nature of intervening Chinese elite decision processes. First, most acts that the Chinese take in relation to the international environment have been reviewed or modified or otherwise affected by the elite. Second, such study can produce more precise and specific predictions. National attributes usually leave elites a large variety of options, selection from which is affected by what they want, know about, and know how to do. The third reason is that such study provides control for what one might call "analytic

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projection," that is, the tendency to assume that the subjects of one's analysis see the same "facts" as the analyst and manipulate them in the same way and in the same context. Unless we try to establish empirically what "facts" the subjects of analysis do see and what might be the conceivable reasons for their responses to them, we become tempted to infer, if their responses do not fit with what we think the "facts" warrant, that the subjects are evil, irrational, or stupid to some significant degree. Of course, we may be able to demonstrate that they were, for example, stupid on a certain occasion, in that they did not manipulate knowledge available to them logically but were not in states that impaired intellectual performance, e.g., emotional or tired states. We may even be able to impute stupidity as an attribute of the elite group if we can observe stupid handling of information on a *series* of occasions.

The remainder of this section explores the small body of quantitative literature to find the extent of support for two prominent hypotheses about Chinese elite decision-making.[9] These posit, respectively, that the Chinese elite live in an "unreal" world, i.e., have poor reality testing, and that they are rigid in their attitudes and actions.[10] This analytic separation seems useful since rigidity does not necessarily imply either impaired or good abilities to test reality. We have selected these two hypotheses because, to the extent that they are correct, they foreclose a large number of specific inquiries. If the Chinese elite have extremely poor reality testing, we would turn from the concepts and methods that assume a moderate ability to test reality to those of psychopathology. If the Chinese elite are rigid, we would forego methods and concepts designed to measure the degree and determinants of flexibility.

Obviously, any attempt to measure reality-testing performance involves many crucial assumptions, the most important of which are the criteria of reality against which elite data are plotted. Since the definition of reality in the relevant literature is that of American academics, it seems reasonable to retain the possibility that the work is systematically biased in the direction of *lowering* the reality-testing performance of the Chinese elite.

[9] The studies reviewed are Charles C. McClelland, *The Communist Chinese Performance in Crisis and Non-Crisis: Quantitative Studies of the Taiwan Straits Confrontation, 1950-1964,* Behavioral Science Group, Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California (December 1965); Martin George Zaninovich, *An Empirical Theory of State Response: The Sino-Soviet Case*, Stanford Studies in International Conflict and Integration (August 1964); Ole R. Holsti, *East-West Conflict and Sino-Soviet Relations, ibid.* (December 1964); and Robert C. North, Jan F. Triska, Richard A. Brody, Ole R. Holsti, Anne Armour, A. Odell Osteen, Jr., *The Analysis of International Tension, ibid.,* (June 1964).

[10] Rusk, statement of March 16, 1966.

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Zaninovich provides relevant Chinese and Soviet data across all four segments of the Stanford mediated stimulus-response model for three different international situations: major threat to China (the U.S.-Japan security treaty); major threat to the Soviet Union (the U-2 incident); and major threat to a pro-Communist third party (the Bay of Pigs). When we look at his data, they suggest three indicators of the quality of Chinese elite reality testing. These are the relationships between (1) the actions of external actors and Chinese perceptions of these actions; (2) Chinese perceptions of these actions and perceptions of their own intended course; and (3) the actions of external actors and China's actions. Using the first measure on both the Chinese and Soviet data, Chinese reality testing seems relatively weaker than the Soviets'. Chinese elites consistently "overperceive" the behavior of external actors in a negative direction, whether the external actor is seen from Peking as being, in aggregate, hostile, e.g., the United States, or friendly, e.g., Burma. However, this "bias" was not sufficient for the Chinese elites to see themselves as the primary target of U.S. hostility except during the month of the Washington-Tokyo treaty. Using the second measure indicates that, except during this same high-threat month, Chinese perceptions of the intentions of others correlate highly with perceptions of their own intentions. They do not seem to perceive their intentions as consistently pacific or good and those of others as hostile or bad. Chinese actions correlate highly with the actions of external actors when they involve states that the Chinese elite do not perceive as threatening. In two of the three periods Zaninovich examined, Chinese actions exceeded the hostility of those by external actors when hostile states were involved, although it is relevant to note that Chinese actions in one of these periods (downed U-2) seem primarily to have been designed to get onto the international stage. Her actions in the other period (the U.S.-Japan pact) were not more discrepant with external actions than are those of the Soviet Union when the latter experiences high threat. Thus, on the basis of the Zaninovich data, Chinese reality testing tends to be relatively good except when major events are directed primarily at China.

Other data support conclusions from the Zaninovich data. Three examples are Chinese public perceptions of (1) the U.S. as extremely strong; (2) the test-ban treaty as active rather than passive in its implications for Chinese policy; and (3) the American government, rather than the Chinese Nationalists, as the appropriate receiver for conflict-reducing messages during Taiwan Straits crises. The only significant data that seem clearly compatible with the "unreality" hypothesis are

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those of Chinese perceptions of the U.S. as a consistent enemy, i.e., as having strong negative feelings toward China. To be able to say that these perceptions of us indicate impaired abilities to test reality requires a larger and more intensively analyzed body of data on our affective posture than now exists.

We can begin to measure rigidity by the extent to which Chinese perceptions and actions change or remain the same in different contexts and toward different actors. General Chinese perceptions of the United States (negative, strong, active) seem to be highly similar over time, regardless of the level of conflict between ourselves and Communist states. However, the Chinese perceive immediate American intentions toward China and U.S. involvement with particular third parties differently at different points in time. The extent to which the Chinese attend to third parties and perceive these as hostile or friendly also fluctuates considerably. McClelland's intensive analysis of data on fourteen years of international interaction over the Taiwan Straits indicates that Chinese behavior, public Chinese elite definitions of the situation, and expressions of intent have varied greatly.

Although all these data indicate that the Chinese elite are selectively rigid, they do not support the hypothesis that they are undiscriminatingly so. Before the hypothesis can be tested more satisfactorily, degree of Chinese rigidity will have to be related to alternative actors and issue areas.

Possible Future Tasks

This review of two types of recent research suggests the following conclusions. First, on the basis of currently available national actor data, understanding Chinese behavior requires attention to the intervening variables of the decision process. Second, at least at first these variables should be conceived of not in terms of psychopathology but in terms of the Chinese elite as a problem-solving group. In part this will mean studying the Chinese elite decision process across a variety of contexts and on a number of variables. For these studies to be cumulative, they will have to be sufficiently quantitative to let us assess the significance of different variables in a particular context and of the same variables in diverse contexts. Third, since the currently available national actor data were particularly fruitful for their hypotheses about "reasons" for decisions, it seems useful to consider types of national actor analysis that will be productive in other ways. Fourth, although only a small body of quantitative work in national actor and decision analysis exists for Communist China specifically, these forms of innovation are pro-

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ductive both of hypotheses with *prima facie* importance and of bases for testing assumptions used in analyzing China.

These findings suggest that the innovation and reconstruction assumed to be needed in analyses of the People's Republic should certainly include, and perhaps be strongly oriented toward, three areas of work. These are data quality control, problem identification and problem solving, and expanded national actor analysis.

DATA QUALITY CONTROL[11]

Whether they work with the open-circulation Chinese press to locate economic trends, psychological tendencies, or political struggles, analysts recognize the possible distortions involved in depending on sources that the Chinese elite control and know how carefully we read. Although we still have to use these sources, we can run data quality control studies to estimate the degree and direction of error in our sources. More specifically, by using computers we can begin to establish the deviation of material in public sources from (a) messages to specialized groups in China, (b) Chinese government actions, and (c) events in the world. This knowledge can be gathered by comparing public statements with (a) media content intended for more select Chinese audiences (e.g., the People's Liberation Army "secret working papers"); (b) known Chinese behavior (e.g., military deployments, delegations sent abroad); and (c) known external events (e.g., weapons tests, revolutions, natural disasters).

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND PROBLEM SOLVING

Progress with three related tasks should improve our understanding of Chinese elite decision-making and our capability to predict Chinese behavior. All three tasks are directed to learning about the cognitive categories that the Chinese use when dealing with a subject for decision, the contents of these categories, and the rules and axioms the Chinese use in inferring costs and gains of alternative actions. The first task involves investigating all these topics by skilled and open "listening" to Chinese words and actions. The second task involves testing, and probably changing, the hypotheses generated by the first task—through experimental and quasi-experimental manipulation (e.g., simulation) of culturally Chinese subjects, preferably socialized under Communist rule for at least some of their years. The third task involves computerized dynamic modeling in which alternative models derived from the second task are run independently of knowledge about Chinese be-

[11] My thinking in this area has benefited from conversations with Raoul Naroll.

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havior in specific cases and then checked against the real world output behavior of the Peking elite.

EXTENDED NATIONAL ACTOR ANALYSIS[12]

Two extensions of national actor analysis seem promising. The first involves the collection of data on China and other nations for a number of years. These time-interval data provide the empirical base for comparing China's accomplishments against those of other states and estimating trends in China's similarity to other nations. The second extension involves enlarging the universe of variables included in national actor descriptions. It is now possible to combine data on political, socioeconomic, and military variables to provide a more comprehensive basis for categorizing nations and for analyzing the degree to which positions on particular variables are dependent on other national characteristics. More dramatically, we can abandon the artificial distinction between national actor and decision-making data after we have progressed with the problem-solving and problem-identification tasks suggested for China and have collected similar data on other elites. With such data available, we would be in a position to measure the relative significance of the broadly psychological elements of the decision process compared with "objective" national traits in accounting for variance in national behavior.

[12] My thinking in this area has benefited from conversations with Rudolph J. Rummel.

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THE SOUTH AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Hope for Subcultures

By J. ALLEN SMITH*

Charles O. Lerche, Jr., *The Uncertain South*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1964, 324 pp. $6.95.

Alfred O. Hero, Jr., *The Southerner and World Affairs*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1965, 676 pp. $12.00.

> Lee, known through life as "Roony," was a Virginian of the eighteenth century, much as Henry Adams was a Bostonian of the same age. Roony Lee had changed little from the type of his grandfather, Light Horse Harry. Tall, largely built, handsome, genial, with liberal Virginian openness towards all he liked, he had also the Virginian habit of command and took leadership as his natural habit. No one cared to contest it. None of the New Englanders wanted command. For a year, at least, Lee was the most popular and prominent young man in his class, but then seemed slowly to drop into the background. The habit of command was not enough, and the Virginian had little else. He was simple beyond analysis; so simple that even the simple New England student could not realize him. No one knew enough to know how ignorant he was; how childlike; how helpless before the relative complexity of a school. As an animal, the Southerner seemed to have every advantage, but even as an animal he steadily lost ground.
>
> —*Henry Adams*[1]

> "I dont hate it," Quentin said, quickly, at once, immediately; "I dont hate it," he said. *I dont hate it* he thought, panting in the cold air, the iron New England dark; *I dont. I dont! I dont hate it! I dont hate it!*
>
> —*William Faulkner*[2]

I

AMONG the books that have appeared recently concerning the South, those by Professor Hero and the late Professor Lerche are of outstanding interest for at least two reasons. First, both authors focus their attention on the attitude of the South toward the outside world and American foreign policy, and especially on the position of Southerners regarding foreign aid. This is a welcome change from the plethora of novels, poems, and tracts by or about introspective Southerners, with their difficulties vis-à-vis themselves, the nation, and, at

* I am grateful to Messrs. Lawrence E. Appet and Paul Siniawer, Rutgers Law School students, for their help on this review article.

[1] *The Education of Henry Adams*, Modern Library edition (New York 1931), 57. Adams was writing of the Harvard Class of 1858.

[2] *Absalom, Absalom* (New York 1936), 378. In Faulkner's story, the year is 1910.

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best, its internal policies. Second, these books are of interest because of the research methods used by the authors in reaching their conclusions, methods based on social science devices that lend support to their findings and tend to convince in a stronger way than would be the case if these conclusions were arrived at through purely personal observations based on intuitive feeling.

The two books here being reviewed comprise over one thousand pages and involve many subtle descriptions and insights that cannot be easily summed up. The main outlines, however, can be conveniently stated. Although both authors, working by different methods, are saying nearly the same thing, they do differ considerably in the way they express themselves. Professor Lerche in some portions of his book shows pique, and an eagerness to combat as well as to describe Southern attitudes. Moreover, he is caught up in a kind of Teutonic generalization that he expresses in a dichotomy—unilateralism versus multilateralism. He seems to see the good, sophisticated, peace-loving persons, who, according to Professor Lerche, surprisingly enough constitute the leadership corps of the nation, as multilaterally minded. Southerners, or at least most of them, are seen as provincial, badly educated, narrow-minded, traditionally minded unilateralists.

The great task, according to Professor Lerche, is to help the Southerner discover his weaknesses and to restore him to the mainstream of American thought which is multilateralism. Professor Hero really agrees with Professor Lerche but, as a member of the Southern intelligentsia, he writes lovingly of his native region. His writing is more persuasive because it is kinder. He seems to want the South to lead rather than to follow, though his goals also are the goals of multilateralism, expressed in simpler terms.

Both scholars agree that at least through World War II the South was anti-isolationist, full of the spirit of Wilsonian internationalism and consequently multilaterally minded. Both, however, fail to say whether this internationally minded state of the South is a continuing theme or whether it was a passing phenomenon. They find, though, that by the 1950's the South had developed a fear of communism and of the United Nations, as well as a lack of concern for international trade and a narrowness suggestive of an earlier Midwestern isolationism.

Along with this Southern withdrawal into self is found a love for the military. In the Southern isolationist view, the military establishment so honored by the South, which the South has traditionally controlled, should be used not as a cooperative peace force, integrated with foreign generals and international troops, but as a great bulwark of

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defense for state and nation. According to Professor Hero, the peculiar affection of the South for the military stems from both historical and psychological antecedents. Ties with the past and romantic notions of chivalry in an ordered, hierarchical society have not disappeared from the Southern viewpoint. Further, the Southerner is decidedly pessimistic rather than utopian; he sees military preparedness as vital in a world governed by self-serving interests. The feeling that war may be inevitable in a world of heterogeneous peoples colors the Southern attitude toward communism. The Southerner puts little reliance on diplomacy as a method of resolving current world problems and is instead willing to consider preventive war to stop communism.

Professor Lerche has come to the same conclusion. Recognizing that "the military fixation of Southerners has a profound cultural root," he points out that the South has been a leader not only in advocating the use of armed forces to subdue the nation's enemies but also "in the flaming rhetoric of the final showdown with communism, filled with gloomy but exciting forecasts of inevitable war" (p. 49).

To defend his nation, the Southerner has been willing to give technical and economic aid to foreign nations. The South encouraged postwar foreign aid, which went to sympathetic allies like England and France with whom the Southerner feels some special cultural affinity. Southerners are less enthusiastic about economic aid for underdeveloped nations. The South remains an ardent believer in the white man's burden and therefore tends to be critical of African independence movements. Professor Lerche has concluded, from an examination of congressional voting patterns, that since 1954 the South has become the most hostile opponent of foreign aid.

These characteristics represent only a few of the variances that exist between the Southerner and the rest of the nation, but since the South represents between twenty-five and thirty percent of the voting population, these attitudes, according to both scholars, can be dangerous. They can prevent the country from reaching greater world cooperation to achieve workable solutions to international problems, can endanger the peace, and can cause our nation to become schizoid, the dominant North moving ahead and the South trailing as a sort of latter-day Colonel Blimp.

Although I do not agree with a good deal of the reasoning of these scholars explaining the way the South behaves, I do think that they have made what another reviewer has called a monumental contribution. They show that it is possible, by different methods, to find out what the South is actually thinking at a given period of time. They

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bring out what others have shown largely through literary insight, that the South is different. To be more exact, these authors prove at least that regarding a particular issue, foreign aid, at a particular time, the South was different. If this were all they did, the two studies would be of minor importance. If the books are to be taken as of major importance, however, we must accept the premise that there is a South; that, though changing, it abides as a different subculture; and that it can be tested as to other issues at other times by scientific methods. We have to ask ourselves, What is the South?

II

The easiest way to define the South would be to call it a geographical region formed by the eleven states that made up the old Confederacy—but few observers let it go at that. Odum, who saw the South largely in economic terms, included, in addition to the eleven states that seceded, Kentucky, Missouri, and Oklahoma, "which could never be included in the South; nor left out."[3] He saw this region as frontier country, "rich in struggle and conflict, romance and adventure, victory and tragedy, . . . a sort of specialized America."[4] Somewhat similarly, Professor Lerche includes Kentucky and Oklahoma, leaves out Missouri, and substitutes West Virginia. Professor Simkins describes the South not only as a geographical area that extends "from Maryland south and west to Texas and Arkansas" and as the "region between the Potomac and the Rio Grande," but, more important, as "an attitude of mind and a way of behavior just as much as it is a territory."[5] It was a similar thought that led Cash to the title of his great book, *The Mind of the South*. In the main Cash limits the region to the eleven Confederate states but, more important, he stresses the Southern mind, which was formed in "conflict with the Yankee."[6] Similarly Allen Tate speaks of "the South, Uncle Sam's other Province."[7] And forthrightly, Professor C. Vann Woodward writes that "rather than a geographical area, the southern identity is a complex make-up of environment, circumstance and situation."[8]

A good many authors writing on the South recognize, although they treat them somewhat cursorily, the large numbers of people who are moving into the South from outside the geographical region. The fact

[3] Howard W. Odum, *An American Epoch* (New York 1930), 25.
[4] *Ibid.*, 19.
[5] Francis Butler Simkins, *A History of the South* (New York 1953), 3, ix.
[6] W. J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York 1961), 65-66.
[7] *Ibid.*, viii.
[8] *The Burden of Southern History* (Baton Rouge 1960), 4-5.

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that literally millions of newcomers have appeared in the South gives rise to somewhat loose and perhaps ill-founded suggestions. For instance, it is frequently stated that Dade County, Florida (Miami), with a population of over one million is not really Southern. Anyone who has resided in south Florida will find this hard to accept. The integration of the Negro, for example, is hardly more accelerated in Miami than it is anywhere else in the South outside the most rural counties. Moreover, the local political leaders tend to be Southern, no matter how that word is defined. A new congressional district, which includes a large number of recently arrived Northern Jews, elects as its representative Claude Pepper, a liberal Populist who was born in Alabama and who got his political start in the farm counties west of the Sewanee. Of course a large number of Cuban refugees have given this area a special tone; and some candidates of indubitably Northern stripe, such as Elliott Roosevelt, have been elected to office. But I would submit that Dade County is no more a Yankee enclave than is Arkansas, where Winthrop Rockefeller is a political factor.

One also hears from time to time that Atlanta, which houses the regional offices of many large Northern corporations, is *au fond* a Northern city; that New Orleans, with its great port and large Catholic population, is somehow a separate and special case; and that Texas, with a booming population of upward of ten million, despite its having been the breadbasket of the Confederacy, is today something other than Southern. Or further, one hears that, considering the opposition to the Civil War by the ancestors of the mountain folk of southern Appalachia, combined with the paucity of Negroes in that large area, this section of the country should be studied separately from the true South. This sort of dismemberment would tear away from the South as traditionally understood all of the elements below the Mason-Dixon line except the five states of the Deep South: South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, with some few contiguous areas thrown in. It may be useful, indeed, to treat the many subdivisions of the South separately, and, in an interesting collection of articles appearing recently in *Harper's*, Professor D. W. Brogan, limiting himself to the race problem, discusses only the Deep South;[9] but if one agrees with Professors Hero and Lerche that it is important for many purposes to see the South as a whole, then one must view it as a great subculture of the United States held together by commonly shared values and attitudes, yet with a variety of different patterns within the common fabric.

[9] "The Impending Crisis of the Deep South," *Harper's* (April 1965), 147.

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Finally, in treating of this great subculture, one must not forget the large number of Southerners living outside the South who still reflect the Southern state of mind. These people would include a large number of former Okies, dispossessed white dirt farmers who during the 1930's emigrated from the South, primarily westward, and hill people who have recently migrated to the eastern and Midwestern cities; a lesser though still considerable number of educated Southerners from farms and small towns who have traditionally sought to make their way in the great North; the substantial number of Negroes who continue the migrations begun in the thirties, swelling the population of such cities as Chicago, Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Newark, and New York; and the thin body of intellectual émigrés who, as a professor at Yale once put it, would say "I represent the South here in the same way I would if I were a member of the Senate in Washington."

It is probably true that the immigrants from the North to the South will remain in the first generation Northern, preferring potatoes to rice, and Yankee bean soup to gumbo, just as the first generation of Southerners will gather in Northern cities in the apartments of fellow Southerners to indulge in the kind of Shintoistic conversation they so adore. It is unlikely, however, that these cross-migrations will as such make many changes in depth in the character of either the North or the South. In either case, children and grandchildren of the immigrant will surely pick up the underlying though constantly changing attitudes of the section in which they are reared.

For Professor Hero there can be no representative stereotype of the Southerner since the Southern viewpoint is derived from many patterns. Geographically, the agglomerate Southern culture developed in the plantation counties, the mountain counties, and the Piedmont, with each imparting its own special flavor to the South. To these sources must be added the obvious differentiating variables of social and occupational status, wealth, and education. Professor Hero attempts to take into account many of these factors by describing five pseudonymous counties—Plantation County, Delta County, Bayou Parish, Hill County, Mountain County—and five cities, three of which are given pseudonyms—Kent (perhaps Edgefield, South Carolina), New Southtown, Antebellum Town, Charleston, and New Orleans. Taken together these places form an intriguing continuum, ranging from a county having no industry, no middle class, and a traditional landed aristocracy to a county representative of the New South, with heavy industry, a middle class, and large urban elements.

Professor Hero presents his materials on three levels. First, from an

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analysis of survey findings, generalized conclusions are made as to the Southerner's interest in and attitude toward specific international problems. Second, the reasons for these answers are deduced from a perceptive examination of the psychological, historical, social, and economic values that have had the greatest impact on Southern attitudes. In addition, the author presents both a prognosis and suggestions for specific therapy to stimulate Southern involvement in world problems.

Professor Lerche's method is simpler and equally persuasive. He worked solely with the 1953-1961 voting records of 126 congressmen from fourteen states. The votes were on fourteen issues clustering around foreign affairs, including such specific bills as Wheat for Pakistan (1953) and the Peace Corps Act (1961).

In addition to this analysis Professor Lerche describes the congressional districts in terms of their constituents, and finds generally a higher degree of multilateral interest in booming urban centers than in the rural districts. Although the overall voting pattern of the South tends toward unilateralism, he finds a spectrum extending toward multilateralism; and he describes a number of considerations such as birth rate, education, economic development, and urban growth as factors influencing the relative position of a particular district on the scale.

The findings of both authors persuade me to accept as a fact that the South was unilaterally minded during the decade of the 1950's, but it does not follow that the South will be similarly minded in the next few decades. The South was multilaterally minded during the administrations of Wilson and Roosevelt and may well return to this view in the future. What is of lasting interest about these studies is that they demonstrate so well that the South will not follow the lead of the dominant North merely because a particular program is put in terms of the general welfare. For acceptance, the issue of the moment must find support in the consciously felt needs and aspirations of the Southern subculture.

III

If we can accept the position that it is possible to generalize meaningfully about a subculture called the South, and further, if we recognize that this subculture acts from time to time against national trends, we come to the question of what to do about it. I submit that those who would seek to change or to influence Southern behavior patterns must comprehend several important situations that exist in the South so that at least they will realize what they are up against. For example, any

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discussion about the South, whether in regard to its relationship to the rest of the nation or its relationship to the rest of the world, must first proceed from a consideration of the relationship of Southern whites to Southern Negroes. The characterizations of the "old South," the "poor-white South," the "tragic South," the "decadent South"—or whatever phrase one wishes to use—all spring from the long-term conditioning that the "North" (used here as the rest of the nation) and the rest of the world have received regarding the ignorant, stubborn, and finally wicked way that the Southern whites, as a group, have treated their fellow citizens, the Southern Negroes. Wise Southerners of both races, and there are many of them, realize that it is too late to argue or to demonstrate in useful terms that large measures of affection have always bound many individual whites and blacks, or to point out that riots in Watts, California, are as troublesome to person and property as riots at the University of Mississippi, or that the hasty shooting of a New York Negro by a callous policeman can be as brutal as the lynching of Negro and white civil-rights workers. It is increasingly being recognized that the official position of the Southern establishment, reflected in its laws, its customs, and its institutions, must accommodate Southern Negroes without respect to their race. Until this is done in fact, and is recognized by non-Southerners as having been done, the North and the rest of the world will not be able to recognize in depth, let alone accept, the many underlying values that the South possesses, values that can be of importance in the solution of world problems.

It is not the purpose of this article to predict the rate of speed at which the Southern establishment will make this accommodation. If the rate is slow, the South will be a negative influence on world affairs, along with, at worst, South Africa. If the pace is rapid, as I believe it will be, then race problems will remain of an individual character, but the South will be no worse off in this regard than, say, the North, England, or France. In fact, the South could be far better off, for it could then provide the clearest example that an industrial modern state can function harmoniously with large numbers of persons of two races interacting. An encouraging example of multiracial harmony and intimacy is often said to be Brazil, which like an older South is emerging from a predominantly agricultural society into one with large industrial potential.

To my mind the most remarkable feature of both the books under review is the conclusion of both researchers that as far as the question of foreign aid is concerned, there exists no noticeable difference in attitude between Southern whites and Southern Negroes. Although neither

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

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book goes into the attitudes of whites and Negroes on matters other than those concerning foreign aid, there is to my mind the strong possibility that the Southern Negroes, if completely integrated, will think very much as do their white counterparts in the socioeconomic scheme of things—that is to say, the Negroes will remain Southern in their deepest feelings and commitments.

IV

If the thesis is right that Southern attitudes will be identifiable, regardless of the existence or nonexistence of racial problems, then persons who seek to change Southern attitudes will have to work in large part through the Southern power establishment, and this elite has always differed from that of the rest of the nation. In the first place, the Southern establishment used to be almost entirely within the Democratic party, a situation now rapidly changing. There are, however, presently three discernible groups that compete and interact: (1) the old landed gentry, (2) the rural Populists, and (3) the new bourgeoisie. There is also a small fourth group that is beginning to make itself felt: the emerging intellectuals.

THE OLD LANDED GENTRY

Everyone by now knows that few, if any, of the aristocrats of England or France came to this country as early settlers, but that among the immigrants were a number of successful colonists who quickly forgot their own origins while remembering what an aristocracy looked like, lived in, and behaved like. Thus a sort of native aristocracy emerged in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, in the coastal regions, which set a tone that still continues to influence all classes of Southern society. Much is made, for example, of the fact that Senator Byrd represented a family prominent in seventeenth-century Virginia, and many people find it heartwarming that the Senator's son was appointed to take his father's place in Washington to represent the Old Dominion. Of perhaps lesser moment was the delight manifest in Charleston, South Carolina, when a few years ago a young Ravenel, a descendant of a seventeenth-century Huguenot family, was a successful quarterback on the Harvard football team. One of the great chieftains of Southern political power is Senator Russell of Georgia, who is thought of as an aristocrat as Southerners use the term.

This class has remarkable capacity to hang on. Today, however, taking the power structure as a whole and putting aside certain able

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

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



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

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men such as Senator Russell, this group does not enjoy the great power it held prior to the Populist revolt at the turn of the century. It would be hard to feature a John Sharp Williams in the present Senate. Williams from Mississippi was a devoted Wilsonian; we might now call him a multilateralist. He resigned in opposition to post–World War I policies with these words: "I'd rather be a hound dog and bay at the moon from my Mississippi plantation than to sit in the Senate."[10] Williams, who had a good nineteenth-century education culminating in two years at Heidelberg, represented the Bourbon leadership that was internationally minded. At the same time this group did little or nothing for the improvement of the Negro, though it did at least eschew violence and cruelty. It reinforced and set forth class distinctions that continue to exist.

THE RURAL POPULISTS

From 1890 onward the poor whites, or, as Faulkner rather drearily depicted them, the Snopeses, began to come into power, led by remarkably able men such as "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman of South Carolina and Thomas E. Watson of Georgia. Tillman was the son of a slaveholder whose American ancestry predated the Revolution. He might easily have identified himself with the Bourbons represented by Senator Wade Hampton, a citizen-soldier in the Civil War, who after the death of Jeb Stuart became head of Lee's cavalry. Instead, Tillman, buttressed by yeomen and artisan support, succeeded through an appeal to poor whites in unseating Hampton to become the major political figure of South Carolina. Watson was an intellectual who wrote poetry, a history of France, and various other books, and who came from the upper, though impoverished, class in Georgia. He too led a revolt of the less fortunate whites. Both of these men introduced social and economic reforms that represented a kind of indigenous Southern socialism. Educational opportunities were broadened and public works grew apace; Tillman even turned the liquor business into a state monopoly. However, along with a laudable and genuine surge of popular democracy, this movement showed a great weakness, that of racism. Little or nothing was done for the Negro. Indeed, white supremacy became the watchword.

This Populist movement still continues in the South and still controls the truly rural areas. Its followers are people who went along wholeheartedly with such experiments as the Tennessee Valley Authority,

[10] *Dictionary of American Biography*, XX (New York 1936), 278.

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who supported the New Deal and the Fair Deal, and who would not object to domestic programs along the lines of the New Frontier. Their economic lot has considerably improved and they have lost their hostility, which was really only skin-deep, toward the upper classes. In fact, they frequently think of themselves as having sprung from the landed gentry. Even though these Populists remain strong in agricultural areas they are gradually losing their power in their states. For a number of decades they controlled the state legislatures. They have recently been losing this control to the rising bourgeoisie, and they will increasingly become a minority, but a vociferous voice, as the one man–one vote principle of *Baker* v. *Carr* becomes felt.[11]

THE NEW BOURGEOISIE

Again, if one could suspend from the mind the haunting specter of the Negro question, one would see that the South is now comparatively rich, a situation dating from World War II. It is rapidly emerging as an important industrial region with capital of its own and with fast-growing cities. The major power elite in the South today comes from the dominant class of city dwellers, businessmen, and industrialists. Although most of the leaders of this group come from the old Populist movement, they tend to imitate the style of the Bourbons and to lose the older feeling of white egalitarianism. They now intermarry with the Bourbons, a development suggestive of the older French tradition. For business reasons at least they are abandoning their rabid public racism. They carry on their social life among themselves in spacious houses, country clubs, and, the pride of them all, country places or ranches. It can be argued that this bourgeoisie can be approached by persons wishing to influence Southern values, as the dominant bourgeoisie in the North is approached; and similarities among all American bourgeois groups can obviously not be overlooked. This Southern group, however, has never lost its attachment to the country, to the land; and appeals to Washington and Lee count much more with it than do appeals to Lincoln and Jackson.

THE EMERGING INTELLECTUAL

Although the Southern intellectual has frequently shared common educational experiences with his Northern counterpart, the roles the two groups play are quite different. Southerners, as do other people, admire intelligence. They admire shrewdness, and they have produced some first-rate minds—but they do not admire intellectualism. They

[11] 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

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do not particularly like to see the teacher, journalist, or preacher, as such, in high public positions. The role then of the Southern intellectual is somewhat less direct than is the role of a university professor in the North. University boards in the South seek to prohibit Southern professors from running for office. The place of the professor is thought to be on the campus influencing students who will eventually join the power elite. Many courageous intellectuals in universities such as the University of Mississippi and the University of Georgia have stood fast against segregation. They also have firmly taken a cooperative position regarding world affairs, but they have expressed this position through personal influence. It is very likely that changes in Southern thought will be brought about more securely by this group than by outside intellectuals who attempt to face the Southern population directly. Thus, Southern intellectuals should not be harassed by their Northern counterparts to join causes or to develop systematic doctrinal positions. The Southern professor must be encouraged to help in the shaping of national values in terms of Southern rhetoric and style.

In addition to understanding the political elite in the South, persons seeking to influence Southern behavior should realize that one of the major forces forming the South as a subculture is formal religion. A trained, disinterested observer could in any society doubtless find a religion, or a religious equivalent such as communism or libertarianism, which provides a theoretical and emotional cohesiveness for any group; but the religious tradition, still very much alive, of the South is the Christian religion combined (in both its traditional and its fundamentalist manifestations) with an emphasis on the next world.

Southern Christianity is almost entirely Protestant, divided into the major denominations, which are led numerically in both white and Negro groups by the Baptists, followed by the Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, the Churches of Christ and their parent body, the Christian Church or Disciples of Christ (sometimes mistakenly linked under the head of Campbellites),[12] Lutherans, and a variety of Holiness and Pentecostal sects. Despite their large number, these different denominations are very similar in basic approach to Christian doctrine: they are anti-Catholic and fundamentalist. There are, however, some class differences. The Baptists and Methodists were the great frontier churches with a large number of uneducated clergy who had a desire to win,

[12] It is rather odd that commentators on the South give so little treatment to these two churches. Of interest is the fact that President Johnson is a member of the Disciples of Christ, as was Lloyd George, who also led a war on poverty in 1911. See *Dictionary of National Biography, 1941-1950,* 515, 518.

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and did win, a large number of souls. These churches now include people of all social classes. The Presbyterian and Episcopal churches both tend to be upper-middle- and upper-class churches. On the whole, the Episcopal church in the South has been low-church, Protestant rather than Anglo-Catholic, despite some recent moves in the latter direction by the high-church diocese of South Florida. Among all these denominations, though, there is hardly any doctrinal distinction as understood by the average member.

In stressing the formal side of Southern religion, I do not mean to suggest a want of genuine spiritual conviction, which obviously always depends on the individual member. I do mean, however, to emphasize the pervasive influence of religion in the subculture: the vast church-building program going on; the fact that social problems such as the integration of the Negro are subjects of debate and concern inside the church; the civic clubs that resemble a collection of men's Bible classes, only meeting on weekdays for temporal matters.

Although in the best of the Protestant tradition, Southerners can fight with the clergy when told by them too precisely what to do, the Southerner is more apt than not to be hostile to social programs, such as foreign aid or socialized medicine, which cannot and are not justified by preaching and scripture. Moreover, the prevalence in the South of a legalistic approach to scripture cannot be overstated. This attitude found its worst expression in the earlier anti-Darwinian pose of the South, culminating in the Scopes trial at Dayton, Tennessee. The same approach has its bright side as illustrated by the fundamentalist approach to the Constitution by Justice Hugo Black and by the large number of Southerners who accepted the 1954 school-integration decisions because they were the law. There is also a paradox in the Southern Protestant religion: On the one hand, the vast majority of Southerners, black and white, expect Christian ritual at public occasions, e.g., public prayer, respect for the Christian calendar, allusions by orators to the Bible. They also expect that within the school systems mild acknowledgments will be made to the Christian religion, e.g., Christmas carol singing, stories of the religious foundation of Thanksgiving. On the other hand, the Southerner, here led by the Baptists, is vigorously opposed to governmental aid to church schools, fearing intrusion into church affairs. This, upon analysis, may mean that Southerners, having fought established churches during the colonial period, do not want any one Protestant group to gain too much power and certainly means

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that they do not want foreign religions or nonreligious systems imposed on the South.

This still leaves the position of the Catholics and the Jews, with the Catholic question being the more complicated. Certainly prior to World War II the relationship between Protestants and Jews tended to be an extremely good one. There were not many Jews in any one community. These divided into the older merchant and professional families, who were of German origin, and the Polish and Russian families of small traders who moved up the ladder rather rapidly through the universities. The Jews and Protestants were both aware that the Jews had supplied their share of leaders, headed by Judah P. Benjamin, the brilliant statesman of the Confederacy. Bernard Baruch's father was a Confederate surgeon. Some distinctions are drawn, but these are based more or less sincerely on religious differences. Thus Jews are not usually invited to join the Christian, i.e., regular, college fraternities. Instead they usually form two Jewish fraternities, the so-called better one ranking with the top Christian fraternity in prestige, and the other for the men not yet completely "in." There were and are some tensions. From time to time the Ku Klux Klan has made anti-Semitic as well as anti-Catholic noises; and with the arrival of large numbers of Jewish refugees at such places as Miami Beach, overtones of anti-Semitism have appeared, augmented by the fact that the newly arrived Jew has not accepted the inequality of the Negro with the equanimity of the longer-established Jew. Certainly the traditional position of the South is not anti-Semitic. As Harry Golden of Charlotte put it, Jews and Presbyterians are very much alike.

The traditional anti-Catholicism tends to be subsiding. This improvement is caused by several factors. In the face of the threat of communism and foreign non-Christian ideologies, the Protestants are finding fewer theological points to take up seriously against the Catholics; and although Southerners are not especially ecumenically minded, that movement has reached their consciousness. The large number of young people who have traveled since the Depression, either as soldiers or as tourists, have found much that appeals to them in German, French, and Italian Catholicism. Southern anti-Catholicism is showing itself to be little more than skin-deep. Moreover, it is easy to forget that Al Smith carried a good portion of the Protestant Bible Belt as did Kennedy. Southerners, always admiring an upper class, have known all along that Southern Catholics have always had some families at the top. In *Gone With The Wind*, the O'Hara family was Catholic. A number of Protestant intellectuals, who might tend toward agnosticism,

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respect the attitude of the Catholic Church, in such Catholic strongholds as New Orleans, toward the Negro.

Whether one likes or dislikes the religious situation in the South, it should be obvious that foreign aid and other international programs will have to be placed in an acceptable Christian rhetoric if the South is to go along. Wilson understood this. And Mr. Samuel Lubell quotes a Southern airport attendant, "When Johnson quotes the Bible I know he's like the people I was raised with."[13]

V

It is a part of the American dream or myth, not shared entirely by the South, that progress will come steadily and surely as educational opportunity advances. In keeping with this thought, critics of the South can point to the fact that certainly quantitatively, and perhaps qualitatively, the educational apparatus of the South has since the early 1800's lagged far behind that of the rest of the nation.

Although Southerners spend relatively less money on education than do Northerners, the influence of the schools and universities is still of prime importance in forming the attitudes of the Southern leadership corps. There are in the South three types of colleges and universities. Each has special characteristics.[14]

THE SMALL CHURCH-AFFILIATED OR PRIVATE NONDENOMINATIONAL COLLEGE

There are scores of small church-affiliated and private nondenominational colleges that hold more or less to the liberal arts tradition. These colleges do not have the facilities to carry on fundamental research. At their best, they turn out highly literate graduates, many of whom proceed to graduate schools, both North and South, for further study. A good example of this type of school is Davidson College in North Carolina, which has a thousand students, a strong Presbyterian bent, and a proud and affluent body of alumni. At the moment the leading Davidson alumnus is Secretary Rusk. The college considers itself rightly as one of the three or four finest colleges in the South and to most Southerners this is an adequate aspiration. The graduates go into industry, usually on the managerial rather than the proprietary level, into

[13] *White and Black: Test of a Nation* (New York 1954), 154.

[14] For the argument that there are at least six Southern universities—Texas, Tulane, Vanderbilt, Duke, North Carolina, and Virginia—that can rank with the best in the North, see Virginius Dabney, "The Good Southern Universities," *Harper's* (March 1965), 86.

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insurance, and, after further study, into the professions. Davidson has recently developed a first-class basketball team whose appearances at Madison Square Garden bring out the New York alumni, who immediately revert to the Southern patterns of vociferous, chauvinistic demonstrations. On a more serious side, Davidson is firmly committed to world affairs but is somewhat inclined to see them from a Presbyterian-missionary point of view. Moreover, Davidson has taken the lead over most other private colleges and universities in integrating Negro students. This integration tends to be of the token sort, not necessarily the fault of Davidson. There are not many Negro Southern Presbyterians, and the Negroes interested in applying are likely to be Africans who have come under Presbyterian influence. Southern Negroes might as readily apply to a Northern university, such as Harvard, and might, without necessarily casting aspersions on Davidson, prefer a non-Southern sojourn.

Along with Davidson are many other small colleges following the same model, including several essentially Negro colleges, such as Morehouse, now in the process of integrating white students and offering in Atlanta facilities for the new Negro elite. Although these colleges have obtained a considerable amount of help from philanthropists and alumni, they need much more money to shore up their scientific facilities, to attract a more cosmopolitan student body, and to employ many more first-class scholars, particularly in the behavioral sciences.

THE LARGE PRIVATE UNIVERSITY

The institutions of higher learning best understood by the North are the comparatively new private universities, such as Vanderbilt, Duke, and Emory, which are new in the sense that through large private endowments they have developed from small church colleges (Methodist in the case of the three mentioned). A university of this type will sometimes refer to itself as "the Princeton of the South" or as a member of the "Southern Ivy League."

Until quite recently most of the financial resources of these universities went to medical schools and to the support of technological departments. Within these areas the universities have accomplished a good deal, but they have fallen short of their Northern brothers in basic research, and they have tended to be conservative and traditional in the humanities and social sciences. If the philanthropists who made these schools possible had earmarked their funds for investigations into the psychological and sociological aspects of life, as distinct from the

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purely physical, it is quite probable that these universities would have made an even more remarkable contribution.

These colleges seem to like to employ Northerners in the upper ranks of the administration and as academic deans and department heads. The South, like other emerging subcultures, understands the importance of Yankee know-how, efficiency, and insistence on rigorous academic standards. Unfortunately these Northern norms are not always applied to Southern values, and these universities in a search for national rank overlook their most important mission, that of being academic leaders of the region.

THE STATE UNIVERSITY

The most important intellectual aspect of the South, and the one least understood, is the state university. Traditionally it has offered the student body a unique combination of both aristocratic and free-thinking values. By "aristocratic" I mean that the sons of older families of Virginia will usually go to the University of Virginia; the political and agricultural elite of Georgia will go to the University of Georgia. The campus of the University of Mississippi presents a collection of Southern mansions. Although most of the students, of course, come from yeoman and commercial stock, and the oldtime agricultural aristocrats find it increasingly difficult to compete with the sons of the rising bourgeoisie, the tone of the state universities is aristocratic or, as the Southerners used to say, "aristocratical."[15]

The agnostic, free-thinking tradition goes back, in the case of the University of Virginia, to Thomas Jefferson's notion of the free European university, although, somewhat later, Dr. Cooper was dismissed as President of the University of South Carolina for being either an atheist or a deist.[16] A European visiting American universities would find himself very much at home in Athens, Georgia, or Oxford, Mississippi, were it not for the racial problem, which is fortunately now being favorably resolved.

There are other special characteristics. The state universities compare with Northern universities in curriculum as the English universities in the nineteenth century compared with the German. That is to say, they lag on the scientific side. Their aim, not always achieved, is to

[15] Rollin G. Osterweis, *Romanticism and Nationalism in the Old South* (New Haven 1949), 46-47. This author points out that Southerners once put great stress on three words borrowed from Sir Walter Scott: chivalrous, Southron, and aristocratical.

[16] James McBride Dabbs, *Who Speaks for the South* (New York 1964), 91.

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develop the whole man. They prefer the intelligent man to the intellectual man. There is great emphasis on sports, and the most benighted backwoodsman in Georgia will identify himself with the plight of the university football team.

Moreover, these universities accept and tolerate large numbers of students who do mediocre or less-than-passable work, who remain a year or so and then return home, but who feel nonetheless part of the university. For those who wish to learn, however, there are departments that have always been demanding. The Latin and Greek program at the University of North Carolina is as difficult as one will find anywhere. The fact that the state university (and I include here the newer universities that used to be mechanical and agricultural schools) embraces so many strains in the South and is of such importance to the honor of the South explains the unfortunate episodes at the universities of Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia as integration came about. It was a question of the inner temple. Still it would be as fair to say that forty percent or more of the students were markedly advanced in the sense of desiring integration as to say that another large group was obviously against it. Senator Kennedy's courageous and shrewd visit to the University of Mississippi, where he was warmly received, shows an awareness of the deep importance of this phase of the sub-culture.

The foregoing discussion is meant to be only suggestive of a few special characteristics that identify the subculture, the South. Others come to mind: the cuisine differs; the role of the woman is thought of in somewhat different forms; accent betrays a Southerner's origin as does his tenacious clinging to elaborate forms of address—and there is the recurring evidence of underlying violence that emerges when formal speech barriers give way. Nor can one overlook the great Southern achievement in letters accomplished by T. S. Stribling, William Faulkner, Erskine Caldwell, Eudora Welty, Tennessee Williams, the *Fugitive* poets, Peter Taylor, Katherine Anne Porter, Flannery O'Connor, Truman Capote, Randall Jarrell, Edgar Bowers, James Dickey, and Donald Justice. There is every reason to believe that the South wishes to remain Southern, different, however variously the difference may appear at any particular moment in time. As Odum put it: "And never America in general shall diminish one whit the specific part which the South shall play in its own epic; nor the concrete task of the South diminish the nation's part in the new Southern epoch."[17]

[17] *An American Epoch*, 321.

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VI

What does all this lead to? As Professor Hero asks in his last chapter, "Where to from here?" It seems to me that those of us who recognize the South as a subculture must in our own thinking decide whether we want it to remain a subculture or to lose its identity and become merged in the rest of the nation. To put it differently, when concrete issues arise—such as the attitude toward foreign affairs with which the two books here reviewed deal—we must either favor a presumption that the subculture must have its way or else favor the presumption that, since the subculture is in conflict with the national tenor, the subculture must give in.

Although I favor a presumption that would encourage variety and therefore the subculture, there is a highly rational and a somewhat attractive argument that we should work toward eliminating the Southern subculture altogether and attempt to accelerate the pace of completely integrating the South once and for all into the dominant North, though realizing that this will take time. Deep in Northern consciousness is the hope, as expressed in the Preamble to the Constitution, for a more perfect union. Scarcely anyone in the South wishes to question the verdict of the Civil War that rendered the nation indivisible. The argument follows that since there is no genuine separatist movement in the South, why should not the Southerners be prodded into joining the main currents of American thought, especially when some Southern attitudes hinder and embarrass national programs. If one chooses to work for uniformity then one should urge the great private philanthropic foundations to grant funds to eradicate, albeit gradually, differences between Northern and Southern secondary and higher educational patterns. The federal government should be urged to employ more widely its fiscal powers and its powers over interstate commerce to thwart differences—doctrinal, legal, and customary—that exist between North and South, in much the same way as the federal government is successfully eradicating racial differences throughout the nation and as in the past it eradicated tariff barriers.

The other point of view would encourage subcultural differences, provided (and this is an important qualification) they do not involve what may be described as crisis issues. A crisis issue in this argument would be defined as one going to the safety of the country or to its fundamental integrity. That the South would attempt alone to manipulate nuclear weapons is an absurd thought to contemplate, but if it should attempt to do so, it would create a crisis situation that the country at large would have to put down. Reactionary racial points of

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view must similarly be stamped out. Now, doubtless, Professors Hero and Lerche, when they were writing their books, felt that the unilateral attitudes of the South in foreign affairs were so bad as to constitute what I am describing as a crisis situation. In this I disagree with these scholars. There is much evidence in their own books indicating that the attitudes of the South they describe, though disagreeable ones, are not expressive of permanent conviction; that they have something to do with the resentment toward the manner in which foreign programs have been put forward, as well as toward the persons espousing these programs. It must be noted, however, that the nation is now being led by a Southerner; a Southerner continues as Secretary of State; and the military and foreign programs of the United States apparently have the support of a large majority in both the North and the South. At the same time, the national spokesman for the opposition to the military and foreign policies of the administration is also a Southerner, Senator Fulbright. Perhaps this means that the entire nation is becoming more unilaterally minded. In any event, the South is not in a peculiarly minority position. I am trying to say merely that the particular issues ferreted out for study by Professors Hero and Lerche do not now tellingly divide the nation into regions as they did during the Eisenhower and Kennedy periods. This does not detract from the permanent value of the two books. For if the issues studied in the books have lost their immediate pertinency, other issues will arise in which similar stubborn subcultural patterns can be observed.

Not only do I prefer variety to uniformity, but I suggest that a healthy subculture within America could in the long run greatly enhance the prestige of this country and, as a consequence, its usefulness to the many existing subcultures of other countries, as well as to many independent states. No one can seriously question that despite the need on the part of many emerging nations and subcultures for American money, and skill, and protection, there is wide resentment toward the United States for its presumed attempts to force other peoples to surrender their identity or at least to qualify it within a hegemony led by the United States, which does not on its part seem to wish in turn to subordinate itself. France, Egypt, Cuba, the Dominican Republic are among the most obvious examples. If, on the other hand, within the United States the North could display to the world its own tolerance and understanding of the Southern subculture, then people belonging to other subcultures might feel less tense and might begin to realize that the South, an integral part of America, can share with them certain common experiences.

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1. Among these experiences is defeat. No one in the United States wants to see this nation defeated, but it is historically true that the South once knew this bitter condition. Most other nations and certainly most subcultures have shared this experience.

2. The South has only recently emerged from an agricultural society. Of course the Midwest, a part of the North, and many areas of the Far West still have robustly agricultural elements, but these have played supporting roles in an industrial complex. The memory of the farm is still very strong in the South, which understands the waning agricultural tradition and the need for more industry in a way that might make the South a guide for the other emerging subcultures.

3. The South knows the problem of caste. Although I see no evidence in the South that a class-conscious society will wither away in the foreseeable future, it is true that the South is outgrowing its notion of caste as distinct from class. The North of course also has class distinctions, but has not had to overcome the problem of caste and may well be less sensitive to the problems of countries long caste-ridden who are attempting to lose this burden.

4. The South understands the problem of theocracy. The South, because of the continuing importance of the churches in all phases of Southern life, is perhaps more than the North in a position to understand how theological differences may be deeply felt in the twentieth century.

5. The South is both old and new. To most non-Americans, the United States is thought of as a young country. To them, 350 years is not a long time, and the virility of America reminds them of adolescence. But the South is both young and old; it is steeped in memory; it has a fondness and respect for bygone times; and it can feel with those who seek to maintain an honorable tradition while making their way in a strange new world.[18]

However the future unfolds for the South, the two books here reviewed will have done much good by probing the South in an intellectual rather than a sentimental manner. It would be nice to think that these books would also be of value to intellectuals in many subcultures, who might find themselves able to say with the South, ". . . sometimes arm in arm, but never, thank God, in step."[19]

[18] Amerika, du hast es besser
Als unser Kontinent, das alte,
Hast keine verfallene Schlösser
Und keine Basalte.—*Goethe, "Amerika"*

[19] W. H. Auden, "In Praise of Limestone," *Nones* (New York 1951), 13-16.

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Peter Kunstadter, formerly a Research Associate at Princeton University's Center of International Studies, is a Research Associate in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Washington.

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